DESIGNING OUTCOME-BASED PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS THROUGH SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODELLING TO FRAME CORRUPTION BEHAVIOUR IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT by Marinkovic, M.
  
 
 
                      
   Ph.D. Program in Model based Public Planning, Policy Design and Management 
D.E.M.S. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
DESIGNING OUTCOME-BASED PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS THROUGH SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODELLING TO 
FRAME CORRUPTION BEHAVIOUR IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
 
A CASE BASED PERSPECTIVE ON SERBIAN PUBLIC SERVICE PROVIDER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IL DOTTORE      IL COORDINATORE 
               MILICA MARINKOVIĆ                             CARMINE BIANCHI 
 
 
 
IL TUTOR   
                FEDERICO COSENZ  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CICLO XXVI 
ANNO CONSEGUIMENTO TITOLO 2012-2015 
ii 
 
  
ABSTRACT  
 
Corruption is one of the most significant problems facing Serbia. While there are some signs 
that corruption may have become less rampant in recent years, available evidence suggests that 
corruption levels are still high while trust in key institutions is low (European Commission, 2014). 
This phenomenon is ubiquitous and has serious consequences on a country’s public welfare. 
Numerous conducted studies have mainly focused on specific characteristics such as economic issues, 
legal issues, social propositions, impact on national development, and about economic policy. The 
rationale of this research is to concentrate on a specific Anti-Hail Public Service provider in Serbia 
by not only exploring the outcome of the public provider’s procurement practice, but also outputs of 
such actions on the territory level. Therefore, the aim is to build a model of corruption based on 
Dynamic Performance Management approach in order to extend our understanding of corruption and 
grounds behind, as well as to provide an input to future policy-making on corruption issues. 
This is achieved by the use of computer simulation modelling to explore how the results of 
public procurement in a specific Public Service provider results both in short and long term. In other 
words, how to apply Dynamic Performance Management system to reduce the effects of corruption 
on Public Service organisation performance - on the one side, and Public Welfare - on the other side. 
Systems Dynamics model of corruption developed in this study would be of use to policy makers and 
non-governmental organisations in understanding the complex nature of corruption. This modelling 
methodology is used in perspective of Dynamic Performance Management approach, which gives an 
opportunity for decision makers to clearly distinguish how performance drivers can be used to reflect 
the effects on the End Results and Strategic Resources of this public service provider.  
With this study, I expect to interpret better interrelated main forces that regulate corruption 
and to design sustainable policies on strategies to limit the negative effects of corruption in Public 
Service provider. Furthermore, this paper provides a case-study analysis that can be a basis for further 
examination of Public Service provider’s performance using dynamic modelling. Future research 
should focus on the empirical examination of this study to redefine its applicability, and should give 
to the policymakers and managers a better position to understand the system and achieve the desired 
results. 
 
Keywords: Corruption, Public Procurement, Developing Countries, Serbia, Perception, Simulation, 
Dynamic Performance Management, System Dynamics, Thematic Analysis, Case Study  
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I CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“Every dollar that a corrupt official or a corrupt business person puts in their pocket is a 
dollar stolen from a pregnant woman who needs health care; or from a girl or a boy who 
deserves an education; or from communities that need water, roads, and schools. Every 
dollar is critical if we are to reach our goals to end extreme poverty by 2030 and to boost 
shared prosperity.” 
World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim, Washington, December 19, 2013 
 
 
This thesis is the result of my doctoral research within my study of Corruption applied to 
Public Service Organization for Anti-hail protection, located in Belgrade, Serbia. The purpose of this 
work is to create a System Dynamics model that can help understanding of the influence of Public 
procurement on the efficiency of a Public Company and its performance. Therefore, the goal is to 
develop a useful tool for measuring and evaluating performance in a Public Service Organisation.  
To reach this objective and accurately analyse the behaviour of the organisation’s indicators, 
analysis of the two elements of the Dynamic Performance Management system approach was 
conducted. Namely, namely (1) output perspective, based on the direct results of the company’s 
business and, and (2) outcome perspective, based on the indirect effect on the wider audience, all 
stakeholders. During the research, performance indicators and their causal relations were 
investigated. The objective is to provide better understanding of the causes and effects related to 
adopted policies, undertaken actions, and targeted results in the public sector, which includes the 
main performance drivers related to financial, organisational and social results. 
This chapter sets up the study overall. The subject area of corruption is introduced and 
positioned in a historical background. This case study research used mixed methods, and the different 
knowledge areas within which the research has been placed are briefly described. The presentation is 
followed by an explanation of the research objectives guiding this study, and how these translate into 
focused research questions. Short summaries of the individual chapters of the thesis are 
communicated afterward.  
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1.1 Background 
 
There are many scientific works available for the topic of the need for profounder corruption 
studying (Leff 1964, Friedrich 1972, Mauro 1995, Treisman 2000). These studies have primarily 
concentrating on legal issues, economic issues, and the influence on general growth. Academic 
analyses of corruption have given emphasis to game theory, econometric modelling, and similar 
mathematical methodologies. Nevertheless, presently a significant number of reports, books, and 
articles are published on a regular basis. This change partially can be explained as increased public 
concern for the issue. Additionally, it reveals changes in the methodical methods and techniques and 
together with first-hand data accessibility that has made corruption a researchable subject. As a result, 
it has also made it possible to perform an “elaboration on corruption studies” since various exciting 
hand-outs and insights are obtainable. Corruption is widespread and has serious effects in developing 
countries. Research on corruption is a crucial part of understanding the dynamics of corruption so 
that anti-corruption policies might be successfully implemented. In this study, I aim not to examine 
a global level of corruption in Serbia, but to achieve a more practical understanding of what corruption 
might mean in a long run, based on a case-study approach on specific Public Service provider using 
Dynamics Performance Management system.  
Performance Management systems have become more significant in recent years since 
“managers, be they in the public or private sector, are under constant pressure to improve the 
performance of their organizations” (Holloway, Francis & Hinton, 1999: 351). There are many 
scientific works available for the topic of the need for performance management systems to the public 
organizations. On the other hand, growth in the use of performance management analysis in the public 
companies is also evident (Radnor & McGuire, 2004). 
A widely used approach to Planning & Control (P&C) in Public organizations regards the 
usage of spreadsheet models and accounting packages. Although using excel sheets based on BS and 
PL can provide some simulation modelling to support decision makers in their business growth 
planning there are other approaches that are more reliable. Nowadays, the lack of P&C systems is an 
important internal complexity factor in firms, leading to a much-bounded set of relevant information 
for decision-making, processes which are often mainly based on accounting reports, balance sheets 
and “flair for business” (Bianchi, 2002).  On the other side, using SD allows applying in details non-
linearity, delays, feedback loops, and soft variables (for instance company image, perceived 
corruption level or skills of employees), therefore making it suitable combination with standard 
performance methods.  
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In order to give suggestions for improvement of company’s performance, and foster strategic 
learning I will try to make evident how a DRBV supports an analysis of Public Procurement concern. 
I will provide an analysis of the procurement dynamics to show the differences in the insights with 
diverse policies. In so doing, the field of the potential use of tailored performance management 
systems in other environments, particularly in this case Public company will be extended by using 
SD modelling. 
 
1.2 Motivation 
 
Transparency International’s 2013 Global Corruption Barometer (GCB)1 provides 
information that Serbian citizens rated a number of key institutions around 4 out of 5 on a scale where 
1 means ‘not at all corrupt’ and 5 ‘extremely corrupt’; the worst rated were political parties and 
healthcare, followed closely by parliament, the business sector, police and the judiciary. According 
to the available research and reports by international organisations, corruption remains a solemn 
problem in Serbia. In 2014, Serbia reached a score of 41 out of 100 in the Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)2 yet, while in a different study carried out annually by Freedom 
House, it is similarly stressed out that “corruption has decreased overall from the excesses of the 
Milosevic era,”3 and the CPI itself suggests some improvement. It should be mentioned that 
comparisons of the CPI among different years are challenging due to the index’s changing 
methodology. 
The model introduced in this work has been developed using the SD methodology “as it is 
well suited to dynamic environments in which human behaviour interacts with the physics of an 
operation, and in which there are multiple feedbacks connecting employees, managers, customers, 
and other actors” (Oliva & Sterman, 2009). To be more concrete, I used DRBV to create the SD 
model on the real case study. SD model focuses on investigating Anti-Hail Public Service 
organization internal procurement processes and their influence on the company’s success (through 
key performance indicator).  
                                                          
1 See http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=serbia 
2 See Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/in_detail. 
The CPI - presumably the most known corruption index – is based on an average of a range of analysis and studies 
performed by other organisations; on TI’s scale, country/territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector 
corruption on a scale of 0-100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and a 100 means that a country 
is perceived as very clean 
3 See https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2014/serbia#.VWYGEc_tmko 
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The author thinks SD is a prominent instrument to display causal relationships underlying 
business results, could be exceedingly useful and valuable to Anti-Hail Public Service Company. The 
results of this work may be used as food for thought and as a way to learn from past decisions by 
testing different policy levers within the simulation model. Bianchi & Winch (2008) point out a lack 
of systemic view of the linkages between strategic resources and a flawed perception of the delays 
associated with their growth processes that constitute the major causes of losses for many 
organisations. The systemic view is intended to include a comprehensive set of relevant factors and 
dimensions, which together form an integrated managerial system of performance measurement.  
The central idea of designing performance management systems using SD is to follow the use 
(transformation) of resources from the point of the very first (elementary) resource allocation to the 
point when the results of the allocation are realized (as company’s outcome, and output in the society). 
In the causal chain, one factor at any point along the chain is regarded as a determinant of the factor 
that succeeds it. Moreover, the next resource allocation decision is dynamically affected by the results 
of the former decision, thus allowing for learning-by-doing.  
During the review of the obtainable literature, no publications were found in the use and 
application of System Dynamics on corruption in Public Procurement within the Anti-hail Public 
Service field. As a result, this current research has a certain degree of novelty. Nevertheless, exploring 
new fields is always a challenge that comes together with the risk of failure. 
 
1.3 Research Approach  
 
A systems approach can be used in understanding corruption from a broader perspective.  
With a systems approach, one can create a model to recognise causes and consequences of corruption 
in any public organization in any country. Corruption affects both social and financial systems in 
either a damaging or positive way - that can be understood by using systems simulation, collecting 
data from the people employed in different public and private organisations.  
One of the most important tools of systems analysis is systems thinking. Basically, system 
thinking is a way of seeing systems from a broad perspective that take account of overall system 
structures, rules and loops, along with complex connections and delays in systems, instead of viewing 
only particular connections in the system. This comprehensive interpretation can help us quickly 
categorise the existent causes of problems in organisations and know just where to work to address 
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them4. System thinking has created a diversity of codes and apparatuses for analysing and improving 
systems. It is a unique approach to problem solving, in that it views certain 'problems', e.g. corruption, 
as part of the whole system. Therefore, focusing on these outcomes will only further develop the 
undesired element or problem (Warren, 1999).  
Several conceptual challenges need to be addressed in this research. The first challenge is 
coming from inconsistent definitions and effects of corruption, which seem to give a contradictory 
understanding of what is to be considered as corruption. Instead, this work uses the information 
provided by different official sources (e.g., UN, World Bank, IMF), and non-governmental 
organizations (NGO), containing abbreviations as used in this research. Also, all information are open 
for public use in different institutes like Transparency International (TI), CMI, and different Statistical 
Data. Therefore, by retrieving information from the same sources, it is possible to overcome this 
challenge. The primary hypothesis of this research is that the effects of corruption cases in public 
procurement on government budget are direct and negative - meaning that the higher the degree of 
corruption, the lower the relative public budget. Additional, the lower the budget, the lower is Public 
Satisfaction.  
The second challenge is connected with using quantitative data that could lead to comparing 
divergent periods. Barro (1991) states that incomes converge over time and, therefore, should the 
problem be studied over the long time with the best available data (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1991). 
However, there is a risk of missing important data about the appearances and forms of corruption. 
This challenge is solved by using same quantitative data and methods, starting in 2004 and running 
the model for the following 50 years, isolating the corruption effect only. 
The last one is connected with the modelling of corruption itself. For the aim of this study –
limiting its scope to the problem that affects only public procurement, means restricting its usability 
to only policies that may be possible or interested in improving. However, there could be significant 
sources of corruption associated with unofficial influences and the revenue coming from different 
types of corruption actions, «which are measured by the Shadow Economy (Schneider et al., 2010, p. 
1). In this work, the scope of corruption is narrowed to reflect the facts that are found in the Anti-
corruption Council5 report6 and that are actually encountered in Public Service Company processes.  
                                                          
4 Read more on http://managementhelp.org/misc/defn-systemsthinking.pdf 
5 The Anti-Corruption Council (Savet za borbu protiv korupcije) was established by The Decision of The Government of 
the Republic of Serbia on 11th October 2001. The Council is an expert, advisory body of The Government, founded with 
a mission to see all the aspects of anti-corruption activities, to propose measures to be taken in order to fight corruption 
and to monitor them. 
6 See the report (in Serbian) http://www.antikorupcija-savet.gov.rs/analize-i-misljenja/cid1033-1104/preispitati-rad-
rhmz-a-i-nezakonito-trosenje-budzetskih-sredstava-za-protivgradnu-zastitu. 
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1.3.1 Research Focus  
 
This research mainly focuses on perceptions of corruption combined with available data on 
corruption practice, in order to gain an understanding of corruption connected with public 
procurement. This standpoint is associated with my curiosity in the study of practices that have a vast 
existence in people’s daily lives.  
In this study, we all will try to understand the issue of corruption in depth by using System 
Dynamics Modelling (SDM) with qualitative research methods to analyse the data and provide a 
foundation for the DPMS. Direction originated in qualitative data breakdown are operationalised in 
a SD model. The emerging computer simulation model is based on the description of the current 
situation in Anti-Hail Public Service provider. Strategic resources that were showed and elaborated 
as the most important ones, and what is the connection with the end results based on the performance 
drivers, are explained subsequently. 
 
1.4 Objectives and Research Questions  
 
The principal objective of this dissertation is to construct a computer-based model that can be 
used to understand better both performance dynamics and corruption practice, and their 
consequences. This research will explore and study this topic by using a systems approach to building 
a tailor-made structural model of corruption, gained through computational simulations on qualitative 
data collected from Belgrade (Serbia). This model aims to see corruption from a new perspective. An 
attempt has, thus, been made to understand the problem of corruption, financial problems, and social 
perspective through a system thinking methodology. Therefore, using the simulation modelling will 
allow to explore how the social system of corruption limits the behaviour itself. The standpoint of 
corruption utilised in this research is that it is a social phenomenon. That encompasses public dealing 
in general; demonstrated as a social system of corruption that affects many other structures in one or 
another manner. This thesis intent to explore the following issues in more depth:  
 
General Research Question: 
 How can our understanding of corruption be extended by using a DPM approach? 
 What would an SD model of corruption in Serbian Anti-Hail Public Service provider look 
like? 
 
7 
 
Specific Research Questions: 
 How can strategic resources and their relations be framed in a particular Public Service 
Organisation? 
 What are the main strategic resources that affect the performance of public service institution? 
 What are the key performance drivers related to critical success factors that impact on Public 
service organisation results? 
 What are the end results affected by performance drivers that feed strategic resources over 
time? 
 How are they presented in the SD model? 
 Which policies can be recommended to manage the performance of Public service provider 
with regards to public procurement? 
 
This dissertation has the objective to stimulate the broadening of a logical theoretical 
framework that can be used to investigate corruption dynamics. Despite the fact that it is challenging 
to ascertain the ultimate result study might have on concrete reforms of corrupt procurement practices, 
without providing an analytical framework for reform, meaningful change itself seems improbable. 
In the table below in short are presented the main research methods used to answer the 
research questions.  
Table 1-1 Research questions, sources and methods 
Research Question Sources Research Methods 
What are the main specifics of 
performance management system design 
and use in Public Service provider 
(RHMSS)? 
Literature 
Public records 
Literature review 
Analysis 
How can strategic resources and their 
own relations be framed in a particular 
Public Service provider (RHMSS)? 
Public records 
Literature 
Analysis 
Deskwork  
 
Which policies can be recommended to 
manage the performance of a public 
provider using SD methodology? 
System Dynamics 
model 
Mental model 
consideration 
SD simulations 
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1.5 Design of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is organised into five chapters. This section provides short summaries of the 
contents of each chapter. 
Chapter 2 begins by laying out the theoretical dimensions of the research and looks at 
economic and development theories on corruption. Here, I also present an overview of corruption, 
governance and economic issues in Serbia. Next part introduces the System Dynamics studies on 
corruption. The last part provides an overview of the Performance Management approach, and in 
particular different approaches elaboration.  
Chapter 3 starts with describing the methodology used for the study. In this chapter, I also 
discuss the difficulties in studying corruption. Finally, it presents the findings from the qualitative 
data analysis phase. The chapter concludes by discussing how the themes contribute to a more 
nuanced understanding of corruption in Serbia by implementing SD to enhance traditional PM into 
Dynamic Performance Management Systems.  
Chapter 4 focuses on a most important aspect of this research. It describes the set of data used 
by the System Dynamics methodology for development of the corruption model. This chapter has 
been organised according to the stages of model-building identified in Chapter 3: feedback process, 
causal loop diagrams, dynamic model building, dynamic behaviour and analysis. The last section of 
this chapter on simulation presents the analysis and a discussion of the simulation results in the 
context of the dynamics performance management, as well as suggested policies. 
Chapter 5 rounds off the thesis as a whole by providing a brief summary of significant 
findings. Furthermore, the theoretical and practical contributions of this study are presented, as well 
as recommending possibilities for further studies that this study has opened up.  
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II CHAPTER LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
“Corruption is widespread in many developing and transition economies, not because 
their people are different from people elsewhere, but because conditions are ripe for it. 
The motivation to earn income through corrupt practices is extremely strong, 
exacerbated by poverty and by low and declining civil service salaries”. 
The World Bank (2012) 
 
In this chapter, the various approaches examined from the obtainable literature to understand 
the phenomenon of corruption are discussed, by using economic, organisational, and System 
Dynamics approaches. In the first section of this literature review, the focus will be on earlier 
theoretical and empirical studies of corruption to give a fair understanding of how the problem is 
formed and studied. Also, to develop a background, which will help the application of a System 
Dynamics approach. In the second section, an overview of corruption, governance and economic 
issues in Serbia is presented. Lastly, the focus is on the System Dynamics approach to giving an 
understanding about System Dynamics modelling and on theories of Performance Management. 
 
2.1 Theories on Corruption 
 
This section reviews important issues related to the theoretical and empirical work in the area 
of corruption, social and cultural issues, weak institutions, and economic development. Theories from 
economics and a development studies perspective on corruption are discussed. 
Some scholars have defined corruption as behaviour by public officials that deviates from the 
public interest (Morris, 1991), others have conceptualised corruption based on deviation from moral 
standards (Brooks, 1970). Similarly, Morris defines corruption as behaviour that deviates from 
serving the common good, suggesting that it is an embodiment of a state’s original norms and 
legitimising ideology (Morris, 2008). The most prominent definition of corruption7, however, is the 
one used by the World Bank and this is worth exploring in a little more detail given how important it 
has been within the discussion of corruption within the „development‟ context. The World Bank 
defines corruption as the “abuse of public office for private gain” (World Bank, 1997)8. Transparency 
                                                          
7 The word corruption comes from Latin corruptus, past participle of corrumpere, from com- + rumpere, meaning to break, 
break down, and spoil. 
8 Likewise, Svensson (2005) perceive the corruption as the misuse of public office for private gain. 
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International (TI) also uses this definition. Although this definition may be useful, it is rather too 
narrow and simplistic.  
Brown and Cloke (2004) point out some further limitations of the World Bank’s definition of 
corruption. They argue that private individuals gains from corruption are not limited to purely 
personal and monetary interests and that the abuse of political position (political corruption) to pursue 
a particular socio-political program for personal interest, against the will of the majority of the people, 
is not adequately considered in the Bank’s definition of corruption. According to Shleifer and Vishny 
(1992), corruption is the sale by government officials of government property for personal gain. For 
instance, public administration officers, every so often, get bribes for certifying authorizations and 
licenses, or for prohibiting the entry of competitors. In these cases, administrators charge for their 
selves for things that formally is a custody of the state. 
When trying to discover the grounds and variations of corruption practice, it is typically 
rewarding to start with academic reviews of corruption but also to put it into perspective with country-
specific knowledge, to understand it deeper and to propose policy actions. That makes it harder for 
handling from the purely theoretic methodology. Also, it is very problematic to investigate and collect 
relevant information, which often are hidden, untrustworthy, and “soft” or “mushy” data9.  
The GDP per capita grade bears most of the clarifying power of the different corruption 
indicators (Paldam, 2002). That implies that the poorest nations have the highest corruption practice, 
and the risk is high for e.g. foreign financiers.10 There is also a specific variation regarding different 
democracy levels.  For example, Cheung (1998) claims that the aforementioned promotes not only 
poor economic performance but corruption as well, “as politician’s auction off government favours 
to factions in an electorate ill-prepared to appreciate the costs of such measures”.  
Practically, the issue of corruption occurs when public institutions and the business players 
have some kind of collaboration, and public institutions and decision makers have to be observed 
endogenous. The recognition that both corruption and government are endogenous is also detected 
by Ehrlich and Lui (1999). For example, if the authorised officer cannot differentiate a price between 
customers, at that point as a monopolist, he/she will just fix the marginal revenue the same as the 
marginal cost. When there is no misuse of the authority, the total price including the bribe at all times 
surpasses the government price. It pays the official to generate a shortage at the official price, and 
                                                          
9 Information about things that are difficult to measure such as people's opinions or feelings, company’s image, etc.  
10 On the other side, Denmark had a score of 10.0 in the 1998 TI ratings, which is characterised as “perfectly corruption 
free.”  No country, on the contrary, has up till now received a score of zero. 
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then to get bribes as a method to clear the market for the government-supplied goods (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1992).  
Moreover, government activity beyond the protection of property rights will cause more 
corruption. If the incentives to corrupt further develop of the sort predicted by Krueger (1974), 
government size will increase corruption, and corruption too will increase government spending.  
Furthermore, the seller, in this case, has no incentive to report on the officials; therefore, the chances 
that corruption will be identified are significantly reduced. This in turn generates a further incentive 
for corruption with mugging to increase. For the reason that corruption practice supports the interests 
of both buyers and sellers, it will be more tenacious. This result suggests that the first step to reducing 
corruption should be to create an accounting system that prevents theft from the government. In the 
collection of payments duties, such accounting systems might well reduce corruption because without 
theft - bribes raise the buyer's cost and hence give him the incentive to expose the corrupt official. 
From an ordinarily theoretical perspective, the most recent period has been a “time to 
rediscover bureaucracy” (Olsen, 2005) and some academics have claimed a strong defence for a 
recurrence of the Weberian bureaucratic organization (Pollit and Bouckaert, 2004). However, this 
supreme type of administration includes various structural features. For example, it is expected to be 
a formal, hierarchical, and skilled office together with a specialised governmental workforce with 
permanent engagement and structured careers improvements. These different elements possibly will 
not occur together in practice (Olsen, 2008), besides an absence of comparative data on these 
characteristics. Therefore, it is challenging to rely on one attribute to control and combat corruption. 
Another approach to battle against corruption is with the help of the public influence. 
Collective choice regulates spending, which then defines lower corruption. Wittman (1989) argues 
that democracy progress the competitiveness of the administrative process and henceforth should 
improve efficiency, focused not on revenue but inclinations of the inhabitants. Such means may take 
account of freedom of thought (media), different laws, transparent and regularly publishing of 
information. The Wittman suggestions embrace the idea that democratic means for determining 
political power should encourage more efficient corruption control, possibly also with the usage of 
the modern technologies.  
Advanced technologies could be the preferred choice, for instance for over-invoicing 
corruption practice. Besides, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) debate that the managers and bureaucrats in 
developing nations tend to import products on which bribes are the easiest to take (not the products 
that are most profitable for the state organisations). To achieve such a goal, they principally 
discourage or ban the import of suitable tools, and encourage the import of exclusive products on 
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which over-invoicing is harder to discover. Consequently, nations result in usage of instruments and 
goods that are notable below the required level of quality (and/or quantity). This illustration fits 
precisely into the framework of this thesis.  
To get the most out of the situation for their private incomes, public servants ban procurement 
of products and services on which bribes cannot be gathered without exposure, and stimulate imports 
of goods and services on which they can have a private interest. As a result, available products and 
chattels in the country are defined by corruption prospects instead of preferences or high-tech updates. 
The above mentioned example may shed the light on causes why numerous developing countries 
instead of, for instance, on health and education (where remain restricted possibilities for corruption 
practice), would rather use limited funds on large infrastructure projects and defence (with plentiful 
opportunities for corruption). 
 
2.1.1 Forms of Corruption 
 
Based on a number of basic characteristics, Amundsen (1999) has categorised some key forms 
or manifestations of corruption that will be elaborated in this section.11 Although it is hard to make a 
clear separation between them (in some cases they have similar or the same elements), they may label 
some basic variations of corruption practice12.  
Bribery could be understood as the offering or promising an advantage, or the payment itself 
(in gifts, money or kind) that is exchanged in a corrupt relationship (a relationship that is illegal or 
unethical). Lindgren (1993) defines bribery as a corrupt benefit given or received to influence official 
action so as to afford the giver profitable or better than fair treatment. This is undoubtedly a corruption 
form13. There are numerous comparable terms to bribery, like sweeteners, gratuities, “commercial 
arrangements”, baksheesh, kickbacks, and payoffs. Despite different terms, they all have the same 
concept and purpose to get business pass smoother or more favourably through the public or 
administration system of government. Examples regarding private companies are getting easier 
                                                          
11 Since early 1990, The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has become focused on corruption 
as the misuse of public administration for private gain. It encompasses abuse by a government official such as 
embezzlement and nepotism, as well as relating public and private subjects such as bribery, extortion, influence peddling 
and fraud. See more at http://www.usaid.gov/.  
12 The corruption forms arise in both political, or elite corruption and lower-level, administrative corruption. Political 
corruption usually includes a trade of goods, access to rents, or other benefits for governmental elite, privileged 
companies, and their networks of operatives and followers. The transaction volume is normally important. Administrative 
or bureaucratic corruption typically refers to smaller transactions and mid- and low-level government officials. 
13 Surveys in Taiwan, for instance, report 94% of interviewees as having been ‘led to’ bribe corrupt tax administrators 
and 80% of certiﬁed public accountants as admitting to bribing tax ofﬁcials (Chu, 1990). 
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admission to government contracts and infrastructure projects, perform business activities despite 
environmental rules, forgery tax and so forth. 
Embezzlement means to steal (theft of resources), or misappropriation of funds placed in 
one’s trust or under one’s control. Usually, it comes from an unfaithful employee who is hired to 
manage the money or goods. On one occasion it comes from the publicly authorised officer, it is then 
a form of misusing public resources – from that state institution, but in the wider picture of the whole 
nation. Despite the fact that it is not strictly understood as corruption per se (it does not include the 
“civilian” side directly), it is counted in the wider classifications.  
From the legal point of view, corruption is a transaction between two persons, one state 
representative and one private citizen, where the state representative goes beyond the boundaries of 
the law and procedures with the intention of securing himself a private advantage. The public is 
disadvantaged when public funds are embezzled, but then again no individual property is stolen, and 
people do not have right to ask for remuneration. In many highly corrupt countries, it can develop 
separately of the public moral and with limited possibilities of public sanction. It is a crucial part of 
the sources of financing of the regime, possibly higher than resources coming from bribery.  
Extortion is money and/or other resources pull out by the use of pressure, or extraction by 
coercion such as the intimidations to use force14. Blackmailing and extortion are corrupt transactions 
where money is violently extracted by those who have the power to do it, states Amundsen (1999) 
but where too little is returned to the “clients” (possibly simply some vague promises of exception 
from further harassment). 
Straddling is one more form of the embezzlement. It occurs when some power-holders use 
their political workplace to enter into, secure and increase their private business interests. An example 
of this form could be found in a certain nation where the governmental decision-makers have made 
foreign companies and monopoly rights be, firstly, state-owned and, then reallocated these to the 
selected followers.  
Protection” or “security” money, as a distinctive type of corruption, might be organised in 
some countries when, for example, the state and public organisations or some public representatives 
force money out from money from residents or companies.  In this category belongs taking the money 
“below the table” and “gifts” from inhabitants when they intend to undertake some public service or 
                                                          
14 Extortion has been studied in the contexts of an organised crime (Konrad and Skaperdas (1997)) and public procurement 
(Auriol, 2006). 
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institution, as for instance hospital, university, municipality. These practices may perhaps be 
understood as “informal” forms taxation15.  
Fraud is defined as an economic crime that comprises some type of trickery, scam or cheating. 
It is the act of intentionally deceiving somebody so as to gain an unfair benefit and, in this case, 
includes a manipulation by bureaucratic agents between political figures and residents, with agenda 
of pulling a private profit16. In addition to this definition, fraud is seen as a wide-ranging and prevalent 
expression. For illustration, when forgery, smuggling and another organised economic lawbreaking 
is supported by “official” sanction and/or involvement fraud. Alternatively, when the governmental 
elite and public agents participate in closing their eye on different financial criminal activities, not to 
mention if they are as well participating in them.  
Favouritism is an instrument of power misuse implying “privatisation” and a very biased 
distribution of state resources. It is the natural human inclination to give preference to relatives, 
friends, and anyone who is close and trusted. However, this is a form of corruption since it indicates 
a corrupted distribution of resources. Favouritism is the recognised weakness of administrative agents 
and governmental elite (they who are managing public funds and have the legitimacy to make a 
decision with regards to resources distribution) to favour certain people. A typical example of 
favouritism is, for illustration, to award a relative an office job to a relative or a close friend, not 
taking into account any merit.  
Clientelism is, rather, the ordinary tendency of the majority to prefer his own kin (family 
member or ethnic, religious or regional group member). Clientelism itself can embrace a variability 
of types, from a one-time compensation of a person’s vote, the allocations of jobs via patronage, to 
giving political allies right of entry to welfare programs, government subsidies, or other favours in 
return for electoral support from them (Piattoni, 2001). 
Nepotism can be understood as a characteristic type of favouritism, based on both 
acquaintances and relationship whereby a person exploits his/her official administrative position to 
arrange for a job or position to a relative or close friend who is not qualified for or deserving the 
                                                          
15 The rise of the Sicilian mafia is explained in the book by Gambetta (1993). Faced with doubt that the other trader is 
cheating, a trader might ask for the paid (illegal) service of a mafia to provide credible threats beforehand against cheating. 
Because of a low degree of mutual trust and insecure property rights, all traders end up paying members of quasi-public 
organisations to refrain from violence. This payment is not considered corruption but extortion, but most of the economic 
effects are likely to be similar. 
16 Therefore, for different academics this problem was suitable to apply the principal-agent theory or incentive theory 
(Eskeland &Thiele 1999; Fjeldstad 1999). 
15 
 
position. Many directors of institutions or majors in municipalities have attempt to secure their 
position by nominating e.g. wife, brothers, sisters, aunts to crucial job titles in the public apparatus. 
Finally, as a form of corruption is worth mentioning Lobbying, as any activity carried out to 
influence an institution’s policies and decisions in favour of a particular cause or outcome (Brooks et 
al., 2013). Even if allowed by law, these acts can become corrupt if disproportionate levels of 
influence are apparent from individuals or organisations.  
 
2.1.2 How can Corruption be measured?  
 
Various forms of manifestation and diverse approaches of defining corruption ultimately 
influence the way a corruption phenomenon can be analysed and measured. Berg (2001) analysed 
different ways and means on the measurement of corruption. Nowadays, corruption is measured using 
surveys and polls of a random sample from populations or businesspeople (known as subjective 
measuring method despite the fact that they are based on divergent approaches: on the perceptions 
and based on experience). Several quantitate measurements are worth mentioning such as Public 
Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS)17 method, Service provider surveys18, at the bureaucratic level, 
and firm surveys, at the firm level.  
PETS is a method for locating and quantifying political and bureaucratic capture, leakage of 
funds, and the organising issues of human and in-kind resources, for example staff, workbooks, and 
medicines (Reinikka & Svensson, 2003). Furthermore, the governmental honesty variable is an 
important corruption measure that shows an indication of the possibility that “high government 
officials are likely to demand special payments” (Damania et al., 2003). 
Typical cross-national measures of corruption are collected through surveys. When trying to 
discover and analyse microdata, the cagey nature of corrupt acts has to be taken into account, since it 
is almost unmanageable to collect trustworthy quantitative data of corruption practice. For 
investigation on the firm level, information from Business International (BI) were analysed by Mauro 
(1995). In the early 80’s, Mauro done a survey for more than 50 countries containing different 
elements, among them corruption. One of the questions apropos whether and if positive, to which 
level commercial relations contained elements of corruption or some suspicious transaction. The 
                                                          
17 Using sample survey basis, PETS tracks the flow of the public funds and resources through different layers to determine 
how much of the originally allocated resources reach each level.   
18 The quantitative service delivery survey (QSDS) for instance, is based on systematic quantitative data (input, output, 
quality, prices and so on).  
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survey was done with diverse professionals and experts from each country. Based on the perceived 
corruption level, BI ranked them consistently on a scale from 0 - 10.  
The most comprehensive quantitative macro-level indicator of corruption, the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) is based on a cross-country survey with clearly defined country levels. 
Transparency International commissioned the Göttingen University, and a group of academics with 
supervision by Johann Lambsdorff produced the index. The CPI evaluates the degree to which public 
officials and politicians are assumed to agree to take bribes, do illegitimate transactions in public 
procurement, embezzle civic resources, and commit related cheats. Based on the corruption perceived 
level, CPI initially used a scale from ten to zero. When a country is ranked with a score of zero, that 
means that is perceived as completely corrupt while ten indicates a very honest country. 
Transparency International (TI), based on an aggregation of multiple surveys of public and 
expert opinion, presently oﬀers scores for 177 of the world’s countries on an annual basis. In 2014, it 
was created on the basis of surveys conducted by 12 independent organisations and included 175 
countries. These surveys, however, were not tackling corruption problem, but rather widespread 
development and business aspects. Therefore, this index is created as a weighted average of different 
indexes from ten diverse organisations. Also, as part of the update to the methodology used to 
calculate the CPI, the new scale of 0-100 was introduced in 2012 (see Figure 1 for the results of the 
new scaling). Because of the update in the methodology, however, CPI scores before 2012 are not 
comparable over time.  
Another extensive indicator was developed in 2008 by the Forum for a new World 
Governance19 for an accurate representation of the situation of world governance and its progress. 
The World Governance Index (WGI) is based on data from 179 countries, included in the survey, and 
combines five indicators. Each indicator is made of 13 sub-indicators, and each of those made up of 
37 indexes – among them the Corruption Perception Index. The source for it is again TI index, 
calculated in the following way:  
Equation 1 Corruption Perception Index 
Index =  
Country Score 
                          10 
 
                                                          
19 See http://www.world-governance.org/spip.php?page=accueil&lang=en 
17 
 
 
Figure 1 TI’s CPI index, according to the new scaling 
 
The majority of detailed indexes are based on justly ambiguous and overall questions 
regarding the occurrence of corruption actions perceived by either specialists or business leaders. 
Approximately half are made based on expert opinions within created checks to guarantee cross-
country consistency. The other half is based on questionnaires from middle and high-level firm 
management. Hence, the CPI is mainly a “poll of polls”, created by different ways of professionals 
and risk specialists assessment and, therefore, is replicating their impressions.  
Survey-based measures of corruption have some fundamental weaknesses, such as the 
trustworthiness of data collected, or even that reliability of the CPI, for instance, might deteriorate 
over time since with rising media coverage. Therefore, there is a risk that survey participants, rather 
than stating how much ‘‘real’’ corruption happens, are reporting what they believe is happening20.   
Alternatively, a novel objective measure of corruption has been proposed by Golden & Picci 
(2005). They created a subnational proxy of corruption and, using Italian data, point the creation of 
an index of missing infrastructure, or ’corruption’. It is based on the diﬀerence between the amounts 
of the physical quantities of public infrastructure21 (roads, hospitals, etc.), and the cumulative price 
government pays for these capital stocks. The larger the diﬀerence between these two is, the more 
money is being lost to misuse, fraud, bribes, and embezzlement, and the greater corruption level is.    
                                                          
20 For an overall discussion of the reliability of the TI index, see Lambsdorﬀ (2001). 
21 This measure was made for Italy’s 95 provinces and 20 regions as of the mid-1990s, controlling at the regional level 
for potential dissimilarities in the costs of public construction. 
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2.1.3 Manifestations of Corruption in Public Procurement  
 
Procurement22 of products and services by government bodies alone averages between 13% 
and 20% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In some states it is even more - worldwide is estimated 
the average of 9.5 trillion USD p.a.23. Hardly any other field is more attractive for misuse of public 
funds or gives additional prospects for corruption than government procurement. The loss in value of 
the contract, caused by various forms of public funds misuse, is estimated at in general between 10% 
and 25% and in some cases even higher, up to 50% (yearly damage in EU is calculated to be around 
120 billion EUR or 163 billion USD 24).  
There are diverse aspects in which the effect of corrupt procurement can be recognised. 
Underneath, the key manifestations of corruption in Public Procurement are underlined and explained 
briefly.  
 Financial impact or monetary loss can encompass the following categories: 
 Needlessly high expenses of purchases, capital investments, services, on the one side, or 
unnecessarily low income accrued from licences, permits, and concessions, on the other side; 
 Sub-specification quality of goods or works, not justifying the price actually paid; 
 Stocking a government budget with monetary obligations for acquisitions or investments that 
are not required, not economically reasonable or are overpriced; and 
 Increasing the government cost with early repair costs to restore and maintain goods, which 
are too recent to justify such maintenance expenditure. 
 
 Economic Impact  
Economic influence might contain loading a governmental budget with operational, 
maintenance and debt servicing obligation for public investments or procurements, without having 
any value for the country’s wellbeing. Additional, indirect impact may take place if capital investment 
levels drop because of corruption costs and stipulations to businesspersons, hence affecting 
investment and monetary growth.  
                                                          
22 The term “Public procurement” concerns all agreements made by the public institutions and agencies and firms (public 
or private) or individuals. 
23 See more at http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/meetingofleadingpractitionersonpublicprocurement.htm 
24 Calculated by The European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
– EU Anti-Corruption Report (February 2014). Check http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/index_en.htm     
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 Environmental Effect 
Misuse of public funds could lead to a wrong decision, for instance, projects that have a 
controversial environmental impact. For illustration, if an investment venture is not aligned with the 
country environmental standards, then the harm might involve unnecessary environmental or health 
risks or else real loss, financial burdens, or durable indirect environmental influence. 
 Health and Human Safety Influence  
Due to quality deficiencies, environmentally undesirable choices or even noncompliance with 
environmental or health standards might involve health harm and safety risk. A suitable example of 
this effect is a situation in which corruption stimulated sub-standard investing caused construction 
failure and had consequence in injuries (or even human losses).  
 Effect on Innovation 
When there is an absence of competition due to strong corruption practice, that situation leads 
to the neglect of innovation. Firms that are counting on “corrupted” public procurement process will 
not use resources on innovation. Indirectly, even enterprises that are not involved in corruption 
practice might feel discouraged to invest in innovation if they cannot access the markets because of 
corruption. 
 Erosion of Values 
Nowadays, corrupt practices have become a fair way of life in many countries and population 
is exposed in one or another way to the cases of flourishing corrupt practices. As time goes by, and 
these careless practices are not being sanctioned, while unscrupulous and corrupt officials are getting 
rich and becoming role models because they are perceived as successful - it is inevitable that morality 
of society undermined. Provided that greater wealth due to corruption activities causes increases in 
social status, without being punished then moral values of a society, in the long turn, will only grind 
down.  
 Erosion of Trust in Government 
In a way connected with above explanation, erosion of trust in the government occurs, with 
time delay, when people witness that reckless deeds by public officials are not being sanctioned. 
Consequently, they conclude that public administration is not to be absolutely trusted. Moreover, it 
sends the message that cheating is morally tolerable and not against collective principles. 
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 Damage to Honest Competitors 
The fraudulence of corrupt bidders, when fruitful and not sanctioned, damages and most likely 
destroys the honest competitor. Also, it might result in job losses on the side of a market subject who 
might be superior and more innovative. However, the corrupt bidder, not willing to rely on quality 
and price of his goods or services, but choices to corrupt to gain contracts, might be better off25. 
 Danger to Economic Development 
If public administrators invest resources in capital investment projects not based on their 
contribution to economic development of the country but in their capability to produce bribe 
payments, a country might rapidly result in wasteful investment opportunities. That may limit external 
development assistance and therefore seriously hold back the country’s economic development.  
To end with, corrupt (bad) public procurement will contribute to the rising of poverty and 
inequality by taking the funds away from the social needs. It will stimulate wrong choosing, inspiring 
rivalry in bribery rather than in quality or price. Regarding firms, corrupt procurement will make 
available an imbalanced and risky competitive advantage for those companies who do not have 
aspiration, or cannot afford to bribe their way in the market. 
 
2.2 Corruption in Serbia  
 
Corruption is one of the most significant issues facing Serbia. While there are some signals 
that corruption may have become less rampant in recent years, accessible data advocates that 
corruption spread be still in elevation while trust in main government institutions is at a very low 
level. The effect on populations is substantial: everyday corruption routine can place a significant 
anxiety on the poorest and marginalized groups while numerous scandals including corruption linked 
with highest governmental representatives undermine nation’s, especially young citizens’, confidence 
in the future.  
The TI’s report summarized the results of the public opinion survey about a perception of 
corruption, compared with the other European countries, in Figure 226. Notwithstanding this 
perception, the percentage of Serbian citizens who believe the country is moving in a good direction 
                                                          
25 Transparency International’s Handbook for Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement provides more examples of 
corruption practice.  
26 Source: http://www.mdtfjss.org.rs/pub/serbia-judical-functional-review/, adapted from 
http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/report 
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stands at 30 percent (CeSIDOpinion Polling Agency and UNDP Serbia, 2014). According to this 
survey, the low living standard critically affect perceptions of the issues Serbia is facing; most 
problems are related to financial matters. Unemployment (44%) and poverty (16 %) are two of the 
Serbia’s leading issues. Ranked third is corruption, with 11% of all respondents seeing it as the key 
problem. 
Also, Serbia has yet to consolidate its own statehood – is presently confronting the challenges 
of Kosovo’s status27. A severely divided public is facing a political deadlock between reformist and 
anti-reformist that undermined the reform. This challenge resolution will determine the further 
progress toward EU accession. Serbia28 is also a country in transition. It is essential to tackle 
corruption thoroughly to avoid it becoming institutionalised. Even so perceptions are thin on the 
ground, the country is on a progressive path in quite many areas. There are many indications of 
significant improvements, such as better public expenditure control, regulation of conflict of interest, 
availability of information as well as public agencies transparency. In addition, the capacity of 
enforcement agencies to investigate and take legal action towards organised crime cases is gradually 
growing. There has been a noteworthy enhancement of rules and procedures to make business easier 
for private professionals, at the same time reducing opportunities for bribery.  
 
 
Figure 2 Perception of Corruption in Serbia compared with other European countries, 2014 
                                                          
27 Кosovo* is a disputed territory and partially recognised state in the central Balkan Peninsula that proclaimed its 
autonomy from Serbia in February 2008. Despite the fact that Serbia claims it as its own Autonomous Province of Kosovo 
and Metohija, Serbia recognises the Republic's control of the territory. However, Kosovo does not have diplomatic 
recognition from 85 United Nations member states. Kosovo is not itself a member of the UN, however it is a member of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Within the EU, it is recognised by 23 of the 28 members.  
*This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion 
on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 
28 See for details http://data.worldbank.org/country/serbia 
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Nevertheless, the political setting of the problem is persistent, and rooted elites frequently 
obstruct ambitious reforms. A continuous political determination at the highest levels of government 
is required to achieve a long-lasting impact on corruption.  
A different explicit anti-corruption initiative – the effort to regulate the sponsoring of political 
parties and electoral campaigns, particularly the provision of civic resources – has been a major 
disappointment. The sponsoring is an especially ominous problem when the political parties are 
granted public funds, but there is no truthful control mechanism over how those funds are really 
expended. There are numerous irregularities, gaps, conflicts and inconsistencies in the newest 
legislation. Furthermore, the whole framework for its implementation is unfortunate. Despite that, the 
general public do not put enough pressure for changing existing practices and rules.  
 
2.2.1 Types of Corruption in Serbia 
 
The following sections emphasise certain vital occurrences of corruption in Serbia that need 
to be addressed.  
 
 Political Corruption 
The utmost demanding challenge Serbia needs to battle is certainly political corruption, 
coming in its various faces. The manifestation (particularly public perception) of such corruption 
activities, weakens the legitimacy and stability of voted political figures and the regimes, besides the 
capability and inclination of the regime to carry out meaningful anti-corruption policies. 
Globally, misuse of the power by elected officials happens in the form of bribery of parliament 
members to vote in a preferable way (for particular interests as the natural resources, tobacco, 
telecommunication, and defence industries). Alternatively, in the form of misusing their official 
capacity to serve the interests of companies in which they hold stakes. In states facing transition (such 
as Serbia), this tendency might take on systemic proportions causing the phenomenon recognised as 
“state capture”. Administrators are chosen in a transition environment where corruption is quite 
prevalent, public institutions are still under development, thus temptations are bigger as a result of 
larger opportunities (national assets privatisation, poor legislation and so forth).  
Moreover, in an environment like this, even officials that strongly support the reforms are 
susceptible. For instance, when are faced with unethical negotiations that do not have to be connected 
with their personal gain, but in exchange for achieving political goals in favour of reforms). No 
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comprehensive researches of political corruption in Serbia exist, even though many scandals linked 
with government elite are seen in the media almost daily. Some cases have been to certain extent 
inspected and reported by the Anti-Corruption Council, but not any of these has been investigated 
with adequate methodological rigidity to make certain the facts are indisputable.  
 Structural Factors 
As the institutions in Serbia are still fragile, and noteworthy political instability is present, the 
common-sense consequence is that people are vulnerable to corruption. The example of such fragility 
could be illustrated with the vulnerability of political coalitions. The so-called “democratic block” 
consist of two key political parties with strongly different opinions about main problems fronting 
Serbia, such as Kosovo, joining the EU, and the speed of reforms. On the other side, there is a “radical 
block”, with the diverse political program. A government cannot be constructed without one of the 
two major parties. That leads to a position of dependency of minor parties that are, for ensuring their 
support, compensated in many unethical ways, together with tolerating corruption.  
The second example of structurally caused vulnerability comes because the absence of 
internal democracy inside the parties themselves, and a concentration of power within party elite. 
Because of the treatment within the party, in recent history several delegates firstly “defected” to be 
in parliament independently, or later to join an alternative party. The transfer between the political 
parties created a new ground for corruption activities. A fiery discussion about to who mandates 
belongs, resulted with the new Serbian constitution approved in October 2006, which explicitly 
specifies that mandates belong to parties rather than individual deputies. 
 Corruption in the Public Administration 
According to the international research29, the Government of Serbia provides the public with 
limited budget information. Based on the Open Budget Index (OBI) for 2014, Serbia is placed to 47th 
position out of 102 counties (with the score of 47 out of 100) among countries that provide its citizens 
with „limited information on understanding and analysis of the budget“. That result is slightly lower 
than the regional average (score of 53), while better than preceding scoring in 2012 (when the score 
was 39). It is worse than in 2010 (with a score of 54) and somewhat better than in 2008 (46)30. 
                                                          
29 The International Budget Partnership (IBP) defines itself as an independent non-profit corporation performing a global 
research and advocating program to promote public access to budget information and the adoption of accountable budget 
systems. See more at http://internationalbudget.org/ 
30 The OBI assigns a score to each country based on the publicly available information throughout the budget process. 
Comprehensive analysis and survey evaluate whether governments give the public access to budget information and 
opportunities to participate in the budget process at the national level. See http://internationalbudget.org/opening-
budgets/open-budget-initiative/open-budget-survey/country-info/?country=rs 
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Many shapes of corruption occur in the public administration varying from “minor” (as for 
instance in the distribution of licenses), to “big” (the allocation of public agreements and 
infrastructure projects), however all containing the misuse of public resources by governmental 
bureaucrats in function to their private benefits. Generally is agreed that at least one, if not a 
combination of the following circumstances lead to this mismanagement of public funds:  
- Regulations are imprecise or not widely available; public employees are underpaid and/or 
are not employed based on merit;  
- Governmental representative are not answerable to strong regulations on conflict of 
interest; 
- Public service elite omits internal control apparatuses; public funds usage rules and 
regulations are not clear enough; 
- Insufficient of functionally dependent internal audit; and,  
- Limited external audit to only accounting or is inadequate in some other way.  
 
A vital prerequisite for cutting corruption in the public administration is the effective 
planning, ranking, distribution and controlling of public resources, along with the efficient audit of 
the actual use of such resources. Recording and accounting of usage of public resources need to be in 
compliance with international standards, and then inspected and eventually approved by Parliament. 
So as to accomplish the above mentioned, should exist an external Supreme State Audit Institution 
(SAI) with enough capacity and authorities, and it should report directly to Parliament. 
In turn, targeting SAI to operate proficiently, an integrated system of internal financial control 
is required, including autonomous internal audit within public bodies, and an aligned accounting and 
audit principles through the public sector. Importantly, all of these components are requirements for 
EU accession (see Figure 3 for the overview of the key issues identified by European Commission in 
their report from 8th October 2014).  
Since Serbia lean towards accession to EU, an obligatory condition of succession is to perform 
overall public administration reform. Characteristics of corruption in the public procurement are 
elaborated in more detail in next section, as public procurement is, in general, most vulnerable to 
corruption (together with privatisation, customs, social service delivery but they are not in the scope 
of this work).  
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Figure 3 Public Administration Reform key issues 
                                                                                                                  (Adapted from European Commission report, 2014) 
 Corruption in Public Procurement 
Public procurement – the acquisition of goods and services from governmental budget – is 
one of the main corruption grounds since it embodies a significant percentage of GDP in the majority 
of states. In the long term, corruption activities and wasteful public resources usage will, almost 
certainly, worse the quality of products and services, and might produce indirect negative feedbacks 
(for instance the sponsoring of binding parties via procurement kickbacks). In the process of 
compulsory application of EU Public Procurement Directives, candidate states, such as Serbia, have 
to carry out obligations on member countries regarding the management of procurement activities.  
The first records of public procurement expenditure for Serbia occur subsequent to the 
introduction of public procurement rules in 2002. The Public Procurement Office reported a total of 
124.75 billion Serbian Dinars (approximately 1.46 billion EUR) in all categories of public 
procurement for 200531.   
                                                          
31The majority of the data available pre-dates 2006, and thus, is normally only aggregated data for Serbia and Montenegro: 
extrapolating specific figures for Serbia from these surveys is difficult. 
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2.2.2 Tackling Corruption in Serbia 
 
Together with the implementation of the first public procurement guidelines, there were 
several attempts to regulate the field and battle corruption.  
To begin with, an innovative Public Procurement Law (PPL)32 – formed on the Slovenian law 
and mostly aligned with EU criteria – was approved in 2002 and together with amendments 
implemented in late 2003. The Law is an important effort to bring the Serbian framework closer to 
international procurement standards. But, more significantly is a step forward towards the alignment 
with the EU Procurement Directives (2004/18), as required by the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA) between the EU and Serbia. In addition, the Law established the Public 
Procurement Office (PPO)33 as an independent agency of the government. The PPO started in January 
2003, and is accountable for monitoring and ensuring the effective implementation of the PPL. 
Therefore is responsible, among other things34, for the preparation of appropriate regulations, the 
gathering of tender documents, training and advising bidders and clients. The PPO now fluctuates 
from 22 to 28 employees, which is a minimum knowing the scope of the Office’s accountabilities, 
covering delivery of written opinions on all procedures prior carrying out the procurement.  
Next, the first National Strategy for the Fight against Corruption was approved in 2005 and 
converted into an Action Plan in 2006. Nonetheless, the absence of willpower to steadily and 
permanently address the problem of corruption resulted in unexploding of the action plan, and 
basically leaving the “hot potato” to the responsibility of an Anti-Corruption Agency, established 
earlier in 200135. The main worry was (actual nowadays as well) that without continuous political 
willpower, more systemic reforms are being stalled in the relevant line ministries. Regarding the 
remedies system, the Commission for Protection of Bidders' Rights was established in October 2010 
as an independent body accountable directly to Parliament (European Commission, 2011). This 
Commission is set up as a second-instance body in the review procedure with authorities to cancel 
public procurement procedures completely or partially. Furthermore, the newest Public Procurement 
Development Strategy of the Republic of Serbia was adopted for the period 2014 – 2018. In the next 
years, focus will be on the publication of procurement plans and full texts of awarded public 
procurement contracts (rather than just details of those contracts); preparation of guidelines for right 
                                                          
32 The last edition of the Public Procurement Law (Zakon o javnim nabavkama) is dated 25 August 2015 and could be 
found (in Serbian) on www.ujn.gov.rs/download/files/cms/attach?id=595  
33 PPO (Uprava za javne nabavke) is defined as an independent governmental agency with the task to help the 
establishment of sound procurement procedures and practices ensuring that public funds are spent in an efficient and 
transparent way, thus complementing government's overall drive in containing corruption.  
34 For complete list of competencies, check http://www.ujn.gov.rs/en/about_us/nadleznosti  
35 See more at http://www.antikorupcija-savet.gov.rs/en-GB/page/home/  
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and timely planning and an objective evaluation of needs and market prices of procurement; 
preparation of models of internal act and procedures for contracting authorities; and training of 
managers on accountability and their role in the implementation of internal acts and procedures.  
 
Figure 4 Aggregate Indicator: Control of Corruption in Serbia 
Respectable progress has been made in the area of public procurement. According to 
Transparency Serbia (an official chapter of Transparency International), already in 2003 – the year 
of the PPL’s entering into force – 200 million USD were saved due to the application of the law. This 
figure is gained by comparing the projected cost of the procurement by the contracting authorities 
(approximated based on prices in analogous contracts or the estimated market value of the 
goods/services) versus the actual cost of the procurement.  In addition, the PPL from 2008 introduced 
numerous modifications, for example certification of professional public procurement officials, 
introduction of e-procurement and establishment of an electronic public procurement portal, the 
option of court review, introduction of anticorruption clauses and institutional independence of the 
public procurement bodies (especially the PPO and the Commission for the Protection of Rights in 
public procurement matters). See Figure 4 for the Country Data Report that summarizes the data from 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project on Control of Corruption in Serbia36.   
According to the PPL, with the newest adopted strategy all announcements of public 
procurements must be published on the Public Procurement Portal by all contracting authorities in all 
types of procedures, including small-value public procurement procedures. Furthermore, the PPL has 
also introduced the mandatory use of names and codes designations set out in from common 
procurement vocabulary, as well as a publication of other relevant information, such as information 
on contract amendments and execution, opinions of the PPO on the justifiability of the negotiated 
procedure, and negative references. The PPL envisages the option of submitting bids electronically 
                                                          
36 The WGI report six aggregate governance indicators for over 200 countries and territories over the period 1996-2014, 
covering: i) Voice and Accountability, ii) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, iii) Government 
Effectiveness, iv) Regulatory Quality, v) Rule of Law, and vi) Control of Corruption. For a full description of the WGI 
methodology, interactive data access, and downloads of the aggregate and individual indicators, please visit 
www.govindicators.org. 
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and provides for the introduction of distinctive e-procurement techniques, such as electronic auctions 
and the dynamic procurement system. Nevertheless, the PPL does not set a specific timeframe for the 
implementation of these systems. 
There are still ongoing discussions about PPL. Even the latest Amendments and Supplements 
to PPL from 2015, has been criticised by Transparency Serbia emphasizing that Draft Law on 
Amendments and Supplements to PPL was submitted by the Government to the National Assembly 
without prior public debate, although the debate was obligatory in compliance with both the Law on 
State Administration and the Rules of Procedure of the Government. Or, that provisions on „mixed 
procurements“, although possibly useful, are neither clearly defined nor elaborated. In the „anti-
corruption area” amendments abandoned the concept that, contrary to provisions of the Law from 
2012, were not being implemented. That way Governmental omission to adopt the anti-corruption 
plan in public procurements, to the proposition of the PPO and the Anticorruption Agency, is being 
cancelled by erasing this provision37. Also, the obligation for the larger purchasing entities to establish 
Service for Control of Public Procurements is cancelled. 
Lastly, the strategy for improvement of the public procurement framework in Serbia needs to 
be finalised. The weaknesses in the governmental administration’s internal and external audits are 
undermining the effectiveness of the system as a whole. Currently, two main institutions are focused 
on framework strengthening - the Public Procurement Office (PPO) and an independent entity 
responsible for review of complaints (the Republic Commission for the Protection of Rights in Public 
Procurement Procedures). Yet, when performing all the considerations elaborated and defining the 
optimum solutions, it is necessary to take into account all the particular characteristics of the national 
environment, especially the level of development of information and communication technologies 
and the level of sophistication of e-government services in Serbia. 
In summary, Serbia is moderately progressing in the direction of establishing an efficient and 
entirely independent public procurement structure. Further work remains to be done on strengthening 
the institutional capacity for implementation of the SAA requirements. A coordination mechanism 
among the key stakeholders in the procurement system require further strengthening, particularly with 
the purpose of shrinking the grounds for corruption. Sustained political determination is required to 
ensure appropriate implementation of public procurement legislation.  
                                                          
37 See http://www.transparentnost.org.rs/images/dokumenti_uz_vesti/Javne_nabavke_najvazniji_nalazi_maj_2015.doc 
29 
 
2.3 Theories on System Dynamics 
 
 
“System dynamics modelling offers distinctive capabilities to contribute to economics, 
social science, physical science, or political science modes of analysis. It identifies the 
complicated interactions among many feedback loops, rejects ideas of linear cause and 
effect, and requires the analyst to view a complete system of relationships whereby 
‘cause’ may possibly be affected by the ‘effect”“.                                                             
Choucri et al. (2006) 
                
System Dynamics is a relatively young field, introduced in the early 1960’s by Jay Forrester 
in his book, Industrial Dynamics (1961). Prior to the arrival of computers, solving analytically even 
the simplest of models was an enormous challenge. However, the field has been extended over the 
last 45-55 years to modelling new problems such as to model state stability, to analyse supply chain 
management, to explore dynamics of economic growth, to model software development, to analyse 
different policies for project management, etc. It is a “rigorous method for qualitative description, 
exploration of complex systems in relations of their processes, information, organisational boundaries 
and strategies; which facilitates quantitative simulation modelling and evaluation for the design of 
system structure and control” (Wolstenholme, 1990). The foundation of the modelling strategy is to 
design a system structure in terms of stock and flow, with the driving forces of feedback loops and 
including time delays (for detailed information about this methodology see Appendix B).  
System Dynamics thinking and modelling helps analysts to discover ‘hidden’ dynamics. 
Moreover, System Dynamics (SD) provides the researcher enough space for being flexible in the 
research, having in mind that SD modelling encompasses both theoretical understanding of the 
subject and empirical data usage. Quality of SD models primarily is determined by three sources of 
information: a) numerical data, b) the written archive (reports, statistical data, etc.), and c) the expert 
knowledge of main actors in the organisation. The numerical archive is considerably minor as 
compared to the written catalogue that is large, and the expert knowledge of key participants is huge. 
“An important step in SD modelling is to obtain the wealth of information that persons keep in their 
heads. The mental database is a plentiful source of information on the system’s elements, regarding 
the information obtainable at different points in a system, and the policies being followed in decision-
making” (Forrester, 1991). 
System Dynamics methodology has several important features. Firstly, the major benefit of 
SD simulation is that it smooth the progress of testing the business systems. While simulations are 
ordinary used in operational models, there were not as much used in strategic situations. As SD 
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models do not require detailed information or exact data about relations, a strategic system can easily 
be modelled and simulated38. That is primarily because SD focuses on the dynamic behaviour of the 
combination of feedback loops, and not on implementation of the exact numerical data. This means 
automatically that only structural, longer-term behaviour is of interest and therefore SD is a useful 
tool for performance management.  
Secondly, System Dynamics is strongly related to systems thinking (Senge, 1990), which 
states that structure determines behaviour. Accordingly, changing the business system’s structure 
means alter the behaviour of the system and thus changing the future of a company. SD allows that 
all formal goals and missions of public institutions are interconnected to a broad system of 
administration procedures, activities, and mutual influences, bearing in mind all criteria that are 
important in today’s environment, such as budget, quality, service, distribution and modernisation. 
Furthermore, SD model ascertains a transparent correlation among these external criteria and internal 
performance measures. Next, taking into account internal insight about all the procedures, actions 
and processes are weighted to the criteria in a systems-oriented means. That finally generates a 
trustworthy, quantitative framework of the importance of system elements, which is used by 
management or interested parties to reduce a large number of variables (detail complexity). Dynamic 
complexity relates to the interaction effects and the delays that exist in a system.  
Finally, learning takes place when people use the formal model and—by simulation 
experiments—gain insights into the relation between structure and behaviour of the system 
(Groessler, 1994). With the help of this understanding, they can design new structures of the real 
system. Through enriched policies and reduced structural complexity, this could lead to a decrease of 
adverse effects of bounded rationality.  
Beginning with Urban Dynamics (Forrester, 1969), and ensued by World Dynamics 
(Forrester, 1971a) and The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972), there is a long tradition of 
applying SD to study public management problems. Hence, I conducted the extensive literature 
review of the present study and considered the existing formal models to obtain the insights about the 
overall corruption relations to apply them to a specific case of public procurement, and in a particular 
public service organisation. By definition, corruption includes compromising an efficiency in public 
funds usage. The empirical data, e.g. cases of granting the preferential treatment in procurement 
process, confirms that corruption favours those with close relation with authorities over efficiency. 
                                                          
38 Although for validation tests data are needed, in case of the transient, highly non-stationary behaviour (such as a 
truncated S-shaped growth), the best approach is to compare visual measures of the most typical behaviour characteristics 
and no general statistical tools can be offered in this case (Barlas, 1994).  
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The same negative direction of feedback relation between corruption and governmental expenditure 
can be found in the literature, e.g. by Treisman (2000), who is claiming an existence of a strong 
relationship between corruption reduction and good governance. That relation, of course, goes both 
ways, meaning that when bad governance is tolerated, in a long term, the corruption will blossom.  
Additional relations could occur by dint of changing rules, introducing intentional delays or 
needless prerequisites, all with the purpose of generating extra payoffs for public administrators. 
The generally high levels of corruption and low levels of quality of government that are found 
in most contemporary countries turn out to have devastating effects on democracy, prosperity, social 
well-being, public satisfaction, and social trust (Rothstein, 2013). In most of the countries with 
extensive and long history of corruption, could be recognised either poor legislative regulations or 
unsuitable administrative reforms, or both. What is needed to turn the polarity of this relation (from 
bad to good governance) is to reduce both the opportunity and incentive for government officials to 
seek or accept bribes (Morgan, 1998). That is one of the key postulates of the SD model, presented 
in Chapter 4 – direct relation between corruption cases and incentive or inclination to corrupt further.  
Another remarkable SD based study of relations linked with corruption was found in the 
literature. Ullah and Arthanari (2011) described the concept of corruption in Pakistan using a Causal 
Loop Diagram (CLD). Although they develop a macro-level framework that capture the dynamics of 
corruption in social, cultural, political, and legal systems, it can be used to study corruption dynamics 
by the means of SD. Figure 5 illustrates the high-level diagram of an overall model of corruption.   
Almost all countries in the world have an informal economy (Cobb and Gonzalez, 2007), it 
can be defined as that part of the total economy in the country that neither registers with the 
government nor pays taxes on any business transaction. If the size of an informal economy is greater, 
the tax base for sales and for corporate and individual income taxes that are withheld by employers, 
will be smaller. Ultimately, it causes a reduction in government revenue.  
To increase the tax base, the government will attempt to offset this loss of income by (a) 
increasing taxes in the formal economy, or (b) increasing import duties. Either response by the 
government is likely to force even more businesses out of the formal economy. As a result, the amount 
of public funds to pay salaries of government employees decreases. When a government is suffering 
a reduction in funds for salaries, it will either reduce the number of government sector jobs or reduce 
wages. As the actual wage rate falls below the acceptable levels, government employees have even 
less incentive to refrain from corrupt practices, and the competent workforce begins to leave 
government service. 
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Figure 5 CLD macro-level of corruption 
                                                        (Adapted from Ullah and Arthanari, 2011) 
 
Based on the above mentioned feedback relations, the understanding of the compound 
corruption phenomenon is enhanced and it allows the author to design a new structure of the real 
system applied to an empirical case in Serbia in order to dynamically assess the organisational 
performance.  
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2.4 Performance Management  
 
 
When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you 
know something about it . . . [otherwise] your knowledge is of a meagre and 
unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely in 
thought advanced to the stage of science.                                                                                  
(Lord Kelvin, 1824-1907) 
 
Performance Management is an activity that executives carry out in order to accomplish the 
predefined targets, derived from the institution’s strategic goals. Performance Management Systems 
turn out to be more significant in the latest years since “executives, coming from the public or private 
sector, are under permanent pressure to enhance the performance of their organisations” (Holloway, 
Francis & Hinton, 1999: 351). 
However, external stakeholders have been inclined itself to consider only financial 
performance, and to use backgrounds and theories drawn mainly from the economics. Traditional 
financial measures are critiqued for many reasons. Firstly, they are missing strategic focus and are 
unable to provide data on quality, responsiveness and flexibility (Skinner, 1974). Secondly, they urge 
managers to diminish the discrepancies from standard rather than ask to improve continually (Turney 
and Andersen, 1989). To end with, they are criticised for being focused on history (Dixon et al., 
1990). EBIT, for example, solely shows what has been achieved last month or last year, while utmost 
stakeholders would like to have projecting measures that point out what could happen in the future 
period, like next months, or next years. 
Recently, there has been noticed a turn from the assessment of financial performance or 
performance measurement to a more structural development of the Performance Management.  
Performance measurement needs to fulfil the following assumptions (Bititcti et al., 2000):   
 to ensure that gains achieved through improvement actions are maintained; 
 to be sensitive to all the changes in the external and internal environment of an organization; 
revising and reprioritizing internal goals when the changes in the external and internal 
environment are noteworthy adequate; and 
 to deploy the changes to internal objectives and priorities to critical parts of the organisation, 
therefore, to ensure alignments continually take place. 
Up till now, a considerable number of the studies have been concentrated on specific models 
and frameworks for performance measurement, however that little has been done to describe and 
34 
 
investigate concerns with the application of these models and frameworks (Holloway, 2001). Bourne 
(2001) explicates a good performance measurement implementation as a Performance Measurement 
system, which is benefitted by the management team commonly to discuss and manage business 
performance associated matters. Atkinson et al. (1997) reasoned that performance related questions 
can be understood as primary objectives (and results) which are externally oriented and concerned 
with measurable deliverables, and internally oriented secondary objectives concerned with how 
services will be delivered (as cited in Kloot and Martin, 2000). Correspondingly, Kaplan and Norton’s 
(1996) Balanced Scorecard debates for performance measurement over four dimensions of 
performance: ﬁnancial, customer satisfaction, internal business processes, and innovation and 
learning dimension.   
In order to observe, create, and sustain doable patterns of behaviour, the framework by 
Anthony (1965) at the Harvard Business School was established called ‘management planning and 
control systems’. This traditional framework made a distinction ‘management control’ from ‘strategic 
planning’ and ‘operational control’. The goal was to concentrate not only on financial indicators 
provided by accounting but to manage dynamics and patterns. Fitzgerald et al. (1991) clarify that 
Performance Management System encompasses the management of results (ends) and the 
determining factors of these results (means) lacking to specify precisely what these involve 
theoretically or practically.  
 
2.4.1 Different approaches of Performance Management 
 
Managing strategic resources to affect performance drivers and end-results related to a certain 
organisation is a dynamic and complex assignment. The resources and their results are dynamically 
changing over time. Also, the identification of the strategic resources may be difficult to structure 
since most of the analyses are grounded on financial indicators. Indeed, intangible resources are 
difficult to identify and measure (like employee attitudes, preference, and creativity). For illustration, 
liquidity (strategic resource) may change as an effect of cash flows (end-result); image and integrity 
of an organization to the customers (strategic resource) may change because of their (non) satisfaction 
(end-result). There are also interdependencies between different strategic resources. The image may 
affect the capability of an organisation to get funds from venture capitals or other stakeholders, for 
example. 
While reading the related literature, several attempts to approach dynamically managing of 
performance were discerned. Conventional Performance Management approach explains company’s 
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performance as a direct result of the unique combination of its resources (Grant, 1995). So-called 
resource-based view (RBV) explains differences in firms' performance and competitive position in 
terms of grants of fundamental productive assets or resources (Barney, 1991). However, this approach 
is seen as the static one. To evaluate the organisation’s performance dynamics, important to assess 
behaviour over time (the organisation’s performance can be observed both in the short and in the 
long-term).  
Kloot and Martin (2000) research on local government using a qualitative methodology 
provides evidence that organisation’s performance management systems put emphasis on managing 
the effectiveness of outcomes - in terms of customer satisfaction, and in specifying outcome measures 
during the planning process. Their research had implications for performance measurements on four 
dimensions of the balanced scorecard, already explained in the previous section. Moreover, they 
identified many strategic choices that affect the organisation’s outcome and provided an overview of 
how these choices developed from the traditional approach to a performance oriented approach (see 
Table 2-1). The significance of a focus on both results and the means of achieving these results is 
particularly underlined.  
Table 2-2 Public Performance Management Approaches comparison 
Traditional Approach Performance-Oriented Approach 
Focus on ﬁnancial measures only Focus on ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial measures: a 
results and determinants approach 
Top-down State Government, control-oriented 
performance measurement 
Strategic, collaborative development of a PMS 
involving all stakeholders 
Imposition of universal, industry-wide measures 
with less validity for speciﬁc councils 
In-house development of valid, speciﬁc measures 
to be used for organisational improvement and 
benchmarking with similar organisations 
Periodic reporting for the purpose of meeting 
control requirements of senior management, 
public agencies and State Government 
Real-time, up-to-date performance information 
for all stakeholders to monitor progress, show 
accountability and manage outcome 
Fragmentary, myopic approach with a focus on 
the measurement process 
Integrated PMS  across the organisation focussed 
on value-for-money service delivery and 
organisational improvement 
        (Adapted from Kloot and Martin, 2000) 
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Three elements can be distinguished as important ones in the analysis: goals, results and 
resources. According to the focus they give to one of these elements, two similar approaches can be 
distinguished in managing dynamically the organisation’s performance (Bianchi, 2001). The 
frameworks have the perspective to be beneficial in any area where the ideas of the original static 
RBV have been already accepted. They are not alternative one to another but rather supportive 
frameworks.  
To start with, Dynamic Resource-Systems View was constructed by Morecroft et al. (2000) 
on the basis of RVB framework. The main characteristic of this dynamic explanatory view is that it 
combines the System Dynamics with the context of the RBV of the company. The goal is to 
understand how competitive advantage arises in companies over time. The DRBV sees companies as 
the resource systems; therefore, the focus is on the resources. Resources can be categorised into 
tangible or intangible, and managed or unmanaged (Morecroft, 1998). DRBV emphases the process 
of PM system design, the means rather than the detail of concrete measures. Thus, has the strategic 
perspective, and basing on the resources the performance is set. In this case, means, drivers are not 
needed, and decisions are made upon coordination of resources. Goals are not made explicit; they are 
outside of DRBV and usually they are set on political, board level (in case of SMEs often only as a 
mental model of the owner).  
A similar approach is Dynamic Performance Management (DPM), which also relies on the 
use of SD but has a different perspective. This framework focuses on the results (Bianchi, 2001). 
Based on desired results, the related drivers are recognised and only then, needed resources are 
identified. The approach, therefore, focuses on budgeting strategic planning, and decisions are made 
upon coordination of the resources. Policymakers (in case of public institutions, the general assembly) 
plan certain strategic aim based on the desired level of the financial result. In this case, drivers are 
imperative as the means of reaching desired results. Thus, based on the drivers the necessary resources 
are planned. Goals are seen as an instrument in the process and, therefore, the view is so-called 
“instrumental view”. In Figure 6 is shown how, in a planning context, once defined the results, it is 
required to move backwards. For example, to outline the underlying processes and activities, and then 
to define goals and objectives, as well as products. 
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Figure 6 A synthetic picture of “objective”, “instrumental”, and “subjective” view 
Source: Bianchi, 2012 
 
To implement this view, important is to detect performance measures related to both end-
results and respective drivers. The end-results are seen as efficiency or effectiveness measures of 
results, for the realisation of final products. Drivers are used to affecting end-results according to the 
expected direction and time horizon. Performance measures associated with the drivers are usually 
related to processes from which the realisation of intermediate products is possible. Therefore, each 
public organisation should recognise and arrange a proper patronage of strategic resources, 
systemically connected to each other.  
Additionally, Bianchi (2010) differentiate two different and related levels for measuring and 
managing organisational performance under the perspective of sustainability, i.e.: an institutional and 
an inter-institutional level. According to the institutional level, performance is analysed as an output 
or an outcome of the implemented policy(ies) and the activities that are carried on by decision-makers 
in a particular institution. That means that evaluation of organisational results is done mainly by 
comparing the results made by decision-makers on their organisations. On the other side, the 
interinstitutional level assesses performance as an outcome of the implemented strategies and the 
activities by a public governor in diverse, but interrelated institutions or organisational parts. Strictly 
speaking, performance is evaluated by comparing the results of the organisation with the impacts 
generated by decision-makers in the broader system, e.g. either a bounded territorial area or the 
industry to which they belong (Bianchi and Tomaselli, 2013).  
Performance evaluation on an institutional level – a company or public organisation level, still 
conserves a traditional perspective when assessing success and/or sustainability of growth. Regarding 
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a public organisation, performance is mainly evaluated with respective financial results, for example, 
sales orders, expenses, income, and cash ﬂows. Thanks to developing dynamic complexity both in 
the market-oriented and public structures for offering goods and services, institutions and firms more 
and more recognise an increasing necessity to evaluate organisational performance at an inter-
institutional level too.  
In actual fact, by looking at only financial results, they may neglect to consider some 
important elements that might leave an impact on its performance. Such factors can be connected to 
delays, nonlinearity, intangibles, and to not deliberate consequences on human perceptions and 
behaviour triggered by a superficial “or mechanistic approach in setting performance targets, 
especially if such targets are used as a basis for organisational incentive and career systems” (Bianchi 
et al., 2015).  
Evaluating performance at an institutional level, although not sufficient for a comprehensive 
analysis of the performance, is the ﬁrst step to evaluating performance at an inter-institutional level. 
Indeed, an organisation that is capable of balancing the production of proﬁts with the opening of 
additional workplaces, or of contributing to the industrial know-how while improving functional 
characteristics of goods at a realistic cost, is expected to have an appreciated feedback from numerous 
stakeholders. The positive feedback might be expected in a form of higher tax payments, rising 
employment, joint know-how, and environmental contributions. These broader benefits will, in turn, 
offer superior conditions for the establishment of better standards for each organisation, and, 
therefore, will create the further progression of the institutional level.  
Having in mind that the analysed Anti-hail Public Service provider produces several different, 
but highly interrelated results (outputs and outcomes), to dynamically assess its performance the inter-
institutional level has been followed in this works. For that reason, the focus is put on the 
identification of the performance indicators, concerning both the drivers and end-results (so-called 
instrumental view), and the goal is to correlate and model their inter-connections (so-called 
institutional level).  
Therefore, SD modelling has a significant role in adopting a process—rather than functions—
oriented view of performance. With a process-oriented view, the influence of organisation on results 
are considered, besides the effects generated by material and information delays. From a strategic 
standpoint, the formulation and implementation of a DPM system may assist decision makers to 
overcome the shortcomings mentioned above of traditional PM frameworks and support them in 
improving decision-making processes. For all above reasons the SD methodology (Forrester, 1961) 
is proposed (and the simulation package iThinkTM in particular).  
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III CHAPTER METHODOLOGY  
 
 
“The case study emphasizes the proximal causes of the behaviour and circumstances, 
whereas life history emphasizes the remote origins, and the continuities and 
discontinuities in the organization of behaviour over a relatively long period of time" 
Bromley (1991, p. 86) 
 
This chapter summarises the two-phase methodology (a Case Study and System Dynamics 
model) applied to this research to answer the research questions: a) How can our understanding of 
corruption be extended by using a DPM approach?; b) What would a SD model of corruption in 
public procurement in Serbian Anti-Hail Public Service provider look like?; and c) What are the 
contributions of such a model? The function of this section is to: (a) appraise the research 
methodology chosen and why it was adopted for the research question, and (b) describe how the 
model is analysed in. This chapter also covers the research methodology of the study, data collection 
instruments, and data analysis methods used in this study. A justification for the reasons these were 
selected is outlined. Figure 7 demonstrates the phases of this work.   
 
Figure 7 Phases of the Research 
 
3.1 Research Strategy  
 
The research strategy takes into consideration the accomplishment of several relevant 
academic researchers and thematic syntheses and they are valorising some sociological research 
methods. Polit and Hungler (1999) describe a research strategy as a blueprint, rough draught, used to 
conduct research in a supreme controlled manner, by focusing on any aspects that might obstruct the 
validity of the study results. Generally speaking, the research strategy is the academic’s widespread 
scheme aimed at finding answers to the questions that steer the exploration process. Indeed, planning 
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the process timely aids academics to conduct the research in a structured manner, and to achieve the 
anticipated results, therefore improving likelihoods that the results they gained are aligned with the 
actual conditions (Burns and Grove, 2003). In fact, the proper strategy of whichever study remains to 
be the common-sense order that links the empirical data to a research’s primary research questions 
and, finally, to its conclusion (Yin, 1989). 
Various research methods contribute to the wider understanding of different conditions under 
consideration and are used for diverse reasons (Deetz, 1996). As a consequence, the choice of research 
strategy applied have to be suitable to the particular phenomenon of concern. By focussing on the 
nature of the research topic and research question, instead on the research method, more suitable 
methodologies can be carefully chosen (Falconer & Mackay, 1999).  The ordinarily applied methods 
in qualitative studies are the case study, ethnography, grounded theory, and action research (Collis 
and Hussey, 2003). A case study is defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context; also is the best suitable strategy, when “how” and “why” 
questions are there, resolving mainly exploratory research problem” (Yin, 1989). The raison d'être of 
such a widespread application of this methodology in countless studies is because it allows capturing 
of all and complete real-life manifestations, and its activities, in natural setting, therefore, donating a 
comprehensive interpretation of a particular situation (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).   
In this research, a mixture of methodological methods was used for answering the research 
questions and investigating this sensitive subject. Having in mind the statements mentioned above, 
the focal strategy of this work is a case study, which is expected to provide basic framework and 
information for a structural model. It was decided to employ the case study methodology because of 
the qualitative and exploratory nature of the research as “the flexibility of the case study strategy 
lends itself particularly well to exploration” (Robson, 1993). This methodology is expected to be very 
beneficial to get information via qualitative research ways and means to detect different relations, 
aspects, connections and variables (and, in the bottom line, to ameliorate understanding of corruption 
by using a SD model).   
Therefore, the implementation of the research strategy started by applying, in the first phase, 
a case study approach so as to gather qualitative information for the second phase that applies a SD 
model. A research normally involves reviewing the main stakeholders such as public institutions and 
bodies, agencies, judiciary, NGO and the community in general. A mixture of two approaches was 
utilised to gather the information, namely interviews and document analysis. Considering that many 
previous case studies were conducted vis-à-vis human behaviour and interactive actions, comes as no 
surprise that interviews are an important source of case study evidence. Conversant participants 
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normally endow with shortcuts to the previous background of the investigated subject, give unofficial 
information, and shed the light on the hidden relations aiding scholars to detect additional sources of 
information. For an exploratory study, interviews could be a very useful technique to discover what 
is happening and to seek new insights (Robson, 1993), even though it is vastly time-consuming to 
gather all data, and material collected is problematic to compile for an analysis (Patton, 1990).  
According to Myers (2009) this methodology can be accomplished entirely on the basis of a 
one or a small number of interviews with key people. Henceforward, it is possible to have adequate 
available substance for further study (Miles and Huberman, 1994). In this work, taking into 
consideration the sensitivity of the subject matter as corruption certainly is, other sources of evidence 
besides an interview were used. Myers (2009) further illustrates that written documents can be 
valuable as they constantly make available confirmation of information and data, which persons on 
occasion have trouble recalling. Documentary evidence takes account of things such as research 
reports, annual reports, newspaper selections, and memorandums  
Document analysis is a method used in qualitative case investigations to examine documents 
or describe the content of connections. The qualitative study is closely connected with the analysis 
and depiction of the practices which generate patterns of behaviour, and “measures information based 
on opinions and values, not on statistical data” (Yin, 2009). The data obtained by the means of the 
statistical and public administrative scale will be analysed in connection with the performance 
indicator of public procurement of the Anti-hail Public service provider in Serbia.  
To develop a System Dynamics model, the material from the official public report submitted 
by The Anti-Corruption Council (an expert, advisory body of the Government) to the Prime Minister 
of the Republic of Serbian, in 2010 was used. The report describes the structure and the behaviour 
dynamics that result from that structure regarding corruption in the public procurement of anti-hail 
rockets. Also, several informal interviews were conducted, where all the participants insisted on 
remaining anonymous. While the interview did not provide any empirical data, they did provide 
detailed qualitative descriptions that can be represented formally in a System Dynamics model. 
Moreover, the literature review carried out for this study helps in defining many of the relationships 
between variables.  
It is worthy to mention here that some interesting relationships have been developed in the 
model from the qualitative data analysis already explained in Chapter 2, Section 3. Empirical data 
were collected from various statistical sources, governmental reports, publicly available data and 
newspapers articles.  
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3.1.1 Difficulties in Studying Corruption  
 
In any research project, researchers are expected to adopt high standards of academic rigour, 
and to act with honesty and integrity. Ethical issues, such as those related to informed consent and 
confidentiality are more probable to arise in qualitative research. Some difficulties emerge 
specifically because a high level of rapport, so important for many characteristics of qualitative 
research, has been established between researcher and participant. Informed consent is seen to be one 
of the most significant issues in qualitative research.  In fact, it is regarded as the 'key issue' in research 
with human beings (Bogdan and Taylor, 1992).   
 To carry out an interview on the topic of corruption the researcher has to rely on his contacts, 
as participants were a bit scared to give an interview to someone to whom they do not have any 
connection. In a few cases, a snowball technique has been used to select participants but in most cases 
personal contacts were the easiest way to approach participants. According to Konza (1998), covert 
research is claimed to have some validity if it is used to expose malpractice or corruption. 
Alternatively, if there is no risk to the participants, it is widely rejected and is seen by many as being 
intrinsically wrong. Some researchers argue that “the foremost consideration in research should be 
given to the dignity of the research participants, and that on these grounds alone, deception in research 
can never be condoned” (Kiegelmann, 1996).  
Corruption is a challenging and exceptionally sensitive problem that requires lots of 
protections for whistle-blowers. In order to accomplish a “somewhat coherent understanding of 
statements, actions and perceptions, which may prove to be varied and may be ambiguous, it is 
important to engage in participant observation in various social situations, as well as conduct different 
sorts of interviews and conversations with various stakeholders - ranging from 'informal 
conversations' to 'structured interviews'” (Bernard, 1994).  
According to Stulhofer et al. (2008), corruption studies are a significant component of an 
effective anti-corruption policy. It is further argued that since “corrupt practices occur in the 'grey 
area' of social behaviour ― which makes measuring the level of corruption very difficult ― the 
research on corruption is often descriptive and suggestive at best”. The implicit method to studying 
corruption (by the use of surveys) dominates, and, despite the fact it continuously welcomes criticism, 
it is commonly presumed that perception of corruption is a fairly accurate index of the actual level of 
corruption (Lambsdorff, 1999).   
 According to some researchers, “studies on corruption were limited due to ethical concerns, 
cultural sensibilities, and methodological difficulties in the past. The reason for facing such problems 
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were mainly related to the ethical concerns that stemmed from the researchers having to resort to 'gift 
giving and bribery themselves, and researchers exposing informants and putting themselves in danger 
as they explored the nefarious realms of organised crime and corrupt politics” (Haller and Shore, 
2005). Andvig et al. (2000) suggest that corruption is hard to approach methodologically because of 
its complex nature and because individuals are hesitant to admit their interaction with it even when it 
is pervasive.   
The suitable method that could reveal the collective behaviour rules and local moral codes 
regarding corrupt activities can be found in informal interviews. Focus group debates and case studies 
can also be fruitful in some situations. According to Blundo and Sardan (2000), the significance of 
methodological triangulation approaches and methods can be mixed and used simultaneously - e.g. 
informal interviews interacted with observations and newspaper articles, or official reports, to 
validate and confirm the findings.  
According to Yin (2009), case studies present a more difficult situation than when using other 
research methods because these interactions are not essentially as structured as with other methods. 
It is also important to protect those who participate in the study from any harm, including avoiding 
any deception in the study. However, Miller (2006) argues that if there is any contentious issue then 
covert participant observation can be used. Myers (2009) suggests that covert observation can be used 
if it is the only way to obtain data. Myers further stated that the covert participant observation might 
be the only way to study, for example, crime or corruption. Qualitative research progresses as the 
researchers proceed with data collection and analysis. Plans that have been made in the office or on 
the computer in the quiet of their space by researchers may need to change as they proceed in the real 
world.   
 
3.2 Research Process of System Dynamics Modelling  
  
Measurement is not an end in itself. To be effective it must be part of a feedback control 
system where corrective action is taken within the process – and results are fed back into 
consideration of future strategy.                                                                                                
Fitzgerald (2007) 
 
This chapter describes the modus operandi of systems thinking that can ratify the relationships 
shaped by the SD model of corruption. It has the lone purpose of interpreting the natures of complex 
relations between variables and their potential behaviours. To illustrate that relations, firstly are used 
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diagramming tools to symbolise dynamic hypothesis and behaviour, to support their understanding 
and the capture of the mental models. 
The modelling process itself is a feedback process, not a linear sequence of steps. Models go 
through constant iteration, continual questioning, testing, and refinement and the products of any 
iteration can yield insights that result in revisions in any previous step' (indicated by the links in the 
centre of the diagram, Sterman (2000)). 
 
Figure 8 Modelling Iterative Process 
 (Adapted from Sterman 2000) 
 
Normally, the problem articulation is the definition of the issue the researcher wants to 
investigate. It includes the description of the current problem behaviour and its background.  The next 
task in applying the systems methodology to modelling, in this case corruption, is to define the key 
system features. Subsequent, to construct a diagram that captures the key dynamic hypotheses of the 
observed system, containing the major feedback loops. Qualitative System Dynamics tools are also 
called causal loop diagrams (CLD) or influence diagrams. They are used to represent feedback 
processes around the central topic of interest. They are not followed by the real values and are not 
numerically expressed. Therefore, they are not used for simulations and policy testing. On the other 
hand, quantitative SD models, are fully numerically supported. They support the formulation of the 
model based on the CLD in the previous stages and aim to run the simulation and test different 
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policies, consequently. The details on fundamentals of System Dynamics methodology are described 
in Appendix B.  
For a more accurate quantitative analysis, an influence diagram of the corruption model will 
be transformed into a stock and flow diagram. Moreover, it is essential to perform a kind of validation 
regarding past data; variables' past conditions should end up with the depiction of a known state of 
the system in the respective period (Sterman, 2000). 
 In this dissertation, the attention is on one particular issue - the corruption in public 
procurement that has, more or less directly, the influence on economic and social distribution, in the 
country. According to Sterman (2000), in System Dynamics models variables are classified as either 
exogenous or endogenous variables. Table 3-1 shows the variables of the empirical model that are 
labelled as endogenous, exogenous, and variables that are excluded. Exogenous variables are 
variables that are not part of a feedback loop (in this study market price of the rockets is exogenous) 
while endogenous variables are members of at least one feedback loop. A few variables are excluded 
from the model due to the unavailability of reliable data and for the sake of simplicity; these variables 
could be considered for inclusion in a future work.  
Table 3-3 Key Variables of the Corruption Model 
Endogenous Exogenous Excluded 
Corruption Market price of the rockets Moral Values 
People attitude against 
corruption  
(Inclination to corrupt) 
Desired protected arable land Payments to influential 
Arable land protected Budget level Service Quality 
Anti-hail rockets   
Public Satisfaction   
Money Dispersion   
 
In the literature review chapter, we saw a whole range of potentially significant joint 
dependencies (and feedback dynamics) that capture overall system behaviour and performance over 
time rather than one ‘dependent variable’. A causal loop diagram of the model’s structure is 
constructed from these key variables, illustrating the major feedback processes of the corruption 
procurement model. Therefore, a feedback loop is a closed loop of cause-effect, and an interdependent 
set of feedback loops is a feedback system, Richardson & Pugh (1981).  
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Both reinforcing and balancing feedback loops39 were identified. The arrow between variables 
indicates that a causal relationship exists between variables A and B. The sign at the head of the arrow 
signifies the nature of the relationships as follows:    
 
An arrow from A to B with a positive sigh means a positive value for the partial derivate of 
A with respect to B; an arrow with a negative sign means a negative value for the partial derivate.   
Behaviour of the corruption model is constrained by balancing feedback and driven by reinforcing 
loops, where all variables have + or positive influence one on another. The structure of the model 
contains variables identified during literature review analysis in Chapter 2, e.g. government 
expenditure, the inclination to corruption, effects of corruption, and cumulative corruption. Similarly, 
socioeconomic variables, as discussed in the previous chapter, include perceived corruption, public 
satisfaction, people's attitude against corruption, tax evasion, etc. They will be argued in further detail 
in balancing feedback loops in the next section. 
According to Qureshi (2009), the System Dynamics models are causal models and these 
models should generate the right behaviour for right reasons. The general direction of these functions 
is based on corruption literature and interviews for this study. Time constants for the flows are 
constant per year for the simulation. 
 
3.3 Implementing SD to enhance traditional PMS into DPMS 
 
Traditional PMS may deliver a static analysis of value creation processes and, therefore, may 
not consider the time delays existing between the adoption of a policy and the achievement of the 
related results, Cosenz (2013). In addition, not tangible variables and nonlinearities often 
considerably influence strategic resources, and the associated performance drivers and end-results. 
To overcome such undesired effects, by incorporating SD models to PMS is possible to ease decision-
makers’ understanding. 
In addition, “identifying administrative products, mapping the underlying processes and 
matching them to key-responsibility areas is a major component of developing a System Dynamics 
                                                          
39 When the main loop behaviour is one of reinforcing the original state of the system, the loop is positive. When the main 
loop behaviour is one of opposing the initial situation of the system, the loop is negative, balancing or goal seeking.    
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(SD) model-based performance management approach” (Cosenz and Bianchi, 2013).  SD models 
may support decision-makers in identifying those policy levers on which to act to undertake 
sustainable performance improvement programmes in universities (details of the SD model are shown 
in Chapter 4). SD modelling is used to depict the dynamics of the strategic resources and the factors 
determining performance – drivers (since some of the strategic resources are hard to express and 
quantitatively measure). 
To evaluate the outcomes of public policies, a civic decision-maker, e.g. a regional planner, 
needs to move the focus of analysis from an institutional to an inter-institutional perspective (Bianchi 
2010: 378–381). The relevant system’s boundaries for such analysis are much broader than those 
associated with an institutional perspective. In fact, other public and private institutions will be 
involved in such a system. 
An inter-institutional system’s perspective, apart from evaluating the sustainability of the 
performance based on the single organisation’s results, should take into account how such results 
participate in the wider system’s performance (that will influence the organisation in the long run). 
Inside such a broader system, strategic resources such as infrastructures, human capital, capacity, 
image, and the environment are shared among the organisations and built for mutual benefit. Both 
the aggregate performance of a territory or industry and the speciﬁc performance of each organization 
inside it are signiﬁcantly affected by the accumulation and depletion processes of social capital and 
other strategic resources, e.g., infrastructures and image. 
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IV CHAPTER AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
 
 
The more corrupt the republic, the more numerous the laws.  
Tacitus, Annals 
 
 The interpretation so far communicated a not very imposing picture about Serbia’s 
development performance. The intention of this thesis, however, is not to portray Serbia in a negative 
light. Therefore, this chapter seeks to explicate the intricacies of corrupt public procurement practices 
influencing, among other factors, its development performance. 
Constructed from the previous description of the problems facing Serbia, this chapter moves 
on to investigate the occurrences of corruption more directly. Firstly, investigation via publicly 
available arguments of the range of the phenomenon in a particular public service provider. Secondly, 
research via discussion of some of the key relations, feedback factors, and simulation results of 
embedding of corruption; before finally moving on to consider some of  the outcome-based 
performance related attempts made to tackle corruption through implementation of possible policies. 
 
 
4.1 Problem Articulation  
 
Thieves for their robbery have authority 
When judges steal themselves. 
William Shakespeare, 1623 
 
The key problem addressed by this work is the debatable public procurement practice by 
Republic Hydrometeorological Service of Serbia (RHMSS), and more specifically procurement of 
the anti-hail rockets (missiles) that are used for the protection of the agricultural land in Serbia from 
hail. The official report number 72 submitted to the Prime Minister on October 16 by Anti-Corruption 
Council - the foundation of this work, publicly revealed several instances of bad governance of the 
public funds.  
According to the claims of the assistant director of RHMSS who addressed the Council, the 
rockets were procured via direct negotiations with the supplier Poliester" from Priboj, at a higher 
price than could be reached by the public tender. Moreover, priority purchase of rockets always had 
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company "Poliester"40, without sufficient argumentation (except that they have well past 
collaboration). It is further stated that, other than missiles procured via official purchases, in the main 
warehouse of the RHMSS in Rekovac were stocked the additional rockets, which have not officially 
been ordered or purchased, supposedly because company "Poliester" had nowhere to store them. 
Eventually, these rockets, which were there for storing purposes, were bought with funds from the 
budget.  
The purchased quantity of the rockets is disputable as well. Namely, besides the accounting 
records of the number of bought and used rockets, other analytical databases would, in theory, have 
to match up with accounting records. These databases originate from RHMSS sector that deals with 
keeping the records of a number of launched rockets, based on the radars data about affected clouds 
by the rockets. According to the allegations that were submitted to the Council, the unregistered 
rockets (mis)usage reached the amount of approximately 28.000 rockets - actually the Anti-
Corruption Council report (2010) states that the mismatch in the number of rockets is 28.501. In other 
words, for the total of 28.501 rockets no evidence exists as a proof that they were actually used. 
According to the statements of the assistant director, it can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, the 
rockets were launched into the clear sky only to be consumed. Another explanation is that the rockets 
did not exist at the first place, since there is a general arrangement (and practice) to distribute directly 
the rockets from the "Poliester" factory to the end users - radar centres, without any mechanism of 
control from the central warehouse in Rekovac. However, at the end of the financial year, a set of the 
accounts showing the income, expenses, and the net results for tax purposes needs to be summaries 
and finalised, and that includes the accounting records, as well. As per the Anti-Corruption Council 
report, only at that point the records concerning the rockets were made. Also, a document confirming 
the entrance to the main warehouse (receipt of the missiles) was retroactive signed by a person that 
never had seen that rockets before. 
These statements support the suspicious that there is a strong and close coalition between 
supplier and buyer (in this case manufacturer Poliester from Priboj and RHMSS)41. It is deducted in 
this report that either the rockets were used randomly during the year in the days with no hail, or – 
                                                          
40 There are certain amounts of the rockets bought from the other suppliers, but they are very modest if not trivial. For 
example, in 2010 from the "Krusik", Valjevo only 270 anti-hail rockets were procured. In the "Krusik" they claim that 
they can quickly and efficiently produce missiles, however, they are receiving only minor orders per year (the orders 
amount never had exceeded 500 pieces). http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/aktuelno.69.html:332443-Njive-od-grada-
nema-ko-da-cuva 
41 For more testimonials, read – in Serbian, 
http://www.transparentnost.org.rs/stari/index.php?view=details&id=357%3Amediji-o-
korupciji&pop=1&tmpl=component&option=com_eventlist&lang=sr  or 
http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=946179 
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more probably, however without a verdict so far42, that these rockets were displaced to be 
purchased/paid again (there is a certain recurrence rate). Both alternatives are undoubtedly not driven 
by a good governmental practice and efficient usage of a public fund but on the pure lucrative motives 
of gaining private interests.  
Whether it has one or the other explanation, the damage is immense. If we bear in mind that 
those disputed quantities were paid with the price per rocket around 300 EUR, then the estimated 
damage and misuse of the public funds is over 8.5 million EUR43. The problem itself is a dynamic 
one, since the act of official buying, and misusing is repeatedly happening during the whole year, and 
every single year with delayed different non-linear and accumulative effects. This dynamic behaviour 
will be analysed in terms of the effects of such practice on several strategic resources, and possible 
actions that could be undertaken to mitigate not only the unbefitting end results but also the roots of 
this complex problem. 
 
4.2 Formulation of the Dynamic Hypothesis 
 
The report indicates that there exist several irregularities, and at the same time a close 
connection between supplier and buyer, and even co-location. Since the RHMSS and Poliester 
(supplier in the rest of the text) share the same storage place, there is no clear evidence of entry/exit 
of the rockets from this storage place, and the grounds for corruption are fruitful. However, it cannot 
be reasonably assumed that more than 20.000 high-priced rockets were launched into a clear sky “just 
for fun”. Most likely, and also as described in the official report, we are facing planned and organise 
abuse of rules.  
Therefore, it is realistic to adopt the hypothesis that because of the clear corruption practice, 
occurs a different depletion of the rockets, other that the official purpose of the rocket – to hit the hail 
clouds in order to protect better the agricultural land. That certain amount of anti-hail rockets is again 
purchased from the same supplier. However, it is not reasonable to assume that every year enormous 
amount of the rockets is being smuggled or repurchased. For the purpose of this research, I will start 
with the hypothesis that every year only 10% or procured rockets are disputed during the year, and 
                                                          
42 A criminal charge was sent to the prosecutor's office mid-August 2010 uttering that for years, anti-hail rockets 
procurement was performed by direct agreement with the favoured producer "Poliester" from Priboj, and that due to the 
uncontrolled spending of public funds in the last six years, there was been a damage of over 8.5 million EUR. 
43 The official investigation of this subject was initiated but not any results were concluded from it. Source: 
http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Pocela-istraga-u-RHMZ-u.lt.html.  
The damage was that high because, instead of optimal number of usage of 30.000 rockets that year were available only 
13.250 rockets for shooting, http://www.slobodnaevropa.mobi/a/grad_srbija_rakete/2124577.html 
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since the real need is constant - that amount of rockets is required and thus is being procured again. 
That is a simple and fair assumption, used to show the dynamics of such a practice.  
Consequently, the bigger quantity of rockets procured directly leads to the greater smuggled 
amount of rockets, which in turn leads to the higher public procurement expenditures. With every 
amount of misused public funds, history of corruption cases becomes bigger or so to say corruption 
cases accumulates. The rockets purchase rate (and consequently smuggling rate and public 
procurement expenditures) is triggered by the actual need for rockets coming from desired agriculture 
land that needs protection. How much of the agricultural land needs to be protected by using anti-hail 
missiles, is a constant of the territory area that is decided by the Ministry of Agriculture and that 
defines the required number of anti-hail rockets.44 Since there is a certain amount of rockets that are 
actually not being used for the seeding of the clouds, subsequently more and more land is remaining 
unprotected and, in turn, occurs a higher or additional need for buying new rockets. For that reason, 
as the number or rockets bought increases so does the smuggling rate (as a percentage of the rockets 
procured).   
As stated by the Anti-Corruption Council report, public procurement is continuously realised 
without official and public tender, although the public tender is usually initiated45. That is not in 
compliance with the law of the Republic of Serbia, however, it is a common practice.46 A brief look 
at the figures from the report of the Public Procurement submitted to the Serbian Government tells us 
that it is a non-transparent implementation of public procurement through the legally prescribed 
negotiated procedure without publication of the call is still frequently applied.  
The authorities from this Public service organization are justifying that by stating that they 
have the best practice and excellent historical relation with the provider company. Based on their 
statements, the provider company is available on the very short notice, they have good experience 
with them in a long term, and they are even sharing the same storage place. On the ground of that 
collaboration, Anti-hail rockets price paid is 300 EUR per rocket. If there would be a public tender, 
and the other providers would be considered than the price that could be reached is 200 EUR. There 
                                                          
44 Experts in the area worth mentioning are Tihomir Dejanovic (2012) and Dragan Nikolic, read in Serbian 
http://www.znanjenapoklon.rs/clanci/agroekonomija/otvoreno-pismo-ministru-velimiru-ilicu.html  
45 Recently, there has been a purchase of 20 vehicles from the public funds dedicated, among other thing, for the rockets 
procurement. Anti-Corruption Council has reacted on that as well (read, in Serbian, http://grockainfo.com/kupili-20-
dzipova-a-nemaju-za-protivgradne-rakete/) however, even the Council has severe problems when trying to obtain relevant 
information http://www.b92.net/video/vesti.php?yyyy=2015&mm=09&dd=17&nav_id=1040735  
46 Because the shreds of evidence of this corrupt practice were brought to light, there were certain attempts to change the 
situation. The example of that is changing the authority from RHMSS to Ministry of Inferior in 2010. However, this 
decision did not result in improving the service. Quite on the contrary – with the transfer of mandate to Ministry of Inferior 
more land remained unprotected (possibly because the lack of experience and organisational defects for anti-hail 
procedures). That led to the newest decision in 2015 when the mandate is returned to RHMSS. 
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is an enormous discrepancy between these two prices, and that is another obvious example of 
corruption.  
Based on the elaborated hypothesis, several reinforcing loops that triggers corruption in this 
service organization are identified. The main reinforcing loop is R1, which shows that with bigger 
accumulated corruption (History of corruption cases) from previous years, then decision makers face, 
with certain time delay, the higher inclination to corrupt further. So to say, when their behaviour is 
not properly controlled and sanctioned, they continue this practice in the years to follow. The “profit 
appetite” grows, therefore influencing the fraction of quantity (meaning that in the years to come the 
number of ordered rockets might increase since every single rocket is the source of private, corrupt 
profit of the people involved in this corrupt practice).   
Grounded in the literature review and the above qualitative dissection, Figure 9 illustrates 
three reinforcing loops “R1”, “R2”, and “R3” that are detected and that will be used in the empirical 
application in the next section. The role of government can be observed in the feedback loop R1, 
which deals with the constructs of government expenses and public bureaucrats’ attitude towards 
corruption. The higher the levels of bribery are, result and consequently increases the inclination to 
corrupt further and, in a long term, will increase governmental expenditures.  
 
Figure 9 Reinforcing feedback loops 
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Generally, bureaucratic malpractice manifest in the diversion of public funds to  the areas 
where payoffs are easiest to collect, therefore, abuse of public office may not only reduce the volume 
of public funds available to the government but may also lead to misallocation of those funds. In this 
particular case, public money were not only spent on disputable quantities of the rockets, but the 
misuse occurs also connected with the price that is paid for rockets (see R3). Feedback loop R2 
explains the purpose or so to say the actual need for the anti-hail rockets procurement. To protect the 
arable land from possible devastating effects from the hail a number of rockets available per year for 
such a purpose has to surpass its minimum required number.. More about this methodology, historical 
background, its practical application, and the required settings for a good governance the reader can 
find in Appendix A.  
On the other side, the inclination to corrupt further is limited by the several balancing loops, 
presented in Figure 10. The first of them, loop B1 comes from the amount or level of land that is 
actually protected. With all the inefficiencies originating from the poor procurement process and 
resulting in not having enough anti-hail rockets to actually and timely protect the arable land, the 
public become furious. This behaviour directly leads to the diminishing level of public satisfaction, 
which - with certain time lag - makes pressure on the public bureaucrats and stops, or better to say, 
limits their inclination to corrupt further and more each year.  
 
Figure 10 Balancing feedback loops 
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The second balancing loop is originating from decreasing public satisfaction caused by 
obvious money dispersion of the public funds. Compared with indispensable public procurement 
expenditures, which the population of Serbia is more than willing to pay to protect their crops 
efficiently, there is a significant gap of money that is misused. That has a straightforward influence 
on public bureaucrats when they are deciding upon public funds usage. In addition to this limiting 
factor, inhabitants in Serbia make a similar effect with tax evasions that in turn make additional 
pressure not to corrupt further. 
It seems realistic to assume that if corruption increases and arable land protected deteriorates, 
the public satisfaction will decrease as shown in the balancing loop B1. The same as discussed in 
Chapter 2, as corruption increases public funds dispersion, it causes a diminution in economic growth 
too, leading to decrease further the general satisfaction, loop B2. The model also assumes that as 
perceived level of corruption increases the population will be further unhappy with the governmental 
actions.  Moreover, will face tax avoidance, which is a similar relation as the loop B2 (see Figure 11). 
Since attitudes towards corruption play a critical role in the persistence of corruption — if people’s 
attitude against corruption went high then the corruption would be decreased over time.  
 
Figure 11 Causal Loop Diagram 
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The nature of this research calls for a different approach when referring to hypotheses. The 
purpose of the model is to incorporate postulates of various reports. The endogenous estimations on 
the elements of the corruption practice are integrated into the model. The connection of different 
hypotheses results in a well-structured model, demonstrating multiple areas of the workflow and 
similar explanations of effects, usually separated by time delays. Therefore, the research project has 
objectives instead of only hypotheses, which will be elaborated in details in the next section.  
 
4.3 Simulation Model  
 
One of the research questions concerned structure of the model: How can strategic resources 
and their relations be framed in a specific Public Service provider? The RHMSS qualitative model 
combining different relations through feedback mechanisms to capture the behavioural complexity 
of corruption practices has been already explained in Figure 11.  
The primary objective is to create a model that conceptualizes the dynamics of a RHMSS 
performance drivers and strategic resources (and the end results, respectively). The purpose of such 
a model is to provide an understanding of the existing state of affairs of the public service provider 
being modelled and to indicate the path of reducing the corruption, as one of the main strategic 
resources. Besides, the model has to demonstrate each of the following characteristics. The model is:   
 simple enough to be easily explained and understood at the administrative level of any public 
service provider 
 sufficiently comprehensive to include different dynamic structures, and policies affecting the 
overall efficiency of the organisation    
The secondary objective is to validate the model using estimated data characteristic of a public 
service provider. Once the data is loaded into the computer simulation model, will be run once to 
obtain the current state, and then run several times with different strategies and policies to identify 
opportunities for improvement.  
The data for this case study was collected using different sources and techniques. The research 
was carried out through a process of document analysis, unstructured interviews, and observations. 
The data has been collected from various sources; for instance, Anti-Corruption Council reports, 
Statistical office, and diverse Serbian Laws, as well as newspapers reports. As said previously, before 
creating the quantitative model, the key relations as well as exogenous and endogenous variables 
were also identified (presented in a table form for easier understanding, recall the Table 3).  
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4.3.1 Framing a DPM Model  
 
Traditional PMS may deliver a static analysis of value creation processes and, therefore, may 
not consider the time delays existing between the adoption of a policy and the achievement of the 
related results. In addition, not tangible variables and non-linearity often considerably influence 
strategic resources, and the associated performance drivers and end-results. For example, some of the 
strategic resources are hard to express and measure in a quantitative way but rather as a level 0-1, or 
0 to 100%. For overcoming such undesired effects, it is possible to facilitate decision-makers’ 
understanding and to achieve that, DPM based on the SD model has been chosen as a framework to 
foster accountability and performance improvement.   
Firstly, strategic resources can be presented as stocks (or levels) of available tangible or 
intangible resources in a given time. Consequently, the stock levels are influenced by the value of 
corresponding inputs and outputs over time (inflows and outflows). Exactly this influence is used to 
test different policies in the modelling process. Identification of the strategic resources and the most 
important factors that are influencing their change (drivers) is essential to shed light on the business 
areas important for the performance improvement. They can be measured in relative terms (i.e. as a 
ratio between the business performance perceived by clients and a benchmark, or target). Finally, 
end-results are a measure of the efficiency and effectiveness expressed in terms of volumes or impact. 
They are flows affecting the accumulation of corresponding strategic resources 
 Using an instrumental dynamic performance management (DPM) model, I divided the 
performance into three linked levels: strategic resources→ performance drivers→ end-results (see 
Figure 12), which are separated into three sections by dotted-line boxes. The following main strategic 
resources linked with the direct outputs of the corrupted RHMSS practice are identified: Number of 
Anti-hail Rockets, Number of Unregistered Anti-hail Rockets, and Cumulative Corruption (History 
of Corrupt cases). They can be altered by using different policies to change or improve the end-results. 
Namely, the direct end-results of the public service provider are Rockets purchase rate, Repurchase 
rate, and Additions to Cumulative corruption.  
In addition, there are several interesting drivers identified in this case study. First, Relative 
area remaining unprotected. This performance driver is a ratio between the Desired protected land 
and the Effective area protected. It shows the success of the anti-hail methodology provided by 
RHMSS, however, the outputs of the method are heavily damaged by the corruption practice. This 
performance driver has an impact, through pressure to buy more rockets indicated by agricultural 
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needs, on the Rockets repurchase rate, and stock of Anti-hail rockets, respectively47. Next is presented 
ratio or fraction of unregistered rockets usage that shows how much of the Anti-hail rockets will end 
up being smuggled.  
Focusing on a single static performance measure (for example, the number of rocket 
consumed based on the account records) might lead the public provider's decision-makers (or public 
revisers and controllers) to think that sole problem is in a shortage of the rockets. Therefore, to 
stipulate them to believe continuously that the problem is in the stock supply side, and to try to solve 
the issue by procuring additional missiles (what is exactly happening in the practice, when local 
municipalities or even inhabitants are collecting money to buy additional rockets independently). 
Solving the problem and increasing the number of rockets actually used to protect arable land, might 
produce a certain effect on the Effective arable land protected, and that is accurately what the public 
provider counts as the after-effect of its service.  
Nevertheless, there are “indirect” effects of the public provider practice (in particular, 
corruption practice), and they can be demonstrated to a lower or higher level of public satisfaction. 
With deductive thinking, public satisfaction is identified as an additional strategic resource that 
organisations are not primarily, if at all, taking into account. This strategic resource is not, however, 
a direct result of the company practice (perceived as an output), but rather indirect or outcome. 
Therefore, it is illustrated in Figure 12 as a separate section.  
Related to this strategic resource a number of performance drivers can be identified. Firstly, 
Relative rockets usage effectiveness as a ratio between Rocket usage effectiveness and Minimum 
acceptable rocket usage effectiveness. It shows the influence of the actual usage of the rockets to 
protect arable land taking into account Unregistered rockets usage rate. When the service that 
supposed to be provided by the public organisation is above minimum acceptable level, public 
satisfaction rate will decline, and with a time lag will influence defined strategic recourse. Another 
important performance driver is identified; namely it is a ratio of money dispersion over a specific 
acceptable threshold value. The rationale behind it is that public will tolerate some level or misused 
money, over a number of time units, let say years. The reaction of the public is never instantaneous, 
and “negligible” amounts of mishandled public funds are overlooked. However, with constant and 
significant abuse of public power, there will be a change in public satisfaction, meaning that there is 
a direct linkage between end-result (change in public satisfaction) and the performance driver that 
compares the threshold amount of public funds dispersed and an actual amount of dispersion.  
                                                          
47 The ratio goes from 0.1 to 0.95 in the simulation model. 
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Figure 12 DPM framework 
 
The RHMSS model combines different element through feedback mechanisms to capture the 
behavioural complexity. The representation of all these elements follows a structured approach. The 
model reproduces the important elements or processes of the system in question rather than simulating 
its behaviour through mathematical, pattern-matching type behaviour. 
 
4.3.2 Composing the model structure 
 
The second general research question is: What would a SD model of corruption in Serbian 
Anti-Hail public service provider look like? The final aim of this research is to make 
recommendations for improving the performance, and these recommendations are based on 
simulations; hence a quantitative model is needed.  
For System Dynamics modelling of RHMSS case study, I used iThink™ software (Richmond 
and Peterson, 1997) which supported model design in stock and flow diagram, following the same 
relation of the causal loop model seen in Figure 11. The simulation starts from 2004 where the first 
corruption consequences of the company have been revealed and published later in 2010, and it runs 
for the following 50 years. The previous history has been abstracted from the model, leading to the 
settings of the initial values of the stocks to be 0.  
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To exemplify, corruption is modelled as a stock. This stock is represented by Equation 2 
specified below. The equations of the entire model can be found in Appendix F, together with the 
values corresponding to the base case and documentation. A selection of important iThinkTM 
equations for the simulation model, developed from the S&F diagram, are presented in Table 4-1. 
Equation 2 
Corruption (t) = Corruption (t - dt) + (change_in_C) * dt  
INIT Corruption = 0   
The first equation communicates that corruption at the present time (i.e. ‘t’ ) is equal to the 
corruption at the previous time (i.e. t – dt), plus the change in corruption that occurred during the 
period (i.e. dt) since the corruption level was previously calculated. The second equation indicates 
that the initial value of corruption was 0 at the beginning of the simulation. Dimensions (units of 
measurement) are provided here for each variable in the brackets at the end of each equation.    
Table 4-4 Equations of the Simulation Model 
Equations of the RHMSS corruption model 
Accumulated_Dispersion(t) = Accumulated_Dispersion(t - dt) + (Direct_money_dispersion) * dt 
INIT Accumulated_Dispersion = 0 
INFLOWS: 
Direct_money_dispersion = Procurement_value-Real_rocket_price*rockets_purchase_rate 
Accumulated_Procurement(t) = Accumulated_Procurement(t - dt) + (Procurement_value) * dt 
INIT Accumulated_Procurement = 0 
Rockets_purchase_budget = 6000000 
Rockets_purchase_rate_indicated_by_agriculture = (Desired_protected_land)/ 
Area_coverage_by_a_rocket *effective_pressure 
Rockets_purchase_rate_indicated_by_budget = MAX( ( rockets_purchase_budget - 
unregistered_rockets_repurchase_rate * unregistered_rocket_price ) / Real_rocket_price , 0 )  
Rockets_usage_effectiveness = Effective_area_protected / Desired_protected_land  
 
The quantitative corruption model has been made of 6 stocks: Cumulative Corruption (Dmnl), 
People’s Satisfaction (Dmnl), Rockets (Rockets), Rockets being smuggled (Rockets), Accumulative 
Money Dispersion (EUR), and Accumulated Procurement (EUR). Stocks of Accumulative Money 
Dispersion and Procurement, for example, have the initial value 0. With that, it is said that the 
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previous history is not relevant for the model. Strategic resources identified are Stock of Rockets, 
Arable land to be protected, Stock of Money Dispersion and Stock of Public Satisfaction.  
 
Figure 13 Snapshot - The main model dynamics 
  
Furthermore, flow equations are normally the policy statements in the system. They manifest 
the rate at which the system will improve during the upcoming simulation interval of time – in other 
words, they represent the end result according to DPM (an example of a flow equation from the 
corruption model is given in Table 3). 
The size of arable land to be protected is defined by Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Water Management area, therefore, Desired protected land is 4.800.000 ha (hectares). Based on that 
information, the number of the rockets needed per year to fulfil the requirement of protecting land, is 
defined to be 30.000 rockets48, so the Rockets purchase rate accumulates in the stock of Rockets to 
be used. The usage of the Rocket is defined by Rockets usage rate; however, this is not the only 
outflow from this stock.  
In the simulation model, the main dynamics is exactly related to the stocks of Rockets and 
Rockets being smuggled, and re-bought inflow to the stock of Rockets (see Figure 13). This dynamic 
behaviour is addressed with reinforcing loop R2, showing the relation between Rockets purchase rate, 
                                                          
48 Therefore, coverage by a rocket is a hard number (equivalent to 160). The number of the rockets needed per year is 
connected with optimal public satisfaction, as well.  
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Unregistered rockets usage rate and the Effective or actual area protected. Because of the smuggling 
rate, there will be a gap between the real area protected and the desired protected land (caused by the 
shortage of the rockets), then this gap induces the company to purchase more rockets – since there is 
an additional need for rockets to protect the land.    
 
Figure 14 Snapshot - Enhanced S&F model 
 
As for converting a reinforcing loop R3 into the S&F model, three prices were put in the 
model (see Figure 14). The first one is the price as per perfect market conditions – “Market rocket 
price”, following laissez-faire economic philosophy or “an invisible hand” of the market, Smith 
(1776)49. The second is the price that company pays in order for public bureaucrats to gain some 
private interests –“Paid rocket price”. That price is a trigger for an inclination to corrupt further, so 
the price could even be higher over time (if there would be no mechanisms of control) - creating the 
third modelled price “Corrupted rocket price”.   
The values are 200 EUR and 300 EUR for the Market rocket price and the Paid rocket price, 
respectively, while once the model is launched Paid rocket price can trigger the further corruption 
                                                          
49 Laissez-faire is an economic system in which transactions between parties are free from government interference such 
as regulations, privileges, tariffs, and subsidies. Likewise, Adam Smith viewed the economy as a natural system and the 
market as an organic part of that system. Adam Smith first adopted the metaphor of an "invisible hand" in his book The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments to explain the unintentional effects of economic self-organization from economic self-
interest. Later, many academics have considered the invisible hand metaphor as one for laissez-faire, though Smith never 
actually used the term himself.  
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and the value of that growth will be presented with Corrupted rocket price. There is a limit to the 
growth of that price, and that is established inside of the graphical function. A reasonable assumption 
is that growth of the price will go up to 400 EUR at maximum, see Table 4-2. 
The simulation model is then set to compare Market rocket price with Paid rocket price50. By 
multiplying the prices with the quantities officially procured, will show the difference using flows - 
Procurement value per year and Direct Public funds dispersion rate, respectively. These flows or the 
end-results of the procurement process will eventually build up into the stocks of Accumulated 
Procurement and Accumulated Dispersion. Feedback loop R1 is then closed by showing the relations 
between Rockets purchase rate, Cumulative corruption – history of corrupt cases, an Effect from 
cumulative corruption on the inclination to corrupt, and Accumulated Procurement.  
Table 4-5 Relative cumulative corruption and the Effect on the corrupted price 
Relative cumulative corruption Effect on the corrupted price 
0 1 
1 1 
2 1.01 
3 1.03 
4 1.07 
5 1.12 
6 1.17 
7 1.23 
8 1.28 
9 1.29 
10 1.30 
 
Additional counteractive loops connected with the limiting factors of the corruption practice 
i.e. public satisfaction or the budget of limited public funds, are also converted into SD quantitative 
model. For the complete process of the transformation of the feedback loops into S&F model, read 
Appendix C. Here the whole quantitative model will be presented (see Figure 15) and explained the 
counteractive loops. 
                                                          
50 A ghost function has been used in Figure 14. As cited in Ullah (2006) a ghost of an entity has no independent identity 
- it is simply an image of the building block from which it was ghosted. The ghosted replica has no equation of its own. 
In particular, ghosted stocks can have no inflows or outflows; ghosted flows. Ghosts serve the primary role of keeping a 
diagram tidy. When connectors might otherwise run all over the screen, leading to diagram "spaghetti," ghosted images 
can help to keep the connections neat and clean (Richmond and Peterson, 1997). 
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Figure 15 Snapshot - Full S&F model 
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The model takes into the account Effect of Money Dispersion on Public Satisfaction51 
(calculating it with a threshold value of money dispersion of 7.000.000 EUR), as a counteractive force 
limiting the corruption. This effect is build up both from the impact of rising price and from the 
consequence of misused quantities of rockets since there is a dual source of money dispersion of 
public funds. Then in turn, an important effect of Public Satisfaction to subsequently reduce and slow 
down Inclination to corrupt is modelled, which SD model compare to a certain threshold public 
satisfaction (initially the value is one). Having in mind that people’s attitudes towards corruption have 
a crucial role in the perseverance of corruption — if people’s attitude against corruption goes high, 
then the corruption will diminish in a long run. As stated by Cameron et al. (2005), peoples’ attitudes 
towards corruption are formed by the systems of the nation state they live in as well as their everyday 
experiences of corruption. In the SD model, this is represented by the stock of Public satisfaction. 
These effects are constraining the growing appetite of the public bureaucrats to (endlessly) corrupt. 
The budget is publicly available data, and for the protection of the agricultural land per year 
an amount of 10.000.000 EUR is dedicated from the public funds. The actual budget of the Republic 
of Serbia for this purpose is somewhat higher that I put in the model. However, in reality, it also 
includes salaries and other administrative costs (that are outside of the model boundaries) while this 
model is taking into account only the budget for the rockets required (30.000 rockets). Therefore, the 
model operates under strict budget of 6.000.000 EUR per year calculated with market price.  
One of the performance drivers showing how successful/unsuccessful the service provider 
operates, is the relative rocket usage effectiveness (showing the area protected not in terms of area, 
but in terms of ratio). The model is set to compare this relative indicator with the Minimum 
Acceptable Rocket Usage Effectiveness – public expect that everything is 100% working, so I put in 
this indicator value one as the initial value. In addition, some level of corruption the public will 
tolerate because of different factors such as lack of information, perception delays, etc. Indeed, the 
public can and does tolerate certain public funds misusing; meaning that there is not a straightforward 
reaction of the public to the corruption cases - there is a non-linearity in this behaviour, similar as for 
the price explained in Table 5. The model assumes that public can tolerate certain public funds misuse 
with an informational delay of 4 years (after four years of the corruption indulgence they will start 
expressing dissatisfaction and/or protest). Therefore, the Threshold Money Dispersion is 3.600.000 
EUR52.  
                                                          
51 The Initial Public satisfaction is one while the time to adjust public satisfaction is set to be three years. 
52 The logic behind this number is that corruption process starts with 3.000 rockets being smuggled and with the price 
paid of 300 EUR. Therefore, it is 900.000 EUR per year, and after four years of this continuous corruption, tote up to 
3.600.000 EUR and then the general public will show confrontation and put the pressure on the company. 
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4.3.3 Simulation results 
 
This section is dedicated to the simulations of the RHMSS procurement SD model. All the 
simulations have been conducted in iThinkTM software. The section starts with the design of the 
simulations and the execution of this plan. Then, the results of the simulations are shown. 
The dynamic behaviour of the corruption model can be studied through simulations by varying 
the parameters of the model. Firstly, the model needs to be placed in equilibrium (see Appendix D). 
At the equilibrium, the model does not generate any dynamic behaviour, i.e. nothing changes over 
time, and it lies at equilibrium unless otherwise disturbed. The focal point of these simulations is to 
evaluate the impact of different policies on different indicators of interest.   
The simulation procedure consists of three steps.  
To start with, the parameters of the model are set ideally. Meaning that the key performance 
indicators (which are present in the model) are at desired values. For example, an unregistered rockets 
usage per year is set to be at 10% during all simulations.  
After these settings, the simulations were done. There are two different kinds of simulations:  
(a) Firstly, the exogenous variables can be changed (one by one) to see whether the KPI's are 
as expected. These variables are for instance the Minimum acceptable rocket usage effectiveness, 
Desired protected agricultural land, Thresholds levels, Time needed, etc.  
(b) Secondly, changes in decision rules can take place (for instance, to which level to set the 
Unregistered rocket usage rate). Once more, that is only in order to find out how the KPI's levels are 
changing.  
Finally, the effects of the simulations are compared to determine which parameters have the 
highest influences and which structure or decision changes could cause improvements. Furthermore, 
based on these results certain recommendations are made.  
During all simulations, the model ran for 50 (years) and the time step was one year. In every 
simulation, the following indicators were measured:  
- Effective are protected, as one of the most important indicators.  
- Direct Public Funds dispersion. 
- Ratio Indicated Public Satisfaction. 
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Ideal parameter setting  
 
As pointed out before the first step is to fine-tune the model; all the parameters are set ideally. 
There are three sorts of parameters in the model:  
1. Exogenous parameters: These parameters provide the input for the model. They do not 
depend on other variables. These parameters can be changed to simulate with the model. For example, 
the desired levels (e.g. of a territory of land to be protected) can be adjusted manually such that the 
forecast deviates from the actual need. After running the model the influence of these changes on the 
main strategic drivers, and consequently on the end results can be determined. Despite the fact that 
the value of the parameters can be set arbitrary, there are some logic bounds. The Number of 
unregistered rockets can never be higher than Number of Anti-hail Rockets, Accumulated 
Procurement will never be negative and Corrupted rocket price will not rise to infinity.  
2. Levels: these parameters cannot be changed by ourselves, except for the initial value. The 
levels are governed by on they own inflows and outflows.  
3. The rest of the parameters: these parameters are determined by on the system and are the 
result of decision rules (equations). The internal decision rules can be changed in simulations. For 
instance, rockets purchase rate - based on the Desired protected agriculture area (this rate depends on 
the critical ratio, Gap Area remaining unprotected over Effective area protected) the decision rule of 
Rockets purchase rate indicated by agriculture determines the best possible stock size. Generally, all 
the decision rules can be transformed; nonetheless, some rules are not logic to change. An example: 
the Number of Unregistered Rockets is designed as the percentage in relation to the Number of 
Rockets. It would be strange to change this rule.  
The exogenous parameters were set such that the outcome of the model is ideal, meaning the 
maximum quality level is 100%, or 1, the maximum image is 100% or 1. The basic run of the model 
is the simulation run with the ideal parameter setting.  
With the intention of understanding truly the different influences of the internal variables on 
the strategic resources, it was chosen to use a constant Budget. Naturally, this is far from real, but it 
does provide a better inside understanding the relations between observed strategic drivers and end 
results without any noise from other factors.  
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Parameter alterations  
 
Before any parameters were changed a base run was conducted. This run was done to verify 
the structure of the model and matching with the behaviour that is expected. The simulations start 
with the parameter alterations. The model can be studied through simulations by varying the 
parameters of the model. First the model needs to be placed in equilibrium (see Figures 16 and 17). 
At the equilibrium, the model does not generate any dynamic behaviour, i.e. nothing changes over 
time, and it lies at equilibrium unless otherwise disturbed. The focus of these simulations is to analyse 
the impact of different policies on different indicators of interest.   
 
Figure 16 Equilibrium case 1 
 
Figure 17 Equilibrium case 2 
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In the equilibrium, the effective area protected is equal to the desired area, therefore, the gap 
is zero. I modelled hypothetical situation of what could be happening without any corruption. Since 
the budget is limited, public bureaucrats procure exact quantity that needs to be bought for the 
protection of soil, so the need is exactly satisfied (as we can see in Figure 17, Anti-hail rockets are 
exactly 30.000 pieces as optimal, and Public Satisfaction is 1 or 100%). This run is the benchmark 
for comparison, showing how everything would be functioning without corruption practice. In 
principle, the money dispersed can be calculated by comparing the simulation with and without 
corruption behaviour, they subtracting the values from two simulations. 
As the model is initialised, I simulate the model with the behaviour that reflects the status quo 
before Anti-Corruption Council report was published (see Figure 18 for Behaviour over Time 
diagram - BoT). At this point, scenario planning is done and the results are drawn from the model. 
This provides extraordinary guidance to anti-corruption policy for the government since the outcome 
can influence their decision-making process towards focussing on important factors to target corrupt 
activities.  
 
Figure 18 BoT Historical corruption practice 
 
The SD model enables the projection of several different scenarios (see Appendix E for 
extensive simulation results from different scenarios). Stocks will approach their highest or lowest 
value if one or more of the stock parameter is pushed up or down (see Appendix D for Extreme-policy 
test), although the rapidity of that change is dependent on the extent of the push. In other words, when 
changing the value of stock parameters the model approaches either a very corrupt system or a very 
clean system. This is the most important stage of the modelling process (Maani and Cavana, 2007).  
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Using this dynamic simulation, helps in several ways. Firstly, we can clearly distinguish the 
amount of money that needs to be used compared with the actual procurement expenditure. Not only 
that we see the results of a mathematical operation, but the long-term, dynamic effect on the public 
satisfaction and the real land protected. Secondly, we are able to produce different policy scenarios 
but cutting some reinforcing loops and seeing the results of such policies. Thirdly, the simulation 
itself ensures that we can identify main Strategic resources we want to address in the implementation 
of different policies, main Performance drivers we want to use in order to achieve better end-results.  
The BoT diagrams below show the results of corruption practice over time with different 
levels, however the interaction of corruption and government spending share is always negative and 
significant – meaning that we are far from ideal conditions whenever corruption takes place. Most of 
the flows are showing goal-seeking behaviour, or have so-called “S-shape”. 
Firstly, we can see that due to informational and actions delays, and shifting dominance of the 
loops in the model, the behaviour of the Effective area protected shows some oscillations (what’s 
more due to the fact of stabilisation in number of used rockets). Presented in Figure 19, it sharply 
drops as the simulation starts, before it begins to stabilise steadily over time as a direct consequence 
of the change in the fraction of unregistered rockets usage. Logically, when the fraction or the amount 
of smuggled anti-hail rockets is the highest, the effective area protected is in its minimum level in the 
observed period.  
 
Figure 19 BoT The Effective area protected and the fraction of rockets misused 
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As the arable land is getting insufficiently protected, the need for better protection grows. 
Therefore, the effective pressure to buy more rockets takes place (coming from the Agriculture with 
a certain time delay, of course), indicating the needed rockets purchase rate (see Figure 20). We can 
see that the needed number of rockets goes up to 39.000 pieces in the simulation model (which is 
9.000 more than an optimally defined level by the experts). During the time, the number stabilises to 
a reasonable level, but as long as the corruption exists the number will always be above optional of 
30.000 rockets.  
 
Figure 20 BoT Rockets needed and the pressure from the Agriculture 
 
In addition, as long as there is unrestrained and/or unsanctioned corruption practice, due to 
rising inclination to corrupt further, there will be incentives to pay an even higher price per rocket in 
order to achieve private interest from such transactions. As we can notice in Figure 21, the price per 
rocket is rising until it almost reaches the defined maximum level53, however it stabilises at the level 
of 390 EUR per rocket, which is an increase of around 30% compared with presented standard paid 
price, see line 2. Let us not forget that the standard paid price of 300 EUR is still higher that the 
Market price, so the effects of corrupt actions are even severer.  
                                                          
53 In the System Dynamics methodology, this is called “Goal seeking behaviour”, meaning that the variable will raise or 
decline up to the modelled value, but will never actually reach the exact defined value.  
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Figure 21 BoT Corrupted price vs Paid rocket price 
 
With growing inclination to corrupt, the unregistered rockets usage increases from the initial 
assumption of 10% or 3.000 rockets to mishandle for a private interest to 10.000 rockets in 2015, 
presented in Figure 22. Having in mind that the model operates under strict public budget, which 
manifests in the lessening of the usage rate of the rockets to protect agricultural land. However, this 
behaviour is contracted with explained balancing loops. Therefore, unregistered rockets usage 
declined over time and in the long run model aims to stabilise around mid-values.  
 
 
Figure 22 BoT Rockets usage rates 
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As per overall Public Satisfaction, the behaviour showed in Figure 23 is absolutely expected. 
As corruption practice blossom, with a time lag, people began to realise misusing of the public funds. 
Indeed, this happens with new cases being discovered and prosecuted, new information from whistle-
blowers, and media coverage of suspicious actions. After informational and perception delay, the 
level of Public satisfaction begins to decline. When it almost reaches its bottom lever, it tends to 
stabilise it, known as “indifferent behaviour”, after population being disappointed for a long time. 
However, public satisfaction itself does limit the behaviour of public bureaucrats, and in the model 
that is framed with the effect of public satisfaction on the inclination to corrupt (meaning the 
proclivity to misuse public funds will have to decay, as well).  
 
Figure 23 BoT Public Satisfaction 
 
4.4 Model testing  
 
Testing of the simulation model consists of a number of defined test to assess the model’s 
robustness. Normally, wide-ranging assessment uncovers errors that ask the author to return to 
preceding phases in the iterative modelling development. The sensitivity of the S&F behaviour and 
proposed policies need to be evaluated here to assess structure and model variables above all those 
with high ambiguity (like soft variables or graphical functions). Arithmetical, behavioural and policy 
sensitivities to changes in parameters and structure are evaluated in connection to the model’s 
purpose. The validation tests that are analysed were chosen according to Forrester and Senge (1980), 
and examine the structure and behaviour of the model. For each test, a short description of the test 
and a brief analysis is given in Appendix D. 
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1. Tests of Model Structure:  
 Structure-verification test  
 Parameter-verification test  
 Extreme-conditions test  
 Boundary-adequacy (structure) test  
 Dimensional-consistency test  
 
2. Tests of Model Behaviour:  
 Behaviour-reproduction tests  
 
3. Extreme-policy tests 
The public procurement corruption model has been covered to a number of tests that are in a 
few words recapitulated below: 
a) The CLD diagram needs to be consistent with the demonstration of the problem. The complete 
diagram presented in Figure 11 does match up to the problem articulation rounded up in 
Section 4.1 in Chapter 4. Ratification that the CLD does resemble the problem statement is as 
well emphasised by the qualitative breakdown of the feedback loops in Section 4.2. 
 
b) The equations must match up with the CLD; in specific the positive or negative signs in the 
loop have to correspond the sight in the equations. A careful definition and control of the 
model equations (see Appendix F) confirmed that the direction of the relations in the CLD, 
presented in the Figures 9 and 10, corresponds to the course of the relationships in the S&F 
model simulated with iThinkTM. However, it has to be indicated that the S&F model contains 
more variables than the CLD, since running model requires higher mathematical induction. It 
is relevant to mention here that the literature review helps in providing interrelationships 
between the variables in the model. Wherever possible the qualitative descriptions have been 
supplemented with quantitative data to provide parameter values for the constants and initial 
conditions for the state variables. The relevant theoretical and empirical literature described 
in Chapter 2 provides the structural validity of the model, as well. 
 
c) Does and to which extent the model-generated behaviour fit activities from the real system? 
An exact matching between the real data and model data points is not required for model 
validity, because SD model is not designed to include the internal, external or random factors 
that are needed in the short-time forecasting (Maani and Cavana, 2007, cited by Ullah, 2012). 
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The approximated hypothesised behaviour was reproduced given the normal conditions and 
the presented S&F structure.   
 
4.5 Policy Design and Evaluation 
 
Generally, whether the model fits the identified purpose is ascertained with the policy design 
and evaluation. In this section, I will present policy analysis, advocate interventions, or activities to 
expand understanding about possible short-term and long-term effects, and to end with the final 
recommendations are made. The section starts by given the answer to the research question regarding 
the possible policies to be adopted in 4.5.1. In the second part, section 4.5.2, recommendations for 
improvement are given (in section 4.5.3 these recommendations are summarised).   
 
4.5.1 Possible policies to be adopted 
 
Let us recall the research question concerning policy recommendations: Which policies can 
be recommended to manage the performance of public service provider with regards to public 
procurement?  To answer this question, the exogenous parameters that have the most influence on the 
key performance indicators, were identified:    
- Budget level 
- Desired Land to protect 
- Minimum acceptable rocket usage effectiveness 
- Threshold values (values of public funds dispersion, public satisfaction, or cumulative 
corruption) 
Therefore, other than understanding the suggested policies, it is possible to combine the 
possible scenarios by setting these variables (in iThinkTM software this is made possible by creating 
slide bars with defined min and max amount. The user can easily play with the potential values of the 
exogenous parameters to see how they have an influence on related variables). 
 Each of the policies is compared with the equilibrium case, the case without any corruption 
in the public procurement - we can even call it the ideal system. That ideal behaviour is marked with 
the number 1 in the BoT diagrams within 4.5.2 section. The line number 2 represents the model 
reproduced behaviour with corruption practice and without any intervention. We can call it a 
replication of the real practice – a very corrupt society (for example with this behaviour the price paid 
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per rocket will raise up to 400 EUR). Next, I will introduce several policies, marked with different 
line numbers. To implement separate policies, I put the switches54 into the simulation model and 
tested them separately (for each loop in the model has I created a separate switch or activator for a 
policy). Finally, I will perform analytical initialization for the following policies:  
 The first policy is a Strict Price Control Policy. This very aggressive price policy is almost a 
naïve one, meaning it is possible to control the procurement process and to force the public 
decision makers to pay the lowest market value, in this case, 200 EUR. This policy may be 
achieved by defining strict procurement procedures, and more importantly organising and 
controlling practice. Without rigorous and efficient punishment mechanisms, this policy is 
challenging to implement and remains as “a wishful behaviour”. 
 The second policy is a Realistic Price policy and, therefore, the results are expected to be 
somewhat in between. In terms of effectiveness, if we cannot coerce public decision makers 
to operate under market price of 200 EUR, then the overall effect is not the best possible (at 
least it would take very long time, beyond the time limit of the model). Nevertheless, it is 
more realistic one since some of the improved mechanism to control the price paid could be, 
without major problems, implemented in the procurement practice. 
 The third policy is presented with the line 5, and here we do not implement any price control 
but rather we challenge the direct public funds dispersion effect. This policy implies that 
population do not have available information and complete data about corrupt practice (by the 
explanation of corruption it is normally hidden activity, and people are generally unaware of 
public funds dispersion). However, by insisting on the transparency of the business practice 
or the openness of public bureaucrats’ actions, people can and should become aware, and the 
access to information may lead to disclosing some new information. Then, the effect from 
Public Satisfaction will take place in the simulation model. The line number 5 shows how that 
will influence the flow of the main strategic elements studied. 
 
4.5.2 Results of the policies  
 
The behavioural manifestation of the modelled policies will be presented next with different 
BoT diagrams. All the results of mentioned policies will be illustrated on both the important 
performance drivers (the effective area protected) and, more importantly, on the end-results of such 
                                                          
54 A switch is basically just another variable, with the function of putting “On” or “Off” certain policy. A switch has either 
value of 0, meaning that the policy is not active, or the value of 1, meaning that policy takes place in the running model.  
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a policies (additions to cumulative corruption, direct public funds dispersions). We will see as well 
the outcome - the Public Satisfaction, as one of the main strategic resources.  
 By examining the Figures 24 - 27, we can comprehend the simulation results distinctly. The 
first run or the line number 1 is the ideal state with no additions to cumulative corruption (no new 
corruption cases). The second run or the line number 2 is modelled real situation where extreme 
corruption takes place. It reaches the defined limit of an available budget (meaning that the whole 
budget is likely to be spent if there is no control over public procurement practice). The third line 
represents a Strict Price Policy, and the results are expected to be significantly improved. The 
Realistic Price policy and the behaviour produced are supposed to be somewhat in between the lines 
2 and 3, between the ideal and the real situation and is represented by the green line labelled with 
number 4. Finally, the behaviour with the effect from public funds dispersion is shown by the line 5, 
with the tendency that the system stabilises over time. Below, several graphs are presented to see 
comparative results, namely BoT diagrams for Additions to Cumulative Corruption, Public 
Satisfaction, Effective Area Protected, and Direct Money Dispersion.  
Observing the end-result of the public procurement practice - Additions to Cumulative 
Corruption, presented in Figure 24, we can see that ideally there is not any new case of corruption 
while in practice it reached the maximum possible per year, or 6.000.000 EUR limit. With the 
implementation of the strict price policy, the additions started later than any other simulated flow, 
and, in the long run, tends to stabilise at the lowest level compared with the other options. There are 
oscillations in the cumulative corruption, but let us not forget that additions are connected in the 
model both with the prices and quantities smuggled. The realistic price policy behaviour is indeed 
somewhat in between lines number two and three.  
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Figure 24 Policy evaluation to Cumulative Corruption 
As per outcome on the strategic resources, in Figure 25 is presented the result of the policies 
on the Public Satisfaction. Ideally, it has the value 1 (or 100%), however in the reality is drastically 
lower, especially if the corrupt practices continue in the long run. Population tends to be most satisfied 
when they see the implementation of a very strict and fully controlled price policy – line 3, but as that 
one is almost not reachable, line 4 or 5 are showing where the level will end up in the observed period 
of time. Line 5 includes the effects of public funds dispersion and underscores the overall effects on 
public satisfaction making it almost a flat line towards the end of the simulation.  
 
Figure 25 Policy evaluation to Public Satisfaction 
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Accumulated Money Dispersion is another significant strategic resource that is influenced by 
the outputs of the public procurement malpractice, and therefore inflow or the end-result is chosen to 
be presented on BoT, see Figure 26. In an ideal world, the public service provider procures exact 
quantity to cover the need and for it pays the lowest possible price, see line 1. However, in reality 
there are different levels of public funds dispersion, depending on the simulated options. Strict price 
policy, predictably, reaches and stabilises at the lowest level, around 4.000.000 EUR. Other policies 
show the oscillations, because of the time lag in the balancing loops, as well as the different behaviour 
of the quantities of rockets. The behaviour of money dispersion is of particular importance, having in 
mind that the performance driver Ratio Money dispersion over the threshold (value of 7.000.000 
EUR) directly influences Public Satisfaction.  
 
Figure 26 Policy evaluation to Direct Public Funds dispersion 
Last but not least, the effective area protected is observed in order to see the results of diverse 
policy options. Figure 27 illustrates that, if possible at all, the whole territory of arable land is 
completely protected from the hail with the extinction of corruption in the public procurement.55 As 
for the current practice, it drops and remains below the 50% of the area that is supposed to be 
protected. The flows indicate that the preferred policy is Realistic price control policy that, ceteris 
paribus, generates optimal possible protection of the arable land in Serbia.   
                                                          
55 This policy implies that the rockets have maximum efficiency and that every rocket works without any fail. Obviously, 
this is a hypothetical situation. 
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Figure 27 Policy evaluation to Effective area protected 
 
4.5.3 Summary of recommendations  
 
The first part of this subsection was devoted to testing the possible policies for the public 
service provider. The public procurement structure modelled is showing far-reaching issues in all 
areas of concern. These policies do not offer a distinctive cure for a current situation with corruption 
practices. They rather show variations of the possible outcomes (depending on a change in a mental 
model of public bureaucrats and control points in the procurement process) and their implication in 
the long term. SD allows a public decision-maker to test different policies (dynamic capabilities) and 
their influence to change in company’s routines (functions) and to discover how these changes 
influence public provider’s future performance indicators. Besides, the present model has substantial 
boundaries defined according to the current structure of the resources and macro goals. According to 
the boundaries set, three main recommendations are presented (absolute control of the overall public 
decision process, push for price control and encouraging general public pressure). The first option 
includes limits control of both quantities and prices in the procurement process.  
In the case that decision-makers decide to implement absolute control of the process, the initial 
boundaries should be considered, seeing the long-term impact. This statement complies with the 
implemented framework (so-called “instrumental” view of DPM). Also, the organisation’s impacts 
should be reconsidered in case decision makers choose to keep the existing boundaries. Since DPM 
focuses on strategic planning, particularly concerns budget planning, it is possible to make the 
decision about the structure of the company upon coordination of assets. Thus, the option is to 
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decrease the number of the rockets misused (this could be done by thought additional financial 
internal and external control, or else observance – physical or video of the warehouses). Sustainability 
of the protection of arable land, in the long term, can undoubtedly and impeccably be analysed and 
evaluated using SD model in the context of DPM.    
An interesting relation of public satisfaction and regulating corruption has been proven to be 
the second best policy in the simulation model (after the absolute control of the process and expenses). 
For the reason that public satisfaction impact becomes evident only after a delay (it takes time for 
population to realise the public provider’s overall deeds has been degraded and takes even more time 
for citizens to reach the critical point of when it is enough), is important to work on the transparency 
of the public procurement process, regularly and ad-hoc performing internal and external revisions 
and publishing the result of the investigation in media. Also, citizens should be encouraged to use 
their individual power and responsibility to improve the government (that implies that firstly they 
would have to be protected as whistle-blowers). In general, the extent of financial crime is a political 
challenge (Joly, 2006) and it is up to us citizens to rise to the challenge set by the modern financial 
criminal56.  
 
Modernisation reconsidering  
One of the initial limitations of the model was setting the Area coverage per rocket on 160 
hectares/widget. This restriction is a serious limit to the land protection effectiveness (and public 
satisfaction, as a consequence). If, just for the testing purposes, the model is set with a huge amount 
of Area coverage per rocket, for instance, 1000 hectares/widget, see the line number three in Figure 
28, then the company could reach 30% more of the Effective are protected and Public Satisfaction 
(other conditions being equal).  Consequently, with inventions of the new instruments for protection, 
or placing the anti-hail nets, the arable land would be better protected (although that would not 
diminish the corruption per se).  
                                                          
56 Eva Joly is a Norwegian-born French magistrate, and she symbolises France’s struggle to do away with long-
tolerated corruption in government and business. She is very famous examining magistrate, and the number one 
investigator in cases of financial corruption.  
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Figure 28 Modernisation reconsidering policy 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
The significance of combining DPM approach with SD modelling is underlined. It also 
implies that, for the entire public procurement process, the impact of the social and financial aspects, 
and the effects generated by material and information delays are taken into account.   
Fluctuations in the main company’s assets were modelled by means of in or out-ﬂows of the 
stocks that change over a given time of 50 years, as a result of potential activities implemented by 
decision makers. For example, it is revealed that Public Funds dispersion (strategic resource) changes 
as an effect of rockets repurchase rate (end-result). Public satisfaction (strategic resource) may change 
as a consequence of relative rockets usage effectiveness and ratio money dispersion over threshold 
influence the change in public satisfaction (end-results). There are also causal relations between 
different strategic resources: number of unregistered anti-hail rockets may affect both the 
accumulated money dispersion and corruption. Furthermore, relative area remaining unprotected may 
affect rockets repurchase rate (end result) and relative rockets usage effectiveness (another 
performance drivers). On that way, following so-called “instrumental view” was confirmed, once 
more, very useful in model building.    
 Since the public service recognition becomes evident only after a delay (it takes time for 
individuals involved with agriculture to recognise the public provider’s overall quality has been 
changed), it is crucial to monitor constantly and strive for a sustainable quality level at all times. 
Creating quality pressure requires bureaucrats to become aware of the implications of their service 
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and then, through training, incentives and measurement, persuade public servants that avoiding these 
costs is a priority and that they will not be punished for slowing their work to correct any quality 
problems they detect (Sterman, 2000). In addition, have to be put into a place full and unconditional 
support for whistle-blowers in connection with any quality issues, or related to intentional misuse of 
public funds.  
The simulation model developed demonstrates major problems experienced by the public 
administration (e.g. sensitivity to public satisfaction) and can be explained by the provider’s 
ignorance to public funds dispersion and non-protected area. The model represented the public 
procurement structure and resulted in high correspondence with the real situation. In addition, the 
simulation model has predictive abilities and, therefore, is worthwhile for public decision makers to 
test resources they believe to be valid will lead to better performance in the future. Public bureaucrats 
are encouraged to use the model for the future decision (if no significant changes happen in the 
structure of the company).  
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V CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
 
Things may come to those who wait, but only the things left by those who hustle.  
Abraham Lincoln 
 
This last chapter serves a number of purposes. Firstly, the evidence in support of the initial 
position adopted in arguing that the complexities of corruption in public procurements require the use 
of a more complex systemic and dynamic framework will be summarised. Following that, the author 
provides a summary of the insights gained from the investigation. A critique of this research effort is 
then given based on the perceived shortcomings and gaps that exist. Next, the contributions of this 
work are identified. Finally, the methodology is placed into perspective related to other approaches 
and improvements and future directions in terms of this research are discussed. 
 
5.1 In support of the central Thesis 
 
The central thesis of this research is that the dynamic behaviour of the RHMSS procurement 
practices arises as much from the exogenous inputs (i.e. budget level or the modernisation level, 
expressed through Area coverage per rocket, or public satisfaction) as from the interactions of the 
decision makers, and strategic resources flow within the RHMSS. Therefore, the dynamic behaviour 
is highly dependent on an internal, systemic structure. The author offers the following evidence 
obtained from the research in support of this thesis.   
The systemic feedback structure with resources accumulation and policies of the decision 
agents replicated the performance experienced by the RHMSS given the same exogenous 
environmental factors. This replication provides one point of bond with the behaviour of the actual 
system, developing a measure of confidence in the validity of the model as the means of explaining 
the performance. 
Within the system as bounded for this research, there is a systemic feedback structure 
consisting of several feedback loops that attempt to keep the strategic resources accumulation in 
balance to ensure a sustainable increase in the area protected from hail. The major loops are R1, B1 
and B2, who are in control and dominate the behaviour. Other derivatives of these loops also exist, 
for example, the loop B3. Different policies produce a different performance on Public Funds 
dispersion and consequently on the stocks of Corruption and Public Satisfaction.    
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5.1.1 Thematic Analysis  
 
In March 2012, Serbia was granted EU candidate status57. EU accession implies the efficient 
implementation of the entire body of EU laws, as it stands at the time of accession. According to 
Accession Document (2014) “on the path towards accession, Serbia will need to continue its efforts 
to align its legislation with the acquis and to ensure full implementation of key reforms and 
legislation, in particularly in the areas of the rule of law, including reform of the judiciary and the 
fight against corruption, the independence of key institutions58, and further improving the business 
environment”. 
According to European Commission (2014) Serbia59 is moving ahead in ameliorating its 
public administration. An extensive reform, supported by proper analysis and performance 
management tools, is however still needed. There are several problems that need to be addressed right 
away. Firstly, corruption remains a prevalent problem. Corrupt practices within public procurement 
continue to deflect limited national funds, affecting citizens directly throughout education and health 
services, while tools to efficiently prevent corruption stay under-used. In addition, the ratio of 
convictions over prosecutions is low. Public administration reform targets at greater transparency, 
liability and effectiveness and a better focus on the needs of inhabitants and industry. 
An efficient public administration is compulsory for democratic governance. It also directly 
influences governments’ ability to provide public services and to foster competitiveness and progress. 
Serbia has to develop a track record of concrete results in the fight against corruption, to establish 
whistle-blowers protection, and to implement repression mechanisms. In order to do needed public 
administration reforms, the following has to be (better) implemented: the management of conflicts of 
interest, transparency in the use of public funds, access to information and the appropriation and 
confiscation of assets. Improvements in data collection and accessibility are required to improve 
transparency and help monitor the implementation of anti-corruption policies.  
Appropriate human resources management, enhanced policy planning, coordination and 
development, rigorous administrative procedures and enriched public financial management, are of 
crucial significance for the functioning of the state and for implementing the reforms needed for EU 
                                                          
57 See more http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/serbia/index_en.htm. Besides, in 
September 2013, a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Serbia entered into force (European 
Commission, 2014). 
58 Other independent regulatory institutions – the State Audit Institution, the Committee for the Suppression of Conflicts 
of Interest, the Anti-Corruption Council, the Competition Protection Commission, the PPO and the Commission for the 
Protection of Bidders’ Rights – all continued to face difficulties in carrying out their mandates. These are connected 
predominantly to the lack of resources and inadequate official follow-up to their decisions and recommendations. 
59 The entire report can be retrieved at http://europa.rs/upload/2014-strategy-paper_en.pdf 
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integration. Greater coordination in the implementation of public administration reform is needed, 
including monitoring and evaluation, and better management practices need to be developed. The 
adoption of new methodologies is encouraged, and this work particularly advocates the adoption of 
the method that combines systems thinking, an investigation into dynamic causality analysis, multiple 
criteria decision analysis and SD modelling, as an integrated approach.  
 
5.1.2 General Insight Obtained about the Resource System – SD and DPM 
 
There is a path-dependent evolution of performance based on the state of the key resources. 
Thus, numerous drivers of the procurement structure in turn are dependent on the state of the key 
resources that themselves are dependent on the complementarity between the key resource 
accumulations. Therefore, following dynamic performance management, decisions about the 
structure of the organisation upon coordination of resources can be tested in the SD model. The 
combination of these two approaches is verified as very beneficial one in this work. Thus, the 
performance management is not seen as an extravagance for the public institution. It allows decision 
makers to firstly, test the possible actions of their policies and mental models over time, and secondly, 
change the goal according to the resources coordination. DPM focuses on both processes and outputs, 
as elaborated in this dissertation.  
The key strategic resources accumulation, by which the arable area is protected, embraces the 
Number of Rockets, Number of Unregistered rockets, and Public Satisfaction. The resource flows are 
governed by the competencies and level of honesty of public bureaucrats. The implemented DPM 
approach shifted the focus from static comparison or resource contributions to the dynamic analysis 
of resources accumulation, feedback processes and delays. 
Different performance drivers are included in a clear and simplified way. Hence, the initial 
research question (what are the end results affected by performance drivers that feed strategic 
resources over time?) got its answer in System Dynamics approach. By uniting, performance 
management system and SD performances that can be applied in a simple and user-friendly way. 
Moreover, several policy recommendations were elaborated, tested, and suggested as possible 
improvements in the public procurement process that would have, in higher or lower dimensions, the 
positive consequences on the main strategic resources – the effective area protected, public funds 
dispersion and public satisfaction.  
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5.2. Gaps in the research, knowledge and methods  
 
5.2.1 Gaps in data  
 
Much of the financial data required for this research was documented and available. However, 
as soon as one moves outside the realm of financial information, data sources become far harder to 
source and the data itself is flimsy and often held in disparate sources making it difficult to trace. 
Thus, the utmost of the intangible variables were hard to identify and quantify the proper influence 
on the public service organisation’ structure. System Dynamics methodology ascertained to be very 
useful in the description of the corrupted procurement problem together with soft variables such as 
Public Satisfaction or governmental bureaucrat’s Inclination to corrupt further. Despite the fact that 
numerical data were unavailable or non-existent, these intangible variables are critical to decision 
making and, therefore, were integrated into the System Dynamics model. Nonetheless, the challenge 
was to incorporate them into the simulation model in forms that are both scientifically sound and 
logically defendable60. 
Similarly, hard information such as the graphical functions is not recorded automatically. 
Before-mentioned variables were easier to estimate but also represent gaps in the data. Much further 
research would be required before one is certain about the parameters, values and relationships 
assumed in the model.  
 
5.2.2 Gaps in structural knowledge  
 
 
Conceptualising the resource structure and feedback loops of a business required one to translate 
perceived causal relationships into a structural framework. The lack of data of the makes it impossible to 
verify the hypothesised relationship. Various individuals may also have diverse views on the nature of the 
causality as well as the direction of causality. The corruption cases and evidence of the manifestation of 
public satisfaction pose the greatest challenge in terms of structure and data. This is a definite area in 
which behavioural and structural knowledge is lacking. Hence, Sterman (2002) stated that “all decisions 
are based on models… and all models are wrong”, a phrase quoted almost every time in empirical 
application of System Dynamics methodology.  
For the reason that no model is one hundred percent right, denying to use a model merely 
because it is false is equal to denying to use any models at all. The aspiration in exercising the 
                                                          
60 However, “to omit such [soft] variables is equivalent to saying that they have zero effect – probably the only value that 
is known to be wrong!” (Forrester, 1961: 57) 
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scientific method is to differentiate useful models from useless ones as noted by Box (1979) when 
saying that “all models are wrong, but some are useful”. 
 
5.3 The Contribution of this Research  
 
5.3.1 Theoretical Contribution  
 
This research has demonstrated the dynamic results of assessments and contributed to the 
body of knowledge concerning the interrelated aspects of public procurement efficiency. The 
simulation model made evident the structure and the emerging behaviour with the policy-based course 
of actions and is able to foresee the relative variation in resources, time and organisation when using 
different approaches. In addition, the model could support additional studies as innovative model 
variables can be integrated without difficulty. The study presented has also confirmed that SD is a 
suitable modelling framework for public procurement structure in general and demonstrated the 
modelling can be improved with additional expertise to support public administration reforms. The 
combined dynamic model and performance management approach also supports risk assessment in 
numerous concerns. 
This study has also inspected complementary attributes of dynamic and static models of the 
public procurement procedure. It was presented how a static model is utilised to calibrate a basis of 
the dynamic model (using the accounting data from balance sheet reports), and the dynamic model 
then integrating more reasonable assumptions of problem-related behavioural manifestations. SD 
model could corroborate behavioural comprehension, likelihood and assessment of public 
procurement enhancement, control of the procurement activities and retreating the corruption cases 
occurrences, and the effects on the wider national issues (level of GDP, employment or inflation). 
Different segments of the SD model could be used for other procurement models elements, such as a 
different cost-driven practise (since assessments are analogous to introducing diverse price paid and 
cost-benefit models).  
 
5.3.2 Practical Contribution  
 
The primary contribution of this research is in the systematic and systemic abstraction of the 
corruption in procurement, generating structure of a particular public service provider, and thus the 
development of a quantitative model of limited scope and the insights obtained from it. The model 
developed may be considered to be a distinct model but possibly applicable to another Anti-hail 
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protection organisation (in case of usage of anti-hail rockets as an instrument of the protection), with 
a similar structure but with diverse objectives, parameter values, strategic resources, policy 
parameters and exogenous inputs and offers various performance time paths with the same structure.  
The model captures the major causal relationships and feedback loops of the procurement 
generating system and provides a basis for understanding the path-dependent evolution of the 
performance management. This evolution is in contrast to the linear and financial planning tools that 
are prevalent in the public institutions. Tools such as spreadsheets allow any value to be injected in 
the SD model (standard features of the SD simulation software). 
From a strategic planning viewpoint, this kind of model provides a means of establishing the 
medium to the long-term impact of alternative actions without the use of data-intensive models. 
Especially, it proves a good combination of the two approaches, SD and resource-based view in PMS. 
 
5.4 Improvements and Future Directions  
 
Be not afraid of going slowly; be afraid only of standing still. 
Chinese Proverb 
 
 
In this section, I will try to extend the knowledge to make a connection beyond the boundaries 
of this particular research project. The intention is to provide some perspectives that could guide 
further research direction.  
There are lots of thought-provoking questions and challenging prospects for extensions of this 
study. An explanation of recommendations for future explorations is provided in the paragraphs 
below. Different public reforms can be incorporated into the model. Additionally, various anti-
corruption policies could be implemented. There is a diversity of different formulations to an 
interpretation of rockets effectiveness. For example, taking into account efficiency of different types 
of rockets would enhance the model and further support the arable area protection and causal analysis 
benefits. The present SD model does not account for other anti-hail procedures such as usage of the 
anti-hail nets, shooting the clouds from the plane, etc. Though many organisations in this region of 
Europe elect for only anti-hail rockets usage, there are various other ways and new methods of arable 
area protection that can be integrated into a dynamic model. 
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As beforehand acknowledged, this model studies public procurement in a public service 
organisation, corruption and performance independent of other factors incorporated in the model. 
Numerous additional opportunities exist besides those explored here, such as including the workforce 
and their productivity into the simulation model. The SD model can be refined for finer performance 
drivers and indicators. To begin with, high-level procurement process and LGU rockets procurement 
can be separated out and control points can eventually be incorporated. The rockets usage 
effectiveness can be further disaggregated according to the municipalities in Serbia. The model may 
possibly be enriched to “drill down” further into the corruption control process, and look into the 
dynamics of control effectiveness, rates, etc.  
The simulation model can be enhanced for additional RHMSS cost drivers, and exploration 
of their dynamic effects on the end results could be performed. Further validation against recent data 
is also sought after. The simulation should be re-tested when a whole problem figures are available. 
A diversity of enrichments and further studies can be undertaken for the knowledge-based aspect. 
Additional data from the newest public procurement activities could be collected and evaluated. Other 
features can be added as different suppliers, workforce, control points against the corruption practice 
in the system, enhanced cost model and consequently Direct Public fund dispersions Also, other rules 
can be pinpointed and incorporated to handle more performance drivers, to define different non-linear 
effects, and to enhance the relations within the simulation model.  
The aim of this thesis has been to develop a resource-based systemic and dynamic view of the 
corruption generation structure of a Serbian public service provider (as a case study of the analysis 
of public procurement) that will allow testing the dynamic hypothesis about the causes of observed 
behaviour and explain the dynamic behaviour from a complex feedback perspective. Whilst the model 
does support the objective, one can argue that there are many more pertinent factors that are taken as 
given, but that may shed additional light on the performance of the procurement generating system 
of an organisation. Thus, several extensions can be proposed. 
The main argument is that performance arises as a result of the accumulation of key resources 
of rockets, etc. Even as this holds true the model, the boundary of the model does not draw broad 
enough to explain fully how competitive advance arises for generation system of the company. It is 
a principle of system dynamics that one cannot model the entire system, but only model those aspects 
that are relevant to answering a particular research question. With this in mind, opening the boundary 
of the model would necessitate a revisit of the objective of the model to, perhaps, encompass the 
understanding of competitive advantage rather than performance. 
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The second consideration - drawing the boundary wider to include the competitors from 
rockets supply side - would be to acknowledge the fact that the companies operate in a competitive 
environment where public tenders would possibly severely change the structure and dynamics of the 
model. Therefore, to attain a better understanding of how competitive advantage arises, a rivalry will 
have to be taken into account for all strategic resources that companies provide. This may include 
population (stock of public satisfaction), agricultural lands protected, etc. 
Finally, Investigation of alternative policy design is an area that has not been explored in this 
research. The use of alternative sources of information in the policies is a potential area of research. 
 
5.4.1 An enhanced DPM Model  
 
Public administration constantly experiences difficulties in dealing with dynamic problems, 
particularly when having in mind its capacity to properly measure the results, evaluation of policy 
outcomes, and trying to create a system where decision makers would be responsible for the targets 
(based on clear evaluation criteria).  In particular, the results of this public provider might reduce not 
only the general satisfaction already presented in the model but as well community’s quality of life 
and different outcomes to the society. For example, with longwinded experience of their soil being 
not protected, the population might change their activities from agriculture to other business avenues. 
That would be severe knowing that agriculture is the third sector of the economy that participates in 
the composition of the GDP of Serbia. Moreover, agriculture made Serbia well-known for exporting 
agricultural products e.g. all sorts of berries. In other words, an excess of focus and intensive efforts 
on a single policy might generate specific dysfunctional effects over time. That would further reduce 
GDP of Serbia, and in turn lessen the budget for the procurement of the anti-hail rockets (and not 
only), creating a new vicious reinforcing loop.   
This analysis suggests a possible way to counteract the behaviour distortions arising from the 
performance paradox by extending the boundaries of the observed system to adopt policies that might 
reduce the risk of gaming and unintended behaviours effects. Figure 29 illustrates how instrumental 
DPM modelling might extend the system boundaries. It demonstrates that when considering 
additional end-results related to the stock of anti-hail rockets, two more flows are taken into account: 
the effect of the desired protected arable land and the impact on the GDP. Correspondingly, the new 
stock of GDP would have to be added as a relevant strategic resource to include when formulating 
policies that may contribute to the sustainable production of the majority of people in Serbia.  
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Figure 29 DPM framework future direction for research 
 
 
5.5 Reflection  
 
Looking back at a research you performed there are always things you would do differently if 
you have to do them again. In my case, this is also true. I have learned many things: how to tackle 
such a sensitive subject as the corruption is, how does a public service organisation like RHMSS 
operate, and what dynamic performance management is. These things were essential for my research.  
I think SD is a useful tool for modelling the soft variables in public procurement, it provides 
dynamics and a rich picture of the whole process. Moreover, in this research, I noticed the significant 
development of my modelling skills, and it can be seen by the progress of the models.   
During this research, I investigated, collected and analysed data, and made suggestions within 
a research experience. In turn, I felt the impact of learning how to conduct science for a corrupted 
public procurement procedure. The content, scientific process, experience in studying in Sicily and 
Norway, and reasoned findings of my doctor’s thesis nudged me into a new life stage as a researcher.  
 
“What you need to know about the past is that no matter what has happened, it has 
all worked together to bring you to this very moment. And this is the moment you 
can choose to make everything new. Right now.” – Author Unknown 
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APPENDIX A: HAIL SUPPRESSION IN SERBIA  
 
General overview of Hail Suppression System  
 
Hail suppression attempts to modify hail-bearing clouds (Cumulonimbus) by seeding them 
with silver iodide or other agents (Gavrilov et al., 2013). The focal objective of hail suppression is to 
reduce the production of hail to mitigate damage caused by it, principally in agriculture (World 
Meteorological Organization, 2007). 
Namely, by seeding a hail-bearing cloud with silver iodide crystallization nuclei, many of 
potential deposition cores rises, since silver iodide also crystallizes in hexagonal grids like ice. Hence, 
its small ice crystals grow on additional cores as on natural cores so that each hail grain will become 
less and melt as it falls. Therefore, less sized hail and/or rain will fall rather than larger sized hail. 
This premise was first used by rainmakers in the United States when they tried to stimulate rain in 
dry areas of America. In the 1950s, this hypothesis was also applied in Georgia (former Soviet 
Republic), intended for defending vineyard plantations from hail. However, even before the 
development of rockets in hail suppression, people defended themselves using traditional methods. 
The figure below shows the shooting towards storm clouds with bows and arrows that originated in 
ancient times. This method was practiced in Scandinavia during the 16th century (Magnus, 1976). 
 
Figure 30 Out-dated protection approach 
 
A number of countries adopted hail suppression with due caution concerning its effectiveness. 
To evaluate the efficiency of cloud seeding with silver iodide, two notable experiments were 
conducted almost in the same. One was in Western Europe called the “Great experiment” and another 
in the USA called the “National Hail Research Experiment” (Gavrilov et al., 2013). The results of the 
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experiments showed that there were no statistically significant differences in the occurrence of hail 
between seeded and non-seeded hail-bearing clouds. Numerous European countries reasoned that 
cloud seeding cannot modify weather. Later no such overall experiment was performed but individual 
countries implemented their evaluations with similar results – in Serbia (Aleksic, 1989).  
During the 1960s, hail suppression was attained from the ex-USSR to the ex-Yugoslavia and 
remained operational till the present-day. In Serbia, hail suppression via silver iodide seeding has 
been conducted according to the so-called Soviet method since 1967 (Aleksic, 1989), with later 
smaller adjustments but still based on the beforehand cited seeding hypothesis. Radars are used for 
the identification of the hail clouds, while for the injection and seeding of silver iodide from the 
terrain into the cloud, are used rockets. Rockets reach heights of 6 to 8km, and each rocket bears 400g 
of silver iodide (Vujovic et al. 2007).  
Nowadays, only Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia actively support 
weather defense against hail (Pocakal and Stalec, 2003), although it is starting being abolished in 
Croatia. In different countries, hail suppression is basically left to private initiative, gets very limited 
government support, and/or is constrained to small areas. The occurrence of hail suppression in 
Europe in 2007 is presented in Table A-1.  
Table A-1 Distribution of hail suppression and mode of financing 
 
Source: http://www.wmo.int/ 
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Organisation and costs of Hail protection in Serbia 
 
Meteorological activity on the territory of the Republic of Serbia has a long and rich tradition. 
First systematic meteorological observations started in Belgrade, on 1 January 1848. Already in 1856, 
a network was established in Serbia with 20 meteorological stations and, in 1887, Belgrade 
Meteorological Observatory was founded at the University of Belgrade. For more than a half of the 
century, Belgrade Observatory was the centre of National Meteorological Service. Republic 
Hydrometeorological Service of Serbia was established right after the II World War, in 1947. From 
2003, hail suppression has been carried out from 13 radar centres using approximately 1650 rocket-
launching stations that are evenly distributed over the territory of Serbia (Figure 31). Each radar 
centre is authorised for a certain number of rocket-launching stations and issues commands by radio 
communication on when, where and how rockets should be used for firing into hail-bearing clouds. 
 
 
Figure 31 A rocket-launching station type in use at the Radar centres in Serbia 
 
Hail suppression is operatively carried out six months a year, from April 15 to October 15, 
and has been operatively conducted by the RHMSS61. Because of many complaints and report of the 
corruption, after 2010, all activities related to hail suppression came under the Ministry of the 
Interior's jurisdiction, Sector for Emergency Management. 
Opposite to all other countries that abolished or decreased hail suppression, Serbia 
significantly expanded it to the territory of Vojvodina from 2003. Nowadays, Serbian hail suppression 
covers the whole territory of the Republic of Serbia without the region of Kosovo and Metohija. For 
instance, the budget of the Republic of Serbia for 2008 approved the purchase of 13.000 rockets. It 
                                                          
61 Additional information,  in Serbian, www.hidmet.gov.rs/podaci/novosti/priprema_PGZ-lat.doc 
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was further expected that the Ministry of Agriculture would provide additional funds for the 
procurement of an additional 6.000 – 7.000 rockets. The cost per rocket approved is 270 – 300 EUR 
(Law on the budget of the Republic of Serbia). Equivalent data can be found for other years. Hail 
suppression in Serbia includes approximately 250 full-time personnel, 3.500 part-time personnel, 
1.650 rocket stations, 13 radar centres, lots of cars, around 12.000 rockets fired annually. It is 
estimated that the annual cost of hail suppression is around 10.000.000 EUR, funded by the budget 
of the Republic of Serbia. 
In 2014, according to available data, for the hail protection was spent about 460 million 
Serbian Dinars, which was insufficient for the full effectiveness of the system. From the whole 
amount, approximately 300 million Serbian Dinars was funded from the state budget and 160 million 
Serbian Dinars from the budget of local government units. Namely, for the hail protection, in 2014 
was spent62: 
- From the Republican budget 438 million Serbian Dinars, from Ministry of Interior 303 
million Serbian Dinars (funds planned for 2015 are even lower because the wages are reduced by law 
by 10%) and RHMSS 135 million Serbian Dinars (covering wages and medical examinations for 
3.300 shooters). It is claimed that this was insufficient, primarily due to an insufficient amount of 
anti-hail rockets. The system during one season has operationally to order around 25.000 missiles. 
Also, there was no allocations of the funds for the maintenance of the radar system of radio 
communication, or the procurement of computers and so like. Therefore, lacking is about 400 million 
Serbian Dinars for the full operational function.  
- From the budget of local government units (LGU) about 160 million Serbian Dinars for the 
purchase of 3.000 anti-hail rockets, about 100 million Serbian Dinars, and for shooters around 60 
million Serbian Dinars. 
According to Bergant (2011, 246): »People need protection against hail, so they are sometimes 
like to accept the ways of defence for which there is no clear evidence that they work. Local and state 
politicians want to help people and are willing to support ways of defence for which there is no proof 
they work to gain their affection. Operators of hail suppression wish to obtain funding for their 
activities and are willing to offer a means of defence for which there is no evidence that they work.« 
However, in Serbia the hypothesis obtained the status of a confirmed and accepted scientific theory. 
Based on that, for almost half a century hail suppression has been operative covering the whole area 
of the Republic of Serbia except the region of Kosovo and Metohija. 
                                                          
62 Source, in Serbian, http://www.otvoreniparlament.rs/ 
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There are a couple of reasons why hail suppression is still adopted in Serbia. One of the 
reasons is because of the trust and misconception by the population. The authorities believe that by 
impressive actions of »shooting clouds« they look after the interests of the population. At the same 
time, because of intuitive fears of catastrophes, the nation perceive this as a genuine attempt at 
extending help. Also, there are also meteorologists in favour of these actions, particularly having in 
mind the statistical data on hail days per year. Figure 32 is showing the mean number of days with 
hail per year, and a linear trend line covering the period from 2003 to 2010. 
By this time, they have grown so strong that they made together with other stakeholders very 
powerful lobbies for the support of »shooting the clouds«. The lobby consists of rocket producers, 
budgetary controllers, operative workers, analysts, propagandists, and scientists, opening a ground 
for corruption activities widely. We are witnessing, almost every year, a damage caused by natural 
disasters in Serbia – only in 2012 the damage summed up to about one billion and 700 million EUR. 
However, agricultural land and buildings suffered damage, not only from hail but also from the flood. 
Cause by the hail only, the damage in 2010 was estimated to 100 million EUR63. A long-standing 
problem in Serbia is the lack of anti-hail rockets and archers.  
Source (Gavrilov et al. 2011) 
 
Figure 32 A linear trend line of days with hail 
 
 
 
                                                          
63 Check http://www.znanjenapoklon.rs/clanci/agroekonomija/zasto-u-srbiji-godinama-propada-odbrana-od-grada.html 
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Legislative solutions for Hail protection  
  
Hail suppression is not distinctly covered by the legislation. In the system of anti-hail 
protection there is a legal mismatch and undefined jurisdiction of the Republic and local self-
government, it is not known who buys rockets and who pays shooters64. 
By 2008, the single place in the legislation that regulates the hail suppression activities were 
element of the Article 34 of the Law on Ministries of the Republic of Serbia (2008) that says: 
»…Republic Hydrometeorological Service of Serbia performs expert activities related to…defining 
hail risk degree and acting on hail-bearing clouds…«. Based on that, it is problematic to figure out to 
which action hail-bearing clouds should be »exposed« to, why, and on how? After placing all the hail 
suppression activities under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior, this activity is solely regulated 
by the Article 8 of the Law on Emergencies (2009), in the »preventive measures of rescue and 
protection in extraordinary situations« paragraph. 
In order to overcome the constant problem, a new Law for a regulation of this complicated 
matter came into for force 30th June 201565. The funds for implementation of the Law on Protection 
from Hail are provided in the Law of the Republic of Serbia Budget for 2015 ("RS Official Gazette", 
No. 142/14), of Section 15 Ministry of Interior, Chapter 15.0, Function 310, Point 1401 - Safe Society 
in the amount of 287.350.000 Serbian Dinars or approximately 2.394.000 EUR per year.  
It is proposed that the implementation of anti-hail defence activities will be the responsibility 
of local administration (operation and maintenance of the network launch stations and work shooters), 
who will provide the funds from the budgets of local managements, which will relieve the budget of 
the Republic of Serbia and is supposed to reduce costs compared the current allocation. However, the 
full jurisdiction of the hail protection will be under the Republic Hydrometeorological Service.  
The proposed legal solution would improve the funding of the hail protection, and we would 
relieve the budget of the Republic of Serbia. During 2015 and 2016, responsibility for anti-hail 
stations functioning and of shooters are to be transferred to the local governmental units (LGU). That 
would finally resolve their status, which was during the last four years inadequate since they were 
still under the jurisdiction of the Republic Hydrometeorological Service. In comparison to 2014, it is 
expected a reduction of 135 million Serbian Dinars in the Republic budget. According to the draft 
                                                          
64 In Serbian, see http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/protivgradna-zastita-u-srbiji-i-dalje-bez-sigurnih-
resenja/26966083.html 
65 For the Draft Law on Protection from Hail, in Serbian, check 
http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/lat/pdf/predlozi_zakona/1045-15%20-%20lat.pdf 
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law, 70% would be paid into the state budget for the purchase of the procurement of the rockets, and 
30% in the budgets of LGUs for the financing of anti-hail stations and shooters on their territory. 
 
 
APPENDIX B: FUNDAMENTALS OF SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODELLING 
 
 
According to the System Dynamics Society66, “System dynamics is very similar to systems 
thinking and constructs the same causal loop diagrams of systems with feedback. However, system 
dynamics typically goes further and utilises simulation to study the behaviour of systems and the 
impact of alternative policies”, which are described in Chapter 4, Section 4.5. Here below are 
explained the fundamentals of the SD Modelling.  
 Feedback 
In any system, there is a reciprocal stimulus among the components, direct or indirect one. In 
a dynamic system, interchange describes any relation as either a cause or an effect, concurrently, with 
interactions both ways in the so-called feedback loop. Sterman sharply separates the feedback loop 
as positive or negative. The positive reaction or loop enlarge whatever is happening in the structure, 
as a stimulus for a change. Therefore, it is also known as a reinforcing loop. Contrariwise, the negative 
feedback loop acts as a counteract change and, accordingly, is called self-correcting or balancing 
loop. Ordinarily, systems are combinations or networks of feedback loops, both positive and negative, 
from where all the complexity of the dynamics arises (Sterman, 2000). 
 Causal Loop Diagram 
This simple diagram represents the behaviour of any system by mapping its elements and the 
relationship among them. It is an important tool for evidencing the hypothesis assumed in the model, 
drawing mental patterns and relevant feedback to problem explanation (Maani and Cavana, 2007). 
Causal loop diagrams contain: 
a) System elements or variables relevant to the system; 
b) Delays: effects that are only perceived after a waiting time; 
c) Relationships: arrows are indicating the influence of one element on the other. To each causal 
relation is designated a polarity, being either positive (+) or negative (-), depending on how the 
dependable variable changes with changes in the independent. Methodology variable (either with 
                                                          
66 See more http://www.systemdynamics.org/ 
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the same or with the contrary effect, respectively). It is relevant to note that individual links take 
into consideration that all other variables are kept constant (ceteris paribus), assuming that 
different interactions have different impacts on the system as a whole; 
d) Feedback loops: as previously explained, either positive or negative. Positive feedback loops are 
also known as reinforcing loops (denoted by the letter “R” in the diagram), and negative loops 
are known as balancing loops (denoted by “B”). In real life, the first usually represents growth 
mechanisms and the second equilibrium mechanisms. The example below is a core representation 
of a causal loop diagram; 
Table B-1 Link polarity interpretation 
 Link polarity symbol Interpretation Example 
  
               X                       Y    
Ceteris paribus, in case X 
increases, then Y increases 
above what it would have 
been.67 
 
Birth  Population 
           
               X                      Y 
Ceteris paribus, in case X 
increases, then Y decreases 
below what it would have 
been.  
 
Death Population 
When the number of negative links is 
even, the loops are reinforcing, 
symbolised with an “R” or “+” sign. If 
the number of negative links is odd, the 
loops are negative or balancing, 
denoted by a “-“or “B” sign. 
 
 
The most important limitation of causal loop diagrams is the inability to represent stocks and 
flows (Sterman, 2000), which will be discussed in the next section. To several systems, this means 
losing important information about the flow of materials and data from one loop to the other and 
about the accumulation of stocks in specific points of the system. 
 Stock and Flow Diagram 
Stock and flow diagrams are further particularised than causal loop diagrams since they 
specify entirely the balance of physical flows of material and information of the system. This diagram 
is particularly important in understanding dynamic behaviour since the stocks generate unevenness 
in the flow rates by the accumulation. A stock value can be accumulated by diminishing its outflow 
                                                          
67 Kim, 1992 offers an alternative convention for causal loop diagrams notation. He denotes a link polarity with “s” and 
“o”, instead of + or –, respectively. “S” denotes that x and y move in the same direction, while “o” means that x and y are 
moving in the opposite direction.  
+ 
- 
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rate as well as by increasing its inflow. Clearly, this unevenness has effect in the delays in the response 
of material and information flows and, as a consequence, in policies implementation. 
Conceptualisation of the symbols used for stock and flow diagramming are described as given 
in Sterman (2000), in Table B-2. 
Table B-2 Stock and Flow symbols explanation 
Symbol Key  
 Module 
 Stock 
 Flow 
 Valve (flow regulator) 
 Source or Sink 
 
Stocks are the focal point of every dynamic system. They represent the fundamentals of the 
system that at whatever time you can see, sum total, or quantify. In other words, a stock is an entity 
that steadily accumulates or diminishes over time. A flow signifies the rate of alteration of a stock. 
Mathematically, the connection between stocks and flows parallels to differential equations. Except 
for stocks and flows, in any system there are auxiliary variables as well demonstrating the stock-to-
flow relations explicitly.  
According to Forrester (1961), the stock and flow diagram has an exact mathematical 
connotation. Stocks accumulate their inflows minus their outflows and, therefore, is the memory of 
the history of changing flows. As a consequence, a stock and flow diagram is superior to causal loop 
diagram, imposing constructing codes in the construction of the system elements: 
a. Module - A module of the subsystem diagram is an independent subsystem included in the 
model, and normally classify model structure following the mental models, functional areas 
or organisational divisions. Module outlines the inputs it has to simulate and the output it will 
generate when the module is simulated. 
b. Level - (also named Stock, Accumulation, or State). Stocks accumulates gradually and can 
only be changed by values of inflows and outflows. Levels are additions of flows, whether 
material, monetary or data flows. Stocks normally alter slowly, even when the flows into or 
out of them alter rapidly. For that reason, stocks act as delays or buffers or shock absorbers in 
systems. On condition that the sum of all outflows surpasses the sum of all inflows, the level 
of the stock will fall, and vice versa.  
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c. Rate equations (also called inflows and outflows) regulate the flows that modify the stocks. 
The flows are denoted by double arrows, habitually with a cloud on one end. The cloud 
represents a system boundary (we assume that the cause of the flow does not restrain our 
problem). Stocks permit inflows and outflows to de-couple - to be self-governing and to be 
out of balance with each other (except in a perfect dynamic equilibrium, when they are equal).  
d. Auxiliary variables are converters or so-called functions. Auxiliary variables receive info 
from other variables as an input and convert them to an information output. Auxiliary = f 
(input1, input2... inputn).  
Chapter 4 defines all variables used in the model and determine their characteristics in terms 
of behaviour and state. Chapter 4 also presents the model of corruption in the form of causal loop 
diagram. This form is simpler for the first understanding of the system dynamics but is later detailed 
in a stock and flow diagram, from where the model derives.  
 Dynamic Behaviour 
The forms of interaction among the several elements that compose a dynamic system define 
the behaviour of the whole structure. The combination of feedback and causal loops determine the 
forms of interaction, elucidating the characteristics of real-life phenomena seen in the compound 
world. This section briefly describes the types of behaviour of these dynamic (sub) systems. Figure 
33 shows a graphic representation of the different behavioural types (Sterman 2000).  
 
(Adapted from Sterman, 2000) 
 Figure 33 Fundamental Modes of Dynamic Behaviour 
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The model for corruption forecasting comprises one or more forms of behaviour presented 
above, according to the interactions found in the system. The starting point in determining the 
behaviour of such interactions is the analysis of the graphic forms of the variables in time. This 
analysis compares the shape of such graphs to the fundamental forms of behaviour and enables the 
drawing of the causal loop diagrams. The thesis uses this procedure to build the System Dynamics 
model of corruption in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2. 
Simulation models offer learning environments where academics, modellers, decision-makers 
can create and test policies. Simulation modelling also gives a convenient context where modellers 
can experiment with and learn about the impacts of various policies without any remarkable political 
or financial expenditure. Moreover, simulations can help to build consensus on challenging social 
and financial problems. SD model can support discussion and lead to the development of shared 
interpretations regarding the cause of the respected behaviour. Even for problems where the model 
encompasses diverse objectives and conditions, simulation running might assist in putting the 
attention on the analysis of particular variables and results that are the cause of disagreement. 
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APPENDIX C: TRANSFORMATION OF CLD INTO THE STOCK AND FLOW  
 
Table C-1 Transformation of CLD into S&F 
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APPENDIX D: VALIDATIONS OF THE MODEL  
 
In this section, some validation tests will be conducted and analysed. According to Barlas and 
Carpenter (1990), System Dynamics models should be validated concerning their intended purpose. 
Therefore, these validation tests will be performed based on the objective of the model, which was 
translating a case of corruption in the public procurement of the anti-hail rockets into a System 
Dynamics model. For all validation tests, the base model behaviour is based on figures retrieved from 
the available sources.  
Tests of Model Structure  
 
The testing of the model structure instantly starts when creating the model. All through the 
model building, the model is attuned and improved to represent the real situation in the public 
procurement. Five structure tests were conducted on the model.  
1. Structure-verification test  
“Verifying structure means comparing the structure of a model directly with the structure of 
the real system that the model represents. To pass the structure verification test, the model must not 
contradict knowledge about the structure of the real system. . . .The structure-verification test is first 
conducted on the basis of the model builders’ personal knowledge and is then extended to include 
criticism by others with direct experience from the real system." Forrester and Senge (1980)  
The author firmly believes that the structure of the model does not contradict the real system. 
The model structure corresponds to the hypothesis and the mental model depicted in the official report 
number 72 by Anti-Corruption Council; therefore, it represents the real system.  
2. Parameter – verification test  
“Model parameters (constants) can be verified against observations of real life, just as a 
structure of a model can be compared to available knowledge. Parameter verification means 
comparing model parameters to the knowledge of the real system to determine if parameters 
correspond conceptually and numerically to real life."[Forrester and Senge (1980), p. 212-213]  
Parameter values were collected from the report and relevant literature and match the actual 
data of the projects. Therefore, they correspond numerically to real life. All values of the graph 
function conceptually correspond to real life.  
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The parameters in the simulation model were set ideally, for instance, the rockets usage time 
is always 1 year, public funds for anti-hail rockets does not vary from the value of 600.000 EUR/year, 
the coverage by the rocket is constant, and the initial public satisfaction is 1 or 100%. Although these 
parameters are not that fixed in real life, the reason for regulating the model this way was to determine 
the impact the several parameters have on the key performance indicators.  
3. Extreme conditions test  
An extreme conditions test includes setting the model state variables (stocks) to conditions 
that are outside the normal values in order to see how the model reacts. For example, if the number 
of Anti-hail rockets on the stocks suddenly drops to zero, an effective arable area protected will also 
have to drop to zero. Moreover, opposite if there is a sudden increase in relative rockets usage 
effectiveness then level of Public Satisfaction, other conditions being equal, should also increase. “A 
model should be questioned if the extreme conditions test is not met."[Forrester and Senge (1980), p. 
213]  
One of the assumptions in the model is an initial value of Public Funds available for rockets 
procurement. To test the plausibility of model structure, I conducted an extreme condition test on this 
particular value. Firstly, I wanted to see what behaviour the model would generate in an initial absence 
of the budget for this purpose. Secondly, I run the model with an initial excessively a high number of 
Public Budget. The rationality behind public procurement corruption model suggests that if there 
exist no procurement (or the figure of the rockets is infinitesimal) there will not be anything to use 
for shooting the clouds, so there would be no protection of the agricultural land whatsoever. The test 
of this hypothesis showed that when a number of rockets are set to extremely low (approximately 
0.0000000001 rockets purchase rate indicated by budget) there is no relative rockets usage 
effectiveness generated by the system. Consequently, the Effective area protected goes below 1 
hectare, and Public Satisfaction drops to the bottom limit of 0.2.  
These values are because the system does not intend to close the gap between Desired 
protected land and the Effective area protected. The results of this extreme behaviour could be clearly 
understood by looking at the behaviour over time diagram, Figure 34. The stock of Anti-Hail Rockets 
is depleted before 2014, as well as the Effective Area Protected, as a consequence. The drop is equally 
sharp in the Public Satisfaction, though with a defined time postponement in the mental model of the 
population perception. In addition, a delay occurs because of the initial value of the stock (let us not 
forget that the stock of the Anti-hail rockets had 30.000 widgets at the beginning of the simulation), 
leading to the fact that some area was protected in the first simulation years due to this backlog.  
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Figure 34 BoT Extreme case scenario no rockets 
Considering that the ratio Relative Rockets usage effectiveness compares the Rocket usage 
effectiveness (coming as a function of the exceptionally low amount of effective area protected) and 
a defined minimum acceptance rockets usage effectiveness, the result of this ratio is dropping to zero 
within only four years, see Table D-1.  
Table D-1 Extreme case 1 scenario results  
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Another and opposite extreme case would be if there were infinite inflow to stocks of Anti-
Hail Rockets, meaning that there are no limitation in the Public Budgets for this purpose. This extreme 
case is, of course, unrealistic scenario but is found to be very useful in testing the model structure 
validity. To perform this test, variable Rockets purchase budget were assigned a value of the 
sufficiently large amount of 1.000.000.000.000.000 EUR/year (in the previous extreme test case, this 
value was only 1 EUR/year, since it was needed to restrict the inflow of the rockets). Ceteris paribus, 
it is expected that this test shows the increase in the stock of the Anti-hail rockets, an increase in 
Public Satisfaction, and growth in terms of the Effective area protested, as there are no almost no 
limits in funding this service. The results are quite interesting and are shown in the figure below.  
 
Figure 35 BoT Extreme case scenario no funding limits 
 
With virtually no limits in the Public Budget, the stocks of Anti-Hail Rockets indeed is 
skyrocketing, or in the jargon of System Dynamics there is an exponential growth of the stock of the 
Anti-hail rockets. With no restriction in procurement, we might guess that there should be the same 
logic for the stock of Public Satisfaction and the area protected. Nonetheless, there is also the effect 
originating from the corrupted price paid to both of them. Hence, around the year 2017 the model is 
shifting the dominance between balancing and reinforcing loops. After that the system tends to 
stabilise itself at the level of 0.52 or 52% of Public Satisfaction, coming from the level of around 
2.300.000 hectares protected per year (see Table D-2). The model takes, correctly, into account other 
loops as well, that is why there is no linear behaviour of Public Satisfaction or the Area protected.  
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Table D-2 Extreme case 2 scenario results 
 
We can conclude that the model pass the extreme tests, since the behaviours after altering the 
extreme values follows the structure of the model. In addition, equilibrium case is another special 
kind of the extreme test where all the loops are cut. The structure developed passed this test 
successfully, as well. In testing these two extreme cases, all the loops were taken into account, and 
the simulation results are the consequence of the modelled structure. In the second extreme scenario, 
despite the fact that we are not financially restricted, there will be no complete coverage of the 
agricultural land in Serbia. Consequently, the level of the Public Satisfaction will be half of the desired 
one. This incomplete protection is because the corruption is not obstructed, and while the funding is 
limitless so is the corruption practice (both in terms of quantity procured and the price per widget 
paid).  
We can even go further and speculate that complains about insufficient funding for the 
rockets, are simply not valid. The problem is not on the Budget side, quite the opposite – the available 
funding should be used optimally to fulfil its purpose and protect the arable land from possible severe 
damage from the hail.  
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4. Boundary-adequacy (structure) test: the model includes all relevant structures  
“The boundary-adequacy (structure) test considers structural relationships necessary to satisfy 
a model's purpose. The boundary-adequacy test asks whether or not model aggregation is appropriate 
and if a model includes all relevant structure."[Forrester and Senge (1980), p. 214-215]  
Strictly speaking, the model does not pass this test because the structure and influence of the 
competitors from the supply side are not included, and the usage of the rockets does not cover all 
possible scenario.  
Comparing the boundary of the quantitative model to the boundary that was set in the 
beginning, we see that the model is somewhat restricted. At the start of the model building, it was 
determined that the boundary of the model would reflect the boundaries of public procurement and 
(mis) usage of anti-hail rockets. However, the model focuses mainly on the Rockets usage process 
based on the hypothesis that the rockets are bought, were not use and were rebought, due to lacking 
of controls mechanism. However, the actual boundaries are beyond this process. The shooters of the 
rockets and their efficiency are for the most part absent from the model (technically, I assumed their 
100% efficiency). The part of the actual working force is important for determining the forecast 
because this indicated the real need for both budget and distribution of the rockets; however, this is 
not included in the quantitative model.  
In addition, the buying scheme of the rockets is critical for the corruption procurement 
process. In theory, the Price of the Rockets could go even more down via modernisation, technical 
development or if the market is completely open, leading to the effective protection of land would 
rise. As a matter of fact, I have found certain records recently that small amounts of rockets are 
purchased from another supplier. Although these factors are important and perhaps the boundary 
should be extended to include them, I have decided not to do this.  
First of all, the data regarding these issues was not really available; market intelligence 
depends on the market, and the price change is not easy (perhaps not possible) to be predicted by 
decision rules. Concerning the additional suppliers, the official report from Anti-Corruption Council 
did not mention such information, and thus they are not included. Moreover, it is pointed out that the 
Department of Public Procurement in the memo no. 404-02-594/10 dated 29.07.2010, claims a 
violation of the Public Procurement Law Art. 24, paragraph 1, item 4, because there were not a public 
invitation to tenders or call for bid, but only direct negotiation between supplier and this public service 
provider. Finally, the official report states several different alternatives for the rockets usage: e.g. 
rockets were hit into the clear sky only to be consumed, the rockets did not even exist, but they were 
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paid anyhow. The extension of the model with these activities would, therefore, be done with many 
assumptions and even fewer empirical data. This also has to do with the second reason: lack of time. 
The last reason is the fact that the planned simulations only focus on the corrupted procurement 
process to see clearly the influences. When examining the model one can conclude that the model 
boundary is adequate for the model purposes68. 
 
5. Dimensional-consistency test  
The dimensional consistency test was passed without the need for adjustments (see Figure 36).   
 
Figure 36 Unit consistency test results 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
68 The model purposes are to determine the impact the parameters and the decision rules have on the key performance 
indicators. 
122 
 
Tests of Model Behaviour  
 
6. Behaviour-reproduction test - Symptom generation test: the model behaviour matches the 
imaginary reference mode.  
Replication of reference modes of behaviour was tested through the model’s ability to match 
the historical reference modes of behaviour. All stocks were initialized to match the historical 
situation for the company as of 2004. The curves show a reasonable trend-line over the period under 
review. For the purposes of the research, it is more interesting to see the broad trends and the response 
of the system to such trends.  
 
Figure 37 Behaviour reproduction test 
The model generated resource accumulation corresponds closely with that observed for the 
company over the period of study (see Figure 37). At the report date, the mid-2010 number of the as 
well as seen in reference mode. When merely corruption is introduced in the model69, both regarding 
quantities smuggled and concerning a price paid per widget, we expect to see rather excessive 
behaviour. In this case, there is no information to the public, or they are careless to corruption practice. 
On the whole, no limits to this behaviour are operating, since the other loops are cut (see different 
consequences in Figures 38 to 41). The general public, in theory, expect that everything is 100% 
working properly, so this variable has value one as the start value (see the blue line, numbered 1 in 
Figure 41). The model will produce non-linearity, meaning that not immediately all the effects are 
working and with the same lane.  
                                                          
69 The conventional and regularly used kind of sensitivity analysis has been to alter model parameters and to watch how 
behaviour transforms. This form is a very useful procedure for model testing, learning, and validation.   
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Figure 38 BoT R1& R2 are active, new corruption cases 
 
Figure 39 BoT R1&R2 are active, effects on fund dispersion 
 
Figure 40 BoT R1&R2 active, effect on the area protected 
 
Figure 41 BoT R1&R2 active, effect on Public Satisfaction 
Therefore, when corruption starts, both 
corrupted quantity and corruption regarding 
price paid per rockets takes Place. Since there 
exist no limitations in the model, corruption 
will reach its maximum of 6.000.000 
EUR/year very sharply, within 15 years. 
 
Although the detected amount of public funds 
dispersion for the rockets is 3.000.000 with 
limitless corruption the amount grows sharply 
before it stabilises at the level of approximately 
4.600.000 EUR/year (see Figure 39). 
 
With boundless corruption, Rockets usage 
effectiveness will start lowering so relative 
usage effectiveness will also go down. Hence, 
the Effective Area protected will practically 
be zero from around 2020 (there will be not 
enough rockets to protect the land, Figure 40).  
 
 
In addition, the Public Satisfaction will be 
going below one (Figure 41), with a typical 
“S-shape” behaviour. 
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Extreme policy test  
 
7. Extreme-policy test: when applying an extreme policy, does the model behave as it would 
in the real system?  
a) Playing with Contractions from Public Satisfaction  
One of the assumptions in the model is an initial value of Public Satisfaction, set to one. Also, 
a bottom limit of public satisfaction is placed; it cannot drop down to zero. The lower limit is 0.2 
(level of an indicated public satisfaction). To test the plausibility of model structure, I conducted an 
extreme condition test on this particular value. Firstly, I wanted to see what behaviour the model 
would generate in an initial absence of corruption, which has been already presented ad Equilibrium 
Case (Figures 16 and 17). Secondly, I run the model with previously explained simulation, where 
Public Satisfaction is absolutely ignored and not taken into account, so-called limitless corruption 
(Figure 42). Therefore, corruption is growing up because of the all three reinforcing loops.  Finally, 
the model is simulated with the same assumptions but I put active the contraction coming from Public 
Satisfaction – a balancing loop.  
 
Figure 42 Extreme policy test, a base line for policy test 1 
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As elaborated in the dissertation, this situation happened when new information are available 
and the general public all of the sudden reacts on what is happening. Alternatively, population was 
aware all the time, but their patience reached the maximum, and they strongly protest and limit the 
corrupt behaviour of public bureaucrats.  Just to recall the reader, in this test corruption is on (both 
the quantity and the price effect) and the limiting factor coming from Public Satisfaction is operating. 
Therefore, with the certain time delay forces the corrupt behaviour to descend (Figure 43). 
 
Figure 43 Extreme policy test, effects of the policy test 1 
 
The effect is that the level of Public Satisfaction will be dropping but not as much as without 
the policy in place. Population see the results of their action (the fraction of the unregistered rockets 
will be less), plus there is significant incremental in the effective area protected; therefore, the level 
does not drop to the bottom line. The clearer illustration of the extreme policy test can be seen in 
Figures 44 and 45, where comparative simulations were performed, as explained in the begin of this 
section. In recap, the blue line is representing the equilibrium case, the red line is the limitless 
corruption practice and the pink line is the behaviour over time with contractions coming from Public 
Satisfaction.  Figure 44 show that equilibrium is at the bottom level of the diagram, the red line is 
significantly higher than the line number 3 – where policy takes place. Therefore, direct public funds 
dispersion stabilise at the level of around 4.000.000 EUR/year which in not ideal, but still much better 
that uncontrolled corruption.  
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Figure 44 Extreme test policy 1 - public funds dispersion 
 
The significant impact of the policy, as would be expected in the real life, we can comprehend 
in Figure 45. The Effective area protected, from 0 hectares per year, when extreme corruption is in 
place could go to the maximum level of around 5.000.000 hectares per year, when there is no 
corruption. However, with motivating the people to be more aware and active in participating the 
political life, or to protest even, the Effective area protected would become constant on the level of 
1.300.000 hectares per year. The system tends to stabilise itself in the long run.  
 
Figure 45 Extreme test policy 1 - Effective area protected 
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b) Playing with Contractions from Public Satisfaction plus Effects of Public Funds Dispersion 
As expected, there were positive effects originated by including pressure from the general 
public, with regards to dissatisfaction with corruption practice about quantities bough and the price 
paid per rocket. Next, I will test the policy including the effect of Public Funds Dispersion. Namely, 
the population might be not happy or even furious when their crops are continuously damaged or 
destroyed by hail that could have been prevented. As in life, one thing leads to another, people are 
eager to know more and soon after the Effect of Public Satisfaction, so-called the Effect of Money 
Dispersion takes place. It manifests the disappointment of people connected with public funds 
dispersion in general. At that point, it is not only important if crops could have been better protected, 
but also if the public funds could have been used elsewhere (e.g., hospitals, schools, or safety).   
After the year 2020, we start seeing the effect of Public Satisfaction, triggered by direct public 
funds dispersion. The value of the Money Dispersion is 7.1231 million at that point, and only after it 
surpasses the Threshold value of 70 million (that is indeed higher than initially estimated because the 
price was increasing as well). After that value of Money Dispersion, the Effect of Money Dispersion 
starts happening. The effect is represented by a graphical function from zero to one; it is one until this 
point and then it begins to decline. In conclusion, in this test corruption is on (both the quantity and 
the price effect), the limiting factor coming from Public Satisfaction, and the factor from Public funds 
dispersion  all together are operating (see Figure 46). 
 
Figure 46 Extreme policy test, effects of the policy test 2 
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Because of this effect, overall Public Satisfaction is going down even more, as an additional 
force influence. Comparing with Figure 43, the Effective area protected start to increase considerably, 
because of the intensive public pressure on funds dispersion, and sounder control of the procurement 
process. The more positive effect we can also be seen in a decrease of new corruption cases, and 
consequently in a reduction of public funds dispersion.  
The comparative simulations of the extreme policy test were performed, and illustration of 
them is offered in Figures 47 and 48. As stated before, a comparison will be presented regards all the 
previous runs, plus the new green line, labelled with number 4 shows the results of the new policy.  
 
Figure 47 Extreme test policy 2 - Public Funds dispersion 
Public funds dispersion now decreases, in the long run, below the level of 4.000.000 
EUR/year. If the simulation period would be extended, there is a high probability that the level of 
misused public funds would approach the optimal level of 3.000.000 EUR/year (see Figure 47). 
However, it was not expected here that all the simulation results reach the ideal values; we rather 
expect to see that policies have reasonable performance and that they could approximately match the 
reality.  
129 
 
 
Figure 48 Extreme test policy 2 - Effective area protected 
The simulation generates behaviour according to our expectations, displayed in Figure 48 
regarding the Effective area protected. Arable land is increasingly covered and in 2054 in reaches the 
level of 2.500.000 hectares.  
  Even though it has not been feasible to test all possible scenarios, no surprise behaviour in 
the direction of trends have been observed. The scales of movements in trends are not always correct, 
but the direction of the observed is explainable and appears to be correct. The relationship thus seems 
to be correct in direction, but further work needs to be done on refining the values attached to the 
relationships.  
c) Playing with Price Control  
To check the behaviour of the price effect, as the first extreme condition I put value 0 for price 
effect. On that way, it is confirmed that no input of the corruption is included in the price structure, 
and in the stock of Public Funds Dispersion, as a final point. Therefore, the only quantity of the 
rockets procured contributed to the inflow of Public Funds Dispersion and the behaviour in 
comparison to the reference behaviour is also confirmed. Thus, the model once more confirmed to 
represent the real life business. The unregistered rocket price in the simulation model does not 
develop (see Figure 49), and explicitly it stays on the actual rocket price level of 200 EUR per piece.  
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Figure 49 Extreme test - Price Control Policy 
Compared with the previously presented extreme test policies, the Price control policy effect 
is the most significant one. In Figure 50 it is shown with the yellow line labelled with number 5 how 
substantial impacts on the occurrence of the new corruption cases restricted price policy has. First of 
all, it occurs several years later. Then, additions to cumulative corruption cases overshot at the level 
of around 5.000.000 EUR before it collapse, and finally stabilises around the level of 2.000.000 EUR. 
 
 
Figure 50 Extreme test restricted price effects on new corruption cases 
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Finally, in the figure below is shown the effect of the constricting price control policy on the 
effective area protected. The extreme policy test labelled with number 5 in Figure 51 shows clearly 
its superiority. Again, the effective area stayed protected maximum possible in the model, around 
4.000.000 hectares. In addition, it stays protected several years more than any previous simulation 
result. Also, it never drops below the level of 1.000.000 and that drop is only for a short period before 
the system does not finally take into consideration full effect of the balancing loops. Finally, it tends 
to stabilises on the highest level compared to all other runs. Namely, the effective area protected, in 
the long run, would stayed protected with approximately 3.500.000 hectares per year, if the strict 
policy control is in place (if the government bureaucrats are forced to pay 200 EUR per widget)   
 
 
Figure 51 Extreme test restricted price effects on the effective area protected 
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APPENDIX E: SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the time horizon selected is equal to 50 years (2004-2054) which is a 
period sufficiently long for showing how corruption is affected by a change in some important 
variables. Here below will be illustrated the simulation results of the full corruption model of this 
Public Service provider, where all the processes were taken into account simultaneously.  
The complete model comprises all the loops, including loop R2, which was not separately 
explained in the main body of the thesis. It is the reinforcing loop that shows when more and more 
area is being unprotected; we are going to do more and more ordering for the rockets70. This additional 
procurement is, in fact, happening in practice, when in the middle of hail season, the local 
governmental units are dedicating additional funds for the hail protection or even self-financing the 
rockets expenditures.  
 
Figure 52 BoT results with all the loops operating 
                                                          
70 The loop is running taking into account information from a graphical function. The area remaining unprotected is exact 
area originating from the simulation but variable of the relative area is expressed as a fraction of desired protected area. 
This relative area is another performance driver. With corruption practice, the relative area unprotected will be increasing. 
This relative area is between zero and one in graphical function, and the pressure will be from one to 1.3 since that it does 
not produce strong effect.  
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We clearly see in the figure above that as corruption practice increase (which has direct 
implication to the fraction of unregistered rockets, presented with the green line), the Rockets usage 
effectiveness decrease and reaches its lowest level around the year 2020. Consequently, the Effective 
area protected sharply drops in the respective period. However, it stabilises around 2.500.000 
hectares/year being protected in the long run.  
Logically, when the additions to the accumulative corruption reach its peak, approximately 
the year 2020, the Relative area remaining unprotected is on its highest level (see Figure 53). Labelled 
with the blue line, we see the most important indicator - Addition to Accumulative corruption. Here 
the dynamics of the model is clearly shown, the corruption is growing because of the reinforcing 
loops. For recalling, the main loop is R1 but also the others loops coming from the needed protected 
area, and the price are operating. Then, the additional forces such as Public Satisfaction, the loops 
deriving from public procurement, or ineffectiveness to protect shift the dominance. Addition to 
Accumulative corruption drops, but it drops and also stabilises because we do not completely 
expurgate the corruption.   
 
Figure 53 BoT other simulation results with all the loops operating 
 
Next, the behaviour over time of the several major stock is presented in Figure 54. One of the 
main characteristics of the stocks is that they accumulate, therefore, illustrated with lines numbered 
with one, two and three we see almost linear behaviour of cumulative corrupting cases and 
accumulated procurement, while the stock of the Rockets to be used have certain dynamic behaviour.  
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Until the year 2020, the pressure originating from the agriculture grows and reaches the level of 1.3, 
creating the feedback effect on the rockets needed. Plus, the effect influences directly the rockets 
purchase rate, and with the new procurements the pressure is dropping. This pressure decrease is also 
because the modelled corruption is reducing due to other balancing loops.  
 
Figure 54 BoT Simulation result of the full model operating - major stocks 
 
Although the counteractive loops certainly limit the behaviour and influence mental models 
of decision-makers, we are facing a situation that the inclination to corrupt further is still stronger that 
the limiting factors.  Also, the reinforcing loops (in particular R1) are stronger and are shifting the 
dominance of the simulation model. With corruption in the system, the price paid reaches and 
stabilises at the level of 390 EUR per widget, which means the direct loss of at least 90 EUR per 
widget if not more.  
The fact that the area remaining unprotected stabilises at the level of around 3.500.000 
hectares should be a strong indicator to the government decision makers to consider either 
implementation of suggested policies, or even consideration of the implementation of the new 
methodologies, such as anti-hail nets of using planes to seed the clouds. On that way, the Effective 
area protected could increase from the retrieved result of the simulation stabled on the level of around 
1.300.000 hectares.  
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Finally, the behaviour of different effects modelled and simulated in SD model are presented 
in Figure 55. Effect of Inclination to corrupt has “goal seeking” behaviour. Moreover, it does reach 
the level of one, meaning that the appetite for additional personal monetary gain raise with historical 
corruption practice (public bureaucrats get to be more greedy).  
 
 
Figure 55 BoT simulation results of different effects 
 
As per effect of public satisfaction to corruption, it is on the initial level in the first quarter of 
the simulated period. After this delay in perception of corruption, general public starts to be aware, 
then dissatisfied and finally begin putting some pressure on corruption practice in public procurement. 
That is the reason both fraction of unregistered usage of the rockets, and unregistered purchase rate 
in the begging have overshoot and collapse type of behaviour.  
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APPENDIX F: MODEL VARIABLES AND RELATED EQUATIONS 
 
Accumulated_Dispersion (t) = Accumulated_Dispersion (t - dt) + (Direct_Public_funds_dispersion) 
* dt 
INIT Accumulated_Dispersion = 0 
UNITS: Euros (EUR) 
INFLOWS: 
Direct_Public_funds_dispersion = Procurement_value-Real_rocket_price*Rockets_purchase_rate 
UNITS: EUR/yr 
Accumulated_Procurement (t) = Accumulated_Procurement (t - dt) + (Procurement_value) * dt 
INIT Accumulated_Procurement = 0 
UNITS: Euros (EUR) 
INFLOWS: 
Procurement_value = 
Standard_rocket_price*(rockets_purchase_rate+unregistered_rockets_repurchase_rate) 
UNITS: EUR/yr 
Cumulative_corruption_History_of_corrupt_cases (t) = 
Cumulative_corruption_History_of_corrupt_cases (t - dt) + (Additions_to_cumulative_corruption) 
* dt 
INIT Cumulative_corruption_History_of_corrupt_cases = 0 
UNITS: Euros (EUR) 
INFLOWS: 
Additions_to_cumulative_corruption = unregistered_rocket_price * 
Unregistered_rockets_repurchase_rate  
UNITS: EUR/yr 
Public_satisfaction (t) = Public_satisfaction (t - dt) + (Change_in_public_satisfaction) * dt 
INIT Public_satisfaction = Initial_public_satisfaction  
UNITS: Unitless 
INFLOWS: 
Change_in_public_satisfaction = (indicated_public_satisfaction - public_satisfaction) / 
Time_to_adjust_public_satisfaction  
UNITS: per year (1/yr) 
Rockets_to_be_used (t) = Rockets_to_be_used (t - dt) + (Rockets_purchase_rate + 
Unregistered_rockets_repurchase_rate - Rockets_usage_rate - Unregistered_rockets_usage) * dt 
INIT Rockets_to_be_used = 30000 
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UNITS: widgets (widget) 
INFLOWS: 
Rockets_purchase_rate = MIN (Rockets_purchase_rate_indicated_by_agriculture, 
Rockets_purchase_rate_indicated_by_budget)  
UNITS: widget/yr 
Unregistered_rockets_repurchase_rate = MIN (Unregistered_rockets_to_be_smuggled, 
unregistered_rockets_repurchase_rate_indicated_by_budget)  
UNITS: widget/yr 
OUTFLOWS: 
Rockets_usage_rate = rockets_to_be_used / rockets_usage_time - Unregistered_rockets_usage  
UNITS: widget/yr 
Unregistered_rockets_usage = rockets_to_be_used * 
Fraction_of_unregistered_used_rockets/Time_to_smuggle_rockets 
UNITS: widget/yr 
Unregistered_rockets_to_be_smuggled (t) = Unregistered_rockets_to_be_smuggled (t - dt) + 
(Unregistered_rockets_usage - Unregistered_rockets_repurchase_rate) * dt 
INIT Unregistered_rockets_to_be_smuggled = 3000 
UNITS: widgets (widget) 
INFLOWS: 
Unregistered_rockets_usage = rockets_to_be_used * 
Fraction_of_unregistered_used_rockets/Time_to_smuggle_rockets 
UNITS: widget/yr 
OUTFLOWS: 
Unregistered_rockets_repurchase_rate = MIN (Unregistered_rockets_to_be_smuggled, 
unregistered_rockets_repurchase_rate_indicated_by_budget)  
UNITS: widget/yr 
Area_coverage_by_a_rocket = 160 
UNITS: hectare/widget 
Corruption_Switch = 0 
UNITS: Unitless 
Cumulative_corruption_threshold = 3600000 
UNITS: Euros (EUR) 
Desired_protected_land = 4800000 
UNITS: hectares/year 
Dispersion_Switch = 0 
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UNITS: Unitless 
Effective_area_protected = Rockets_usage_rate * Area_coverage_by_a_rocket  
UNITS: hectares/year 
Effective_pressure = Pressure_Switch*Pressure_to_buy_more_rockets+ (1-Pressure_Switch) 
UNITS: Unitless 
Effect_from_cumulative_corruption_on_inclination_to_corrupt = GRAPH 
(Relative_cumulative_corruption) 
(0.00, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (2.00, 2.35), (3.00, 3.48), (4.00, 4.78), (5.00, 6.13), (6.00, 7.43), (7.00, 
8.56), (8.00, 9.42), (9.00, 9.91), (10.0, 9.91) 
UNITS: Unitless 
Effect_of_money_dispersion_on_public_satisfaction = GRAPH 
(Accumulated_dispersion/Threshold_money_dispersion*Dispersion_Switch + (1-
Dispersion_Switch)) 
(0.00, 1.00), (0.25, 1.00), (0.5, 1.00), (0.75, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (1.25, 1.00), (1.50, 0.981), (1.75, 
0.921), (2.00, 0.876), (2.25, 0.832), (2.50, 0.721), (2.75, 0.511), (3.00, 0.267) 
UNITS: Unitless 
Effect_of_public_satisfaction_on_inclination_to_corruption = GRAPH (public_satisfaction / 
Threshold_public_satisfaction *Public_Satisfaction_SWITCH + (1-Public_Satisfaction_SWITCH)) 
(0.00, 0.1), (0.0833, 0.1), (0.167, 0.1), (0.25, 0.5), (0.333, 0.7), (0.417, 0.8), (0.5, 0.9), (0.583, 1.00), 
(0.667, 1.00), (0.75, 1.00), (0.833, 1.00), (0.917, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00) 
UNITS: Unitless 
Effect_on_unregistered_price = GRAPH (Relative_cumulative_corruption) 
(0.00, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (2.00, 1.01), (3.00, 1.03), (4.00, 1.07), (5.00, 1.12), (6.00, 1.17), (7.00, 
1.23), (8.00, 1.28), (9.00, 1.30), (10.0, 1.30) 
UNITS: Unitless 
Fraction_of_unregistered_used_rockets = (Initial_inclination_to_corruption * 
Effect_of_public_satisfaction_on_inclination_to_corruption * 
effect_from_cumulative_corruption_on_inclination_to_corrupt)*Corruption_Switch 
UNITS: Unitless 
Indicated_public_satisfaction = MAX (Initial_public_satisfaction * 
relative_rockets_usage_effectiveness*Effect_of_money_dispersion_on_public_satisfaction, 0.2)  
UNITS: Unitless 
Initial_inclination_to_corruption = 0.1 
UNITS: Unitless 
Initial_public_satisfaction = 1 
UNITS: Unitless 
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Min_acceptance_rockets_usage_effectivenss = 1 
UNITS: Unitless 
Pressure_Switch = 0 
UNITS: Unitless 
Pressure_to_buy_more_rockets = GRAPH (Relative_Area_remaining_unprotected) 
(0.00, 1.00), (0.1, 1.00), (0.2, 1.00), (0.3, 1.00), (0.4, 1.04), (0.5, 1.06), (0.6, 1.13), (0.7, 1.16), (0.8, 
1.30), (0.9, 1.30), (1.00, 1.30) 
UNITS: widget/hectare 
Price_Control = 0 
UNITS: Unitless 
Price_Switch = 0 
UNITS: Unitless 
Public_Satisfaction_SWITCH = 0 
UNITS: Unitless 
Real_rocket_price = 200 
UNITS: Euros/widget 
Relative_Area_remaining_unprotected = (Desired_protected_land-
effective_area_protected)/Desired_protected_land 
UNITS: Unitless 
Relative_cumulative_corruption = Cumulative_corruption_History_of_corrupt_cases / 
Cumulative_corruption_threshold  
UNITS: Unitless 
Relative_rockets_usage_effectiveness = GRAPH (Rockets_usage_effectiveness / 
Min_acceptance_rockets_usage_effectivenss) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.125, 0.0702), (0.25, 0.221), (0.375, 0.359), (0.5, 0.546), (0.625, 0.741), (0.75, 
0.928), (0.875, 1.00), (1.00, 1.00), (1.13, 1.00), (1.25, 1.00), (1.38, 1.00), (1.50, 1.00) 
UNITS: Unitless 
Rockets_purchase_budget = 6000000 
UNITS: EUR/year 
Rockets_purchase_rate_indicated_by_agriculture = (Desired_protected_land)/ 
Area_coverage_by_a_rocket *Effective_pressure 
UNITS: widget/yr 
Rockets_purchase_rate_indicated_by_budget = MAX ((Rockets_purchase_budget - 
Unregistered_rockets_repurchase_rate * unregistered_rocket_price) / Real_rocket_price, 0)  
UNITS: widget/yr 
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Rockets_usage_effectiveness = Effective_area_protected / Desired_protected_land  
UNITS: Unitless 
Rockets_usage_time = 1 
UNITS: years (yr) 
Standard_rocket_price = 300 
UNITS: Euros/widget 
Threshold_money_dispersion = 70000000 
UNITS: Euros (EUR) 
Threshold_public_satisfaction = 1 
UNITS: Unitless 
Time_to_adjust_public_satisfaction = 5 
UNITS: years (yr) 
Time_to_repurchase = 1 
UNITS: years (yr) 
Time_to_smuggle = 1 
UNITS: years (yr) 
Unregistered_rockets_repurchase_rate_indicated_by_budget = Rockets_purchase_budget / 
unregistered_rocket_price  
UNITS: widget/yr 
Unregistered_rocket_price = 
(Standard_rocket_price*effect_on_unregistered_price*Price_Switch+Standard_rocket_price*(1-
Price_Switch))*(1-Price_Control) + Price_Control*200 
UNITS: Euros/widget 
